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Thesis (M.A.)--Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1999. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 37-03, page: 0787. Adviser: Roger Koppl.

Trois modèles de gouvernance dominent actuellement la recherche consacrée aux politiques environnementales : un modèle libéral, qui se fonde sur les capacités autorégulatrices du marché et les vertus d'innovations techniques du régime de la libre-entreprise ; un modèle utilitariste, qui repose sur le calcul économique d'un planificateur central, intervenant par des taxes et des quotas pour corriger les défaillances de marché ; un dernier modèle enfin de démocratie délibérative, qui s'appuie sur les capacités de gestion commune des ressources par les populations, par le biais de mécanismes de délibération. Ont été ainsi principalement appliquées jusqu'à présent à la question écologique les théories de la justice (le libéralisme, l'utilitarisme et la démocratie délibérative) et les solutions institutionnelles (le marché, l'administration, le forum) héritées des Lumières. Cet ouvrage se propose d'examiner si ces modèles modernes de gouvernance sont vraiment adaptés à la spécificité du défi du développement durable. En retrouvant les axiomes fondateurs de chacun de ces modes de gouvernance, pour les confronter ensuite aux problèmes spécifiques soulevés par la question écologique, il démontre que les paradigmes politiques modernes s'avèrent peu adaptés aux dimensions spécifiques introduites par la problématique du développement durable, à savoir la préservation de l'environnement naturel et le souci des générations futures, dans un contexte d'économie industrielle mondialisée. Ce travail conduit alors à mettre en lumière les points fondamentaux d'achoppement concernant l'efficacité potentielle des stratégies de gouvernance imaginées jusqu'à présent en se référant à ces doctrines et prépare la voie à des modèles alternatifs de gouvernance. / Three models of governance are actually dominating the contemporary research devoted to the environmental policies: a liberal model, which is founded on the auto regulatory processes of the market and the capacities of technical progress fostered by the regime of free enterprise ; an utilitarian model, which is based on the economic calculation of a social engineer, intervening on markets by enforcing taxes and quotas; a deliberative democracy model, which lies on the ability of common pool management by the populations, using deliberative mechanisms. Thus, what have been applied by now to the ecological stake are the theories of justice (liberalism, utilitarianism and deliberative democracy) and the institutions framework (the market, the central administration, the forum), coming for the Enlightenments. This works propose to examine if these models of governance are really adapted to the peculiarity of the sustainable development objective. We have first restored the fundamental axioms of these technics of government, in order to confront them, in a second time, to the specific problems raised by the ecological crisis. We show that those political paradigms have great difficulties to integrate the particular dimensions of sustainability, that is the preservation of the natural environment, the equity toward future generations, in our present context of a global industrial economy. This thesis exhibit the main concrete obstacle to the efficiency of the strategies of governance imagined so far and prepare us to create ones.

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What does it mean to act morally? This research is part of normative ethics, which studies the formation of moral judgments and whether such judgments are able to motivate people to act in accordance with them. The gap between the dimension of the common good and the private life of each citizen has led to questioning whether there are moral norms whose content may constitute, per se, a sufficient reason for action. More specifically, when a norm, collectively chosen and shared, succeeds in self-imposing without any intervention of external authority.The interest for this theme arises from the urgency of defining conditions under which a group of interdependent agents, can organize themselves to obtain long-term collective benefits, find in collective action, a motivation, a commitment and a responsibility that decrease the temptation of opportunistic behaviour in distribution contexts. The main goal of this inquiry is trying to propose a normative solution of a problem of distributive justice in the following terms of: how can a norm generate a motivational causal force that induces compliance with what it asserts, in contexts where selfish rather than prosocial behaviour would be expected? This problem, approached from different perspectives, economic, psychological, sociological, also requires a philosophical reflection. Within this framework, the issue of compliance might be reread as a motivational problem: thus, the aim of this thesis would be to try to clarify the relationship between an impartial ethical point of view and what kind of real motivations people have to act in accordance with some specific ethical principles – namely, what reasons people have for acting in alignment with principles of distributive justice. Thus, the dissertation provides evidence from laboratory experiments that supports John Rawls’s Kantian constructivism as a method that allows subjects to evaluate different distribution criteria in production situations, making them reach an agreement on the liberal egalitarian principle. The Rawlsian method would rationally justify the ex-ante collective choice on that principle and it gives real motivations to comply ex-post, as it provides the conditions for creating a rationally justified joint commitment.

Economics plays a significant role in decision-making in contemporary western societies, but its role is increasingly questioned. A recurring topic among the challenges raised by critics is that economics as a discipline lacks sufficient pluralism. That is, it fails to enable, encourage, and respect the use of different ontologies, methodologies, theories, and/or schools of thought to study economic reality. Has this been a productive critique? Does talk about pluralism help identify genuine problems in the discipline? Pluralism in economics could draw support from the current consensus in philosophy that pluralism in science is a good thing. I argue, however, that the claim that economic research is insufficiently pluralist is unlikely to convince economists who believe economics is already pluralist enough and that it does not offer unambiguous recommendations for change. This is because there are too many legitimate ways to interpret how pluralism maps to practice. There are numerous variables that pluralist ideals might focus on-the things that they seek multiple rather than one of-and different interpretations of how many of those variables economics has in practice. Yet, as I go on to argue, this does not mean that talk of pluralism is entirely beside the point, since the reasons pluralists offer for their ideals do help to identify genuine problems in economics. The social epistemic strategies that arguments for pluralism recommend point us to three concrete issues in the way economic research is organised: gender imbalances, a steep internal hierarchy, and a dismissive attitude to outsiders. I show that economic research could be more progressive, representative of the interests of those in society, accepted, and legitimate and less likely to fall into bias if the discipline alleviated its gender imbalances, if it were less hierarchical, and if it had a healthier relationship with outsiders. In chapter 1, I outline the debate about pluralism in economics and explain how my thesis utilises a novel approach to social epistemology to offer a way out of the impasse in which that the debate presently resides. In chapter 2, I explain the different philosophical arguments for pluralism in science and categorise them using the variables they focus on and the reasons they give for pluralism. In chapter 3, I argue that interpreting pluralism as a particular arrangement of variables for economics to attain does not lead to unambiguous recommendations for change because it leaves too much open. Yet, I go on to argue, in chapter 4, that drawing on the reasons for pluralism can provide a set of heuristics for piecemeal evaluations of the social epistemic practices in economics. In chapters 5, 6, and 7, I apply these heuristics to economics. I provide evidence that [a] women are outnumbered in economics and face an adverse environment in the discipline, that [b] economics is steeply hierarchical, and that [c] economists form an in-group that assumes superiority and frequently dismisses outside voices. I argue that these three features of economic research block avenues for productive forms of feedback (mechanisms that help to challenge, justify, and refine scientific knowledge), block the interests of certain perspectives being heard, and block public scrutiny of the decisions made by economists.