Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Florida, 2005. / Title from title page of source document. Document formatted into pages; contains 286 pages. Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Harold Trinkunas, Archie Barrett. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-73, 75-79). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "June 2002." AD-A405 054. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Policymakers and scholars are deeply divided on the purpose and effectiveness of sanctions, but recent work has given attention to the strategy of using positive sanctions or incentives. This study investigates the conditions under which the U.S. uses a punitive sanctions policy (indicated by all negative sanctions) or an engagement policy (indicated by a mix of positive and negative sanctions). Applying materialist (Schelling, 1960, 1966; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Axelrod, 1984; Fearon, 1994) and sociological (Schoppa, 1999; Wendt, 2000; Lebow, 2007) bargaining perspectives, this study will consider factors such as the level of target threat, the target's nuclear weapons capability, the extent of international support for sanctions, and the relationship between the U.S. and target. This study analyzes the case studies of the U.S-led sanctions against Iraq (1990-2003), North Korea (1993-present), and Libya (1972-2006). / by Jason Levitt. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2010. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2010. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 305-324).

The relationship between South Africa and the United States was, historically, quite mutually profitable. The South African government regarded the United States as an ally in the world and sought continued friendship with them. The United States was mildly critical of the South African system of apartheid, but they, however, viewed South Africa as an ally. During the 1980's the relationship between the two countries became strained as the anti-apartheid voices in the United States grew louder and louder. The movement sought to end the atrocities of apartheid and change American foreign policy toward South Africa. The strongest diplomatic means available to them was imposing economic sanctions on South Africa in an attempt to force political change in the country. The anti-apartheid movement lobbied extensively gaining support among the American pub1ic and eventually the U.S. Congress. The sanctions campaign culminated in the enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986. Prior to the enactment of the CAAA the South African government and its allies launched their own campaign in an attempt to combat the imposition of sanctions. Lobbying played a key role in the process for those on both sides of the issue. For the anti- apartheid movement, lobbying was effective on the American public and the U.S Congress. For the South African government lobbying was effective on the conservative right wing and President Reagan and his administration.

This dissertation studies topics in the areas of international finance. In the first chapter, the Unintended Consequences of Financial Sanctions, I study the economic impact of the U.S. financial sanctions against Russian companies in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. I show that this sanctions program, which primarily cut off access to international financial markets for sanctioned firms, produced an unintended consequence of strengthening the sanctions targets relative to their unsanctioned peers. Specifically, while the policy successfully halted new international borrowings by sanctioned companies, the spillover impact of the policy resulted in these targets shrinking in size by less than unsanctioned Russian firms. To explain these results, I argue that sanctions led to a reallocation of domestic resources in favor of sanctioned firms. In particular, sanctions precipitated capital crowding out and credit rationing, causing unsanctioned domestic borrowers to suffer more from the policy. The research highlights the limitation of "targeted sanctions" and also sheds light more broadly on the impact of international financial integration and capital flows on firm size dynamics. In the second chapter, Quantitative Analysis of Sanctions Policy, I theoretically and quantitatively analyze the impact of financial sanctions on the target firms and the target economy. I introduce a heterogeneous firm model with segmented capital markets and financial frictions in which sanctions against international borrowers led to capital crowding out and credit rationing among domestic borrowers. I calibrate the model to the 2014 U.S. financial sanctions episode and use the model to estimate the impact of sanctions on firm sizes and macroeconomic variables. I also evaluate policy alternatives and identify factors for policymakers to consider in calibrating future sanctions programs. I conclude by discussing the 2022 sanctions program and inferring broader policy implications. In the third chapter, the Impact of Monetary Policy on the Specialness of U.S. Treasuries, I estimate the causal effect of monetary policy on the specialness of U.S. Treasuries. Quantifying this specialness by the U.S. Treasury Premium, which is the difference in the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries and that of government bonds of other developed countries measured as the deviation from covered interest parity between government bond yields, I find that monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve increases the specialness of U.S. Treasuries primarily by increasing the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries. I also find that the magnitude of the impact varies across the term structure and across countries, especially after the Global Financial Crisis, and U.S. and foreign monetary policy shocks have asymmetric impacts on the specialness of U.S. Treasuries. These results provide evidence for the unique ability of the Federal Reserve to affect the specialness of U.S. Treasuries by altering the supply of dollar safe assets.

This paper surveys U.S. foreign policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the American administration reacted to the Soviet Union's interventions in Afghanistan and Poland and to its planned gas pipeline to Western Europe. Chapter I outlines the origins of the pipeline project; Chapters II and III describe U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviets during the Carter and Reagan administrations. Chapter IV focuses on the economic sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union by the United States and their failure to block or delay the pipeline, and Chapter V stresses the inability of economic sanctions-- in this and other instances--to achieve political ends.