This study concerns the evaluation of alternative pricing strategies involving options on feed grains futures contracts during the period of 1973-1986. To predict the option premiums that would have occurred at various points in this time period, the study did research on market premiums of options on corn futures contracts from March 1, 1985 until December 31, 1985. The research showed that market premiums conformed closely to the premiums estimated by Black model of options pricing. The generalized stochastic dominance with absolute risk aversion function intervals is applied in the study in order to evaluate the strategies. The results showed that under different risk preferences, (DARA and CARA), the commodity options strategies dominate the cash sale strategy, but do not dominate the hedging by selling futures contract strategy. Options may provide alternatives for feed grains producers and traders. Put (call) options provided protection from losses resulting from falling (raising) cash price and may somtimes raise average income/margin of feed grain producers and traders.

In January, 1986, Portugal became a part of the European Community. Although this will have many beneficial effects on Portugal's industrial sector, the agricultural sector will be negatively impacted by the regulations under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) due to take affect in 1996. The Entre Douro e Minho (EDM) region, in particular, will be hard hit by the CAP regulations. Modeling of the EDM suggests that farm operators can offset many of the negative impacts through increases in farm investment and farm size. However, legislation in both the credit and land markets hinder this process. This study analyzes the rental-market legislation in light of tenancy theory. The analysis suggests that changes in the method of calculating maximum rent along with changes in the security of tenure provisions will stimulate the rental markets and lead to the desired increases in farm investment and farm size.

by Fan-sing Hung. / Bibliography: leaves 41-42 / Thesis (M.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1982

by Lam Kwok Wa, Dennis. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1989. / Bibliograpy: leaves 70-71.

This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first chapter, I investigate the effect of long-term income shocks that affect only one side of the marriage market in India. The asymmetric shock is due to two factors - (1) a jobs-based affirmative action program that affects the occupations and wages of a group of castes that were historically against, with a strict upper age limit on eligibility and, (2) a social norm that determines which member works outside the household. The program results in a differential positive income shock for young men in the treated group. The income shock is found to affect the marriage market in several ways. First, there is no effect on the marriage rate of treated men. However, conditional on marriage, treated men pair up with spouses that have higher educational attainment, are taller, and have a higher BMI. They are also more likely to marry outside their own community. Second, treated women are overall less likely to marry, and their choice of spouse is unaffected conditional on marriage. Finally, controlling for observables, treated husbands are found to have greater decision making power within the households that are formed. There is no significant effect for treated wives. A structural model of the marriage market based on Choo and Siow (2006) is used to investigate the aggregate marital welfare effects of the policy. The estimates find that up to 80% of the benefit of the affirmative action policy accrues to men within the treated group. These findings suggest that (1) a larger share of the welfare gains from affirmative action policies accrue to the household member that actually receives them, and (2) that the marriage market is one mechanism through which the distribution operates, in addition to the intra-household bargaining process that is standard in the literature. In the second chapter (joint with Ashna Arora, Rakesh Banerjee and Siddharth Hari), we study the political economy of public service delivery. Local governments in developing countries play a crucial role in the provision of local public goods and the functioning of social welfare programs. This chapter investigates the relationship between the size of elected local government councils and public service delivery. We use a natural experiment from India, where the number of politicians at the village level is an increasing, discontinuous function of village population. We set up a regression discontinuity design to study the impact of a larger elected council on the targeting of welfare schemes as well as the allocation of private benefits by politicians to themselves. We find that larger councils improve access to a large scale workfare program, especially for traditionally disadvantaged communities. We also find that increasing the number of council members increases appropriation of private benefits by the council head but not by ordinary members. These results have implications for policy design. In the third chapter (joint with Ritam Chaurey), we investigate the relative effects of manager supervision on different types of labor. Across a large cross section of firms, we find that managers spend more time in supervisory roles when a larger share of contract labor is employed. This finding is then established causally using a differencein- differences approach, exploiting variations in labor regulations across Indian states and rainfall-driven demand shocks. Using the causal approach, we find that (i) there is no significant change in total management input in response to short run demand shocks, suggesting that the institutional factors of the market for managers has larger search/firing costs than that for industrial workers. However, (ii) managers are observed to spend more time in supervisory roles when relatively more contract labor is employed in response to demand shocks. Contrary to the literature, we also find that (iii) there is no productivity change when there is an influx of contract labor. These findings suggest that there are complementarities between manager supervision and contract labor input, even relative to other types of labor, and that the manner of deployment of management capital within a firm is endogenous, conditional on the total amount.These findings could account for one of the features that is widely observed in empirical studies - firms in regions with strong employee protections have lower steady state productivities.

