The philosophical aim of this dissertation is to determine the best social arrangements for bearing and rearing children in the context of emerging reproductive technologies. A novel feature of my account is that it follows the form of a thought-experiment—imagining a world where artificial womb technology offers a nonphysical alternative to pregnancy. In chapter one, I consider whether gestational motherhood ought to be abolished and replaced with a state-run institution of artificial wombs. While the latter arrangement would admittedly promote equality of opportunity among fetuses, I argue that it conflicts with the fundamental rights of gestational mothers. In chapter two, I consider whether the state should impose licensing regulations on parents and procreators to ensure children are provided adequate care. I offer a series of objections to licensing by challenging the analogical argument between parents and professionals, as well as the assumption that parents’ incompetence is responsible for the harms done to children. I then defend a less invasive alternative to licensing, suggesting that the focus of reform should be on ensuring adults acquire obligations to provide childcare voluntarily. However, limited reproductive options pose a problem insofar as a woman who finds herself unintentionally pregnant may have no choice but to continue providing gestational care. Thus, in chapter three, I argue that artificial wombs ought to be a widely-available reproductive option such that women can opt-out of pregnancy. On my account, childbearing should be performed by willing mothers, and childrearing should be performed by willing parents. In chapter four, I shift focus to determine what children are morally owed. More specifically, I defend a new interpretation of the child’s right to an open future that pays special attention to the challenges of parenting in a morally imperfect world.

Ectogenesis -- literally creation outside the womb -- is a word coined by British geneticist J.B.S. Haldane in 1923 as he provocatively predicted future scientific frontiers. Fast-moving assisted reproductive technologies assure us that ectogenesis is no longer the fantastical creation of futuristic writers. Instead, it is likely to manifest in one of three ways. It may be a quiet byproduct of the lessening gap between in vitro procedures and the use of sophisticated neonatal environments. It may arise from endometrial tissue ladders grown into artificial wombs. Or, it may be as bizarre as that envisioned in Brave New World where there is an intentional effort to create an artificial womb from which the development of a human being may be scrutinized and monitored from start to finish. / The morass of hasty and reckless legislation passed in various countries to deal with the creation and termination of embryonic life shows that few are prepared to deal with exigencies of ectogenesis when it arrives insidiously or abruptly. Moreover, Eastern thought and traditions will conflict with Western ideology with respect to the beginning and maintenance of human life. This thesis suggests that the language, structure and philosophy of the United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act is well crafted and should be considered as a world-wide paradigm. This thesis also suggests that ectogenesis will mandate that the interests of the developing fetus override notions of reproductive autonomy.

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