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<p> This dissertation contains three essays that study monetary transfers. </p><p> The first chapter studies the effect of a politician's vote in the legislature on monetary contributions that the politician receives from interest groups after the vote. I first develop models to show that interest groups have an incentive to make monetary contributions to politicians not only before politicians vote but also after they vote. Then I find evidence that voting in favor of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008 has increased the amount of monetary contributions that the members of the U.S. House of Representatives receive from the interest groups in the financial sector after the passage of the EESA. </p><p> The second chapter studies the effect of a politician's ideological strength on monetary contributions that the politician receives from interest groups. If interest groups care mainly about current policy outcomes, they will make monetary contributions to ideologically neutral politicians who are often pivotal voters in the legislature. However, if interest groups care more about future policy outcomes, they have an incentive to make monetary contributions to politicians who share similar policy preferences, i.e. liberal (conservative) interest groups will make contributions to liberal (conservative, respectively) politicians, to help those politicians win the election and continue to serve in the legislature. I first develop a model incorporating these two opposing effects. Then I find evidence that ideologically neutral politicians receive more monetary contributions from interest groups. This result suggests that interest groups are primarily motivated by the short-run incentive. </p><p> The third chapter studies monetary transfers from parents to children. Unlike most other taxes, the estate tax is levied only on a very small number of very large estates. There is an exemption level of the tax below which there is no tax liability. This threshold divides taxpayers sharply into two groups: those who paid the estate tax when their parent passed away and those who did not. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find evidence that those who have experience of paying the estate tax at their parent's death are more actively engaged in estate tax avoidance behavior for their children. </p>

<p> My thesis study examines the economic and sociological factors associated with political revolutions in order to create a predictive model. I do this by using statistical methods with nation level panel data collected from public domain sources. I anticipate being able to create a predictive model that provides a probability forecast of a country undergoing political revolution within a two year time-frame.</p>

<p> This dissertation consists of three essays on information aggregation in committees and its application. </p><p> The first essay analyzes how the distribution of votes affects the accuracy of group decisions. In a weighted voting system, votes are typically assigned based on the criteria that are unrelated to the voters' ability to make a correct judgment. I introduce an information aggregation model in which voters are identical except for voting shares. If the information is free, the optimal weight distribution is equal weighting. When acquiring information is costly, by contrast, I show that the accuracy of group decisions may be higher under some weighted majority rules than under unweighted majority rule. I characterize the equilibrium and find the optimal weight distribution to maximize the accuracy of group decisions. Asymmetric weight distributions may be optimal when the cost of improving signal is moderately high. </p><p> The second essay analyzes how intergenerational family transfers can be sustained. Why are generous transfers from the younger to the older generations made in some families and not in others? My paper argues that differences in intergenerational dependence are due to variation in community networks. My analysis of the sustainability of intergenerational transfers posits game theoretical models of overlapping generations in which breadwinners make transfers to their parents and children. A novel feature of my models is that there is a local community that may supply information about its members' past behaviors. I demonstrate that an efficient level of intergenerational transfers can be sustained if neighbors "gossip" about each other. </p><p> The third essay, co-authored with Fuhito Kojima, investigates a jury decision when hung juries and retrials are possible. When jurors in subsequent trials know that previous trials resulted in hung juries, informative voting can be an equilibrium if and only if the accuracy of signals for innocence and guilt are exactly identical. Moreover, if jurors are informed of numerical split of votes in previous trials, informative voting is not an equilibrium regardless of signal accuracy.</p>