Abstracting from potential incentive costs, both theoretical and applied research on contracts and contract choice suggest that bundling multiple contracts may be optimal. With the abundance of risk and uncertainty, especially among low-income environments that are often ill-prepared, the design and commercial success of contracts for mitigating these risks remain crucial. This dissertation brings together applied microeconomic theory along with careful empirical analyses to study three issues about contracts and risks, with implications for the functioning of markets, financial inclusion, unequal impacts of climate extremes and the design of insurance and financial contracts aim at mitigating environmental risks that confront society. Chapter 2 studies the potential moral hazard and welfare consequences of interlinking credit with insurance market contracts, establishing that interlinking these two markets not only increases insurance demand, but induces large moral hazard effects in develop- ing countries. Chapter 3 examines environmental risks and their differential impacts on human capital investments, specifically, documenting how Harmattan-induced “Meningitis” outbreaks potentially explain the observed gender gaps in educational attainments in Niger. Chapter 4 evaluates the impact of informal risk-sharing schemes on the adoption of “index” insurance contracts aimed at mitigating climate risks among low-income societies. Two com- peting forces are identified to show that informal network schemes have ambiguous effect on the demand for formal index insurance, which provides novel explanations for two empirical puzzles about index contracts along with an experimental evidence from rural India. The third project connects the first two via contracts and environmental risks, respectively.

Chau Tak Wai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-100). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Pioneering Work --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Collective Household Consumption --- p.8 / Chapter 2.3 --- Household Production --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4 --- Tests between Unitary Model and Collective Model --- p.17 / Chapter 2.5 --- Distribution Factors in Collective Labor Supply --- p.19 / Chapter 2.6 --- Identification of Spousal Leisure --- p.20 / Chapter 2.7 --- Plan of the thesis --- p.21 / Chapter 3 --- Data Descriptions --- p.23 / Chapter 3.1 --- Data Collection Process --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2 --- Data Characteristics --- p.24 / Chapter 4 --- Individual Wage and Labor Supply Equations --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1 --- Individual Wage Equations --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2 --- Individual Labor Supply Equation --- p.36 / Chapter 4.3 --- Conclusion --- p.43 / Chapter 5 --- Collective Household Labor Supply --- p.46 / Chapter 5.1 --- Theoretical Model --- p.47 / Chapter 5.2 --- Parametric Specification --- p.53 / Chapter 5.3 --- Data and Empirical Results --- p.56 / Chapter 5.4 --- Conclusion --- p.64 / Chapter 6 --- Identification of Independent and Spousal Leisure --- p.66 / Chapter 6.1 --- Theoretical Model --- p.67 / Chapter 6.2 --- Parametric Specification --- p.78 / Chapter 6.3 --- Data and Empirical Results --- p.82 / Chapter 6.4 --- Conclusion --- p.91 / Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.93 / References --- p.96 / Tables and Appendices --- p.101

