This study examines ideological discourse in contemporary Egypt. It investigates a number of discourses in terms of the meanings they generate and the role or function they play in the maintenance or transformation of relations of power in society. The analysis is guided by a semiotic view of ideology, that is, ideology understood as a system of representation which operates through language and other signifying practices. / Central to our understanding of the effects of discourse on power relations is the conception of representation as an autonomous level of 'reality' in relation to other levels. The implication of such a conception is that meanings produced in discourse are not to be validated or adequated against the 'real', but are to be analyzed in terms of their interrelations with socio-economic and political structures, and in terms of their appropriation by social forces in positions of struggle. In this sense, it is relevant to look at the rules which govern the formation of the systems of representation; rules which are specific to the discursive formations. Within the framework of this study, the key mechanisms operative in discourse and ideology are validation and interpellation. Throughout the project, attention is paid to the role these mechanisms play in the production of subjects and the construction of subject positions. That is, particular emphasis is put on how ideological interpellations construct or constitute positions of resistance, struggle, domination, acquiesence which are validated or rejected by the receiver. This returns to the process of appropriation of meanings and the functionalization of discourse. / The analysis proceeds through an examination of the narrative and discursive structures of the various discourses under study. It is also concerned with the narrative programs which underlie the discourses as an act or intervention, focusing on the positions of speakers and receivers, the modalization of subject positions and their inscription in relations of power. In treating the Egyptian case, discourses from two socio-political conjunctures are analyzed: one a juncture of populist rupture marked by the consolidation of the revolutionary program, the other a juncture of socio-economic disintegration. / The study examines how the conjunctures manifest themselves in discourse. In this way, an attempt is made to see how the particular conjunctures are marked in the functionalization of certain terms and the imposition of certain ideologemes. The work seeks to demonstrate how this is linked to the appropriation of discourse by social forces. With regard to the first juncture, the discursive and narrative structures which underlie the nationalist discourse are identified. Within the later conjuncture, these structures are revealed in relation to the Islamist discourse, while an analysis of the secular discourse is also carried out. The general objective is to situate the process of the construction of meanings in relation to the socio-economic and political conditions which exist in the particular junctures of discourse production.

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This thesis argues that a strong correlation exists between Islamic militancy and socio-economic and political conditions. Under 'normal' everyday conditions, passive elements of the Islamic community, the mutadayyin, dominate, but in times of crisis or challenge, it is the militants, the isl amiyyin, who react against the state, its institutions and its employees. The Egypt of Anwar al-S ad at (1970-1981) will be used in order to test this hypothesis. The everyday conditions in which the people live, work and survive will be examined in order to establish the constant, the invariable. These conditions include the sectarian strife between Muslims and Copts, especially in Upper Egypt; overpopulation; the lack of housing; the failure of education; the debt burden; the cost of war with Israel, and the 'brain-drain' from Egypt to the oil-rich countries. These aspects encouraged an increase in religiosity, both Muslim and Coptic. Egypt however was also faced with three periods of crisis during S ad at's presidency, namely the October War (1973), the 'open-door' economic policy of infit ah (April 1974+)/the Bread Riots (January 1977), and the peace process with Israel (November 1977+). Shortly after each period, the militants reacted against the state. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

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Islamic resurgent movements have striven to accomplish an Islamic way of life off their own version of an Islamic state, struggling against the socio-economic and political objectives of governments. While autocratic governments have used religion to ensure their legitimacy, Islamic resurgence has professed to have as its objective the establishment of an Islamic dispensation. Resurgent movements aspire towards a greater unity of religion and politics, domains that cannot be separated. Religion provides them with a framework for the transformation. However, factors responsible for the anger and alienation of the Islamic resurgence are still disputed. Their modus operandi is often frowned upon, overshadowing their driving forces. Therefore the purpose of this study is to determine the true motivations, objectives and modus operandi of Islamic resurgence in Egypt. The role of Islam in their motivation, aim and modus operandi is scrutinised together with other crucial factors which need to be investigated. While ideology determines the broad political and socio-economic paradigm, religion serves as the guiding principle for their implementation. The application of religious principles, in turn, is determined by personalities and circumstances. While Islam has a set of generally agreed upon specifications, interpretations have