Policymakers and scholars are deeply divided on the purpose and effectiveness of sanctions, but recent work has given attention to the strategy of using positive sanctions or incentives. This study investigates the conditions under which the U.S. uses a punitive sanctions policy (indicated by all negative sanctions) or an engagement policy (indicated by a mix of positive and negative sanctions). Applying materialist (Schelling, 1960, 1966; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Axelrod, 1984; Fearon, 1994) and sociological (Schoppa, 1999; Wendt, 2000; Lebow, 2007) bargaining perspectives, this study will consider factors such as the level of target threat, the target's nuclear weapons capability, the extent of international support for sanctions, and the relationship between the U.S. and target. This study analyzes the case studies of the U.S-led sanctions against Iraq (1990-2003), North Korea (1993-present), and Libya (1972-2006). / by Jason Levitt. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2010. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2010. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Under the competences of the European Union's intergovernmentally controlled Justice and Home Affairs policy, counter-terrorist co-operation and co-ordination of efforts have progressed at a rapid pace following the 11 September attacks on the USA. Given, however, that Europe has experienced entrenched terrorist campaigns for the past three decades, one could be forgiven for questioning, in light of the unique co-operative position of Western Europe, why it has taken so long for the membership of the EU to reach a common definition of terrorism. Also why is it that even now, the EU has failed to develop a common policy against terrorism? Political explanations are traditional responses to such questions, but there is a risk of underestimating the complexities of the European Project, and the effect which this has had on so many areas of transnational co-operation. By focusing therefore on the often-overlooked role played by European integration on counter-terrorist co-operation, in addition to empirical analysis of the efficiency of the co-operative structures, we place ourselves in a more beneficial position to understand the current situation. Intergovernmentalism, the controlling force of JHA co-operation, we find is not mutually exclusive to law-enforcement co-operation. Two theories tested for supranational influences - neo-functionalism and federalism - have also played their part, from the early 1960s onwards, in facilitating co-operation. The historical emphasis is important, because co-operation prior to the regulation of much of this area within the EU, following the Treaties of Economic Union, provides us with ample material for analysis and greater insight into the JHA process and counter-terrorism. Intergovernmentalism has helped push counter-terrorist co-operation along, but equally we find that it now serves as a hindrance in completing its development because of its in-built tendency to retain subsidiarity. Counter terrorist co-operation, we conclude, need not be restricted to intergovernmental control any longer.

The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations. As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO’s campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other. The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present). The dissertation concludes with an examination of how the Balance Theory may provide insights for the formulation of counter-terrorism strategy against Al Qaeda in the current "War on Terror".

The main focus of this thesis is to examine Israel's counter terrorism methods and their consequences and to debate the effectiveness of Israel's counter terrorism policy. By stimulating a debate on these issues it is possible to identify a more effective counter terrorism policy. In order to examine Israel's counter terrorism methods, their consequences and effectiveness, it is necessary to first explore the overall concepts of terrorism and counter terrorism. Then, because counter terrorism policy is hard to evaluate if one does not look at the context which surrounds it, this thesis will therefore explore some aspects of Israeli security history which has and continues to influence its counter terrorism policy. Furthermore, this thesis will provide an introduction to the general development of Palestinian resistance movements which will include a scrutiny of Hamas. This thesis has selected some of Israel's counter terrorism methods, and will be examining the width and depth of these methods as well as their consequences on the Palestinian society in general and on Hamas in particular. In seeking to answer the more general question about the effectiveness of Israel's counter terrorism policy the thesis will evaluate this aspect by relying on qualitative and quantitative indicators. This thesis will show that Israeli counter terrorism methods do reduce the capacity of Hamas and as such has prevented certain attacks or incapacitated Hamas' military wing for a limited time; they have, however, had a limited effect in the long run. It will be shown that these methods have consequences far beyond reducing the terrorist organisation capacity, which deepen the root causes for terrorism and increase the motivation to continue the resistance.

Electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes was largely unregulated prior to 1978. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (hereinafter "FISA") was enacted to implement a judicial authorization process for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance that would effectively balance competing needs for national security and civil liberty under the Fourth Amendment. This study examines the evolution of FISA and its effectiveness under the Fourth Amendment, as assessed by federal reviewing courts and scholars since the statute's enactment. The study concludes that the FISA electronic surveillance authorization process has been effective in providing a constitutional mechanism to obtain foreign intelligence information.

This study researches the varying threats that emanate from terrorists who carry their activity into the online arena. It examines several elements of this threat, including virtual to virtual attacks and threats to critical infrastructure that can be traced to online sources. It then reports on the methods that terrorists employ in using information technology such as the internet for propaganda and other communication purposes. It discusses how the United States government has responded to these problems, and concludes with recommendations for best practices.

The contemporary threat of terrorism has changed the ways in which government and the public view the world. Unlike the existential threat from nation states in previous centuries, today, government and the public spend much of their effort looking for the inward threat. Brought about by high profile events such as 9/11, 7/7, and 3/11, and exacerbated by globalisation, hyper-connected social spheres, and the media, the threats from within are reinforced daily. In the UK, government has taken bold steps to foment public safety and public security but has also been criticised by some who argue that government actions have labelled Muslims as the ‘suspect other'. This thesis explores the counter-terrorism environment in London at the community/government interface, how the Metropolitan Police Service and London Fire Brigade deliver counter-terrorism policy, and how individuals and groups are reacting. It specifically explores the realities of the lived experience of those who make up London's ‘suspect community' and whether or not counter-terrorism policy can be linked to further marginalisation, radicalism, and extremism. By engaging with those that range from London's Metropolitan Police Service's Counterterrorism Command (SO15) to those that make up the radical fringe, an ethnographic portrait is developed. Through that ethnographic portrait the ‘ground truth' and complexities of the lived experience are made clear and add significant contrast to the aseptic policy environment.