對於無線網絡運營商來說，聯合優化其經濟和技術方面的決策以獲得商業成功正在變得越來越重要。一個運營商的決策可能包括對技術的選取和部署時間的把握、資源投資的數量，以及針對他所提供的服務的定價。考慮到這些決策彼此之間有關聯，我們需要對這些決策進行聯合優化，特別當運營商面對有限的資源、不成熟的技術和市場競爭時，該優化會變得困難。本論文綜合考慮兩類網絡中的這些因素。注意到在所有絨線技術中蜂窩網絡擁有最廣泛的市場佔有率，我們先研究蜂窩網路中的經濟學。然後我們研究認知無線電中的經濟學，考慮到該技術代表了未來無線技術發展的一個主要趨勢。 / 在本論文的第一部分，我們研究一個蜂窩網絡運營商在經濟和技術方面的決策，涉及到網路升級、服務分類和社交應用。首先，我們提出了一套博弈論模型來研究互相競爭的運營商從目前3G 蜂窩技術升級為未來一代(4G) 技術的部署時間。我們的分析指出運營商通常會選擇不同的升級時間以避免激烈的競爭。升級早的運營商在市場佔有方面有優勢，而升級晚的運營商只需承擔少量的升級成本並將面對一個更成熟的4G市場。其次，我們研究一個運營商是否有經濟動機在他已有的蜂窩基站C(macrocell)的基礎上再鋪設家庭基站(femtocell)。家庭基站能解決4G 網絡中室內用戶信號接收差的問題，但是該服務會佔用運營商原本就有限的頻譜資源。最後，我們嘗試去理解一個運營商該如何為異構的智慧手機用戶提供經濟刺激來鼓勵他們協助社交應用(比如，信息收集和分布式計算)的建立。在信息不對稱的情況下，我們設計了有效的激勵機制來根據智慧手機用戶不同的隱私損失、使用能耗和計算效率來提供獎勵。 / 在本論文的第二部分，我們在認知其在線電網絡中研究投資的便利性、頻譜感知的不確定性和安全性將如何影響一個次級(沒有頻譜執照的)運營商的決策。首先，我們研究一個可以通過動態頻譜租賞和頻譜感知兩種靈活方式來獲得絨線頻譜的次級運營商。我們聯合研究該運營商的投資選擇和對底層用戶的定價策略來使其利益最優。與動態頻譜租貸相比，頻譜感知不穩定但是能節約投資成本。其次，我們考慮一個包含兩個運營商的競爭市場，並研究他們之間在投資和定價方面的競爭。我們指出該競爭會給底層用戶帶來顯著好處而給運營商們帶來的收益總損失不會超過25% 。最後，一個運營商可能想利用多用戶合作式頻譜感知技術來提高感知的精確性但是該技術容易遭受數據偽造攻擊(data falsification attacks) 。我們通過合適的攻擊檢測和懲罰設計了有效的機制以防範攻擊。 / It is becoming increasingly important for wireless network operators to jointly optimize economic and technological decisions for business success. An operator's decisions may involve the choices and timings of technology adoptions, the amount of resources to invest, and the prices to set for his services. These decisions are coupled with each other and need to be jointly optimized, and such optimization will be challenging when the operator faces limited resources, immature technology, and market competition. This thesis focuses on such issues in two types of networks. We first study the economics of cellular networks, which have the largest market occupancy among all wireless technologies. We then look at the economics of cognitive radios networks, which represent one of the main development trends for wireless technologies in the near future. / In the first part of this thesis, we study a cellular operator's economic and technological decisions related to network upgrade, service differentiation, and social applications. First, we develop a game theoretic model for studying competitive operators' upgrade timing decisions from the existing 3G cellular technology to the next generation (4G) technology. Our analysis shows that operators often select different upgrade times to avoid severe competition. The operator upgrading earlier has advantage in increasing market share, while the one upgrading later benefit from decreased upgrade cost and a more mature 4G market. Second, we study an operator's economic incentive of deploying femtocell service on top of his existing macrocell service. The femtocell can resolve the issue of poor signal receptions for indoor users in 4G networks, but need to occupy the operator's limited spectrum resources. Finally, we try to understand how an operator can provide economic incentives for the heterogeneous smartphone users to collaborate in social applications (e.g., data acquisition and distributed computing). Under asymmetric information, we design effcient incentive mechanisms that reward smartphone users according to their different sensitivities to privacy loss, energy and computing effciencies. / In the second part of this thesis, we study how investment flexibility, sensing uncertainty, and sensing security in cognitive radio networks affect a secondary (unlicensed) operator's decisions. First, we study a secondary operator, who can flexibly acquire wireless spectrum through both dynamic spectrum leasing and spectrum sensing. We jointly study an operator's investment choices and pricing strategy to the end users to maximize his profit. Compared to spectrum leasing, spectrum sensing is unreliable but has a small cost. Second, we consider a competitive market with two operators, and study their competition in both investment and pricing. We show that end users significantly benefit from such market competition, and the operators' total profit loss due to competition is lower bounded by 25% of the maximum. Finally, an operator may want to deploy collaborative spectrum sensing to improve sensing accuracy, but this approach is vulnerable to data falsification attacks. We design effective attack prevention mechanisms through proper attack detection and punishment. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Duan, Lingjie. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 310-336). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.vi / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Economics of Cellular Networks --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2 --- Economic Viability of Cognitive Radio Networks --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- Outline and Contributions --- p.9 / Chapter I --- Economics of Cellular Networks --- p.13 / Chapter 2 --- Economics of 4G Cellular Network Upgrade --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Related Work --- p.18 / Chapter 2.2 --- System Model --- p.19 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Value of Cellular Networks --- p.19 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- User Churn during Upgrade from 3G to 4G Services --- p.23 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Operators' Revenues and Upgrade Costs --- p.25 / Chapter 2.3 --- 4G Monopoly Market --- p.26 / Chapter 2.4 --- 4G Competition Market: Duopoly Model and Game Formulation --- p.32 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Operators' Long-term Profits --- p.34 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Duopoly Upgrade Game --- p.37 / Chapter 2.5 --- 4G Competition Market: No Inter-network switching --- p.39 / Chapter 2.6 --- 4G Competition Market: Practical Inter-network Switching Rate --- p.40 / Chapter 2.7 --- Summary --- p.50 / Chapter 2.8 --- Appendix --- p.50 / Chapter 2.8.1 --- Proof Sketch of Theorem 2 --- p.50 / Chapter 2.8.2 --- Proof Sketch of Theorem 3 --- p.52 / Chapter 3 --- Economics of Femtocell Service Provision --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Related Work --- p.60 / Chapter 3.2 --- Benchmark: Macrocell Service Only --- p.62 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Users' Bandwidth Demands in Stage II --- p.63 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Operator's Pricing in Stage I --- p.65 / Chapter 3.3 --- Provision of Femtocell Service --- p.67 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Users' Service Choices and Bandwidth Demands in Stage II --- p.71 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Operator's Spectrum Allocations and Pricing in Stage I --- p.73 / Chapter 3.4 --- Impact of Users' Reservation Payoffs --- p.75 / Chapter 3.5 --- Impact of Femtocell Frequency Reuse --- p.82 / Chapter 3.6 --- Impact of Femtocell Operational Cost --- p.84 / Chapter 3.7 --- Impact of Limited Femtocell Coverage --- p.89 / Chapter 3.8 --- Summary --- p.95 / Chapter 4 --- Smartphone Collaboration on Social Applications --- p.96 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.96 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Related Work --- p.100 / Chapter 4.2 --- Collaboration on Data Acquisition Application --- p.102 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- System Model of Data Acquisition --- p.102 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Collaboration under Complete Information --- p.105 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Collaboration under Symmetrically Incomplete Information --- p.106 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Collaboration under Asymmetrically Incomplete Information --- p.109 / Chapter 4.3 --- Collaboration on Distributed Computing Application --- p.117 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- System Model on Distributed Computation --- p.117 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Contractual Interactions between Client and Users --- p.119 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Contract Design under Complete Information --- p.120 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Client's Contract Design under Asymmetrically Incomplete Information --- p.123 / Chapter 4.4 --- Summary --- p.133 / Chapter 4.5 --- Appendix --- p.134 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- Discussion of Model (4.2) in Different Information Scenarios --- p.134 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- Proof of Theorem 9 --- p.135 / Chapter 4.5.3 --- Proof of No Collaboration and Pure Strategy NE in Theorem 10 --- p.136 / Chapter 4.5.4 --- Proof of Existence And Uniqueness of Equilibrium Threshold in Theorem 12 --- p.137 / Chapter 4.5.5 --- Proof of Theorem 13 --- p.139 / Chapter 4.5.6 --- Proof of Theorem 14 --- p.141 / Chapter 4.5.7 --- The proof of Proposition 1 --- p.142 / Chapter 4.5.8 --- Approximated Algorithm to Solve Problem (4.23) --- p.146 / Chapter II --- Economics of Cognitive Radio Networks --- p.149 / Chapter 5 --- Monopoly Spectrum Market Using Cognitive Radios --- p.150 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.150 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Related Work --- p.155 / Chapter 5.2 --- Network Model --- p.157 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Background on Spectrum Sensing and Leasing --- p.157 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Notations and Assumptions --- p.159 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- A Stackelberg Game --- p.163 / Chapter 5.3 --- Backward Induction of the Four-stage Game --- p.164 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Spectrum Allocation in Stage IV --- p.165 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Optimal Pricing Strategy in Stage III --- p.167 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Optimal Leasing Strategy in Stage II --- p.171 / Chapter 5.3.4 --- Optimal Sensing Strategy in Stage I --- p.173 / Chapter 5.4 --- Equilibrium Summary and Numerical Results --- p.179 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Robustness of the Observations --- p.185 / Chapter 5.5 --- The Impact of Spectrum Sensing Uncertainty --- p.187 / Chapter 5.6 --- Learning the Distribution of Sensing Realization Factor α --- p.191 / Chapter 5.6.1 --- Performance Evaluation of Machine Learning --- p.193 / Chapter 5.7 --- Summary --- p.195 / Chapter 5.8 --- Appendix --- p.196 / Chapter 5.8.1 --- Proof of Theorem 18 --- p.196 / Chapter 5.8.2 --- Proof of Theorem 19 --- p.197 / Chapter 5.8.3 --- Supplementary Proof of Theorem 21 --- p.198 / Chapter 6 --- Competitive Spectrum Market Using Cognitive Radios --- p.204 / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.204 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Related Work --- p.209 / Chapter 6.2 --- Network and Game Model --- p.211 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Users' and Operators' Models --- p.213 / Chapter 6.3 --- Backward Induction of the Three-Stage Game --- p.215 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- Spectrum Allocation in Stage III --- p.217 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Operators' Pricing Competition in Stage II --- p.221 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- Operators' Leasing Strategies in Stage I --- p.226 / Chapter 6.4 --- Equilibrium Summary --- p.231 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- How Network Dynamics Affect Equilibrium Decisions --- p.234 / Chapter 6.5 --- Equilibrium Analysis under General SNR Regime --- p.237 / Chapter 6.6 --- Impact of Operator Competition --- p.239 / Chapter 6.6.1 --- Maximum Profit in the Coordinated Case --- p.239 / Chapter 6.6.2 --- Impact of Competition on Operators' Profits --- p.242 / Chapter 6.6.3 --- Impact of Competition on Users' Payoffs --- p.244 / Chapter 6.7 --- Summary --- p.245 / Chapter 6.8 --- Appendix --- p.246 / Chapter 6.8.1 --- Proof of Theorem 24 --- p.246 / Chapter 6.8.2 --- Proof of Theorem 25 --- p.250 / Chapter 7 --- Security Protection in Collaborative Spectrum Sensing --- p.256 / Chapter 7.1 --- Introduction --- p.256 / Chapter 7.1.1 --- Related Work --- p.260 / Chapter 7.2 --- Preliminary --- p.261 / Chapter 7.2.1 --- CRN Model and Assumptions --- p.261 / Chapter 7.2.2 --- Spectrum Sensing and Opportunistic Access Model --- p.264 / Chapter 7.2.3 --- Collision Penalty --- p.265 / Chapter 7.2.4 --- Decision Fusion Rule --- p.266 / Chapter 7.3 --- Attackers' Behaviors Without Punishment --- p.268 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- All SUs sense the channel idle --- p.270 / Chapter 7.3.2 --- All honest SUs sense the channel idle, but some attacker(s) senses the channel busy --- p.270 / Chapter 7.3.3 --- Some honest SUs sense the channel busy --- p.272 / Chapter 7.4 --- Attack-Prevention Mechanism: A Direct Punishment --- p.273 / Chapter 7.5 --- Attack-Prevention Mechanism: An Indirect Punishment --- p.277 / Chapter 7.6 --- Summary --- p.286 / Chapter 7.7 --- Appendix --- p.286 / Chapter 7.7.1 --- Relaxation of Assumptions A1 and A3 --- p.286 / Chapter 7.7.2 --- Attack Prevention in Case:AT of Section 7.5 --- p.293 / Chapter 7.7.3 --- Proof of Lemma 6 --- p.297 / Chapter 8 --- Conclusion and Future Work --- p.299 / Chapter 8.1 --- Conclusion --- p.299 / Chapter 8.2 --- Extensions of 4G Network Upgrade in Chapter 2 --- p.302 / Chapter 8.3 --- Extensions of Femtocell Service Provision in Chapter 3 --- p.303 / Chapter 8.4 --- Extensions of Smartphone Collaboration on Social Applications in Chapter 4 --- p.304 / Chapter 8.5 --- Extensions of Monopoly Spectrum Market in Chapter 5 --- p.305 / Chapter 8.6 --- Extensions of Competitive Spectrum Market in Chapter 6 --- p.306 / Chapter 8.7 --- Extensions of Security Protection in Collaborative Spectrum Sensing in Chapter 7 --- p.308 / Bibliography --- p.310

One out of every three workers on the planet is employed in agriculture. Consequently, major changes to the way that agriculture is practiced will have outsized effects on society. This dissertation focuses on technology and climate change, two key variables that will exert increasing influence on the rural sector and broader patterns of economic development. While the implementation of new technologies to increase crop productivity will be essential in satisfying rising global food demand, shifts in global climate may undermine those productivity gains in terms of both agronomic and labor market output. Chapter 2 exploits a quasi-experimental research design to assess how crop productivity gains resulting from a new technology affect gender wage disparities in agricultural labor markets. Using high-frequency temperature data merged with nationally representative time use data from Indian workers, Chapter 3 estimates a labor supply response function to temperature shocks that informs projected labor market effects under climate change. Chapter 4 demonstrates that a very parsimonious statistical model offers accurate out-of-sample predictions and provides a discussion on modeling weather's role in agriculture and the current state of adaptation research.

Hui, Pik Hung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 23-27). / Abstract also in Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.I / 摘要 --- p.II / ACKNOWLEDGMENT --- p.Ill / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.IV / LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES --- p.V / Chapter 1. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1 . --- EVOLVEMENT OF MODERN SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES --- p.4 / Chapter 2.2. --- THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT AND ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE --- p.5 / Chapter 2.3. --- BIDDING FOR THE GAMES --- p.7 / Chapter 2.4. --- FINANCING THE OLYMPIC GAMES --- p.8 / Chapter 3. --- WILL OLYMPICS GENERATE ECONOMIC GROWTH? --- p.10 / Chapter 3.1. --- DATA AND MODEL --- p.10 / Chapter 3.2. --- ESTIMATION RESULTS --- p.13 / Chapter 3.3. --- MODEL EXTENSION --- p.16 / Chapter 4. --- HOW TO WIN THE OLYMPICS --- p.18 / Chapter 4.1. --- MODEL AND DATA --- p.19 / Chapter 4.2. --- ESTIMATION RESULTS --- p.20 / Chapter 5. --- CONCLUSION --- p.21 / Chapter 6. --- REFERENCES --- p.23 / Chapter 7. --- APPENDIX --- p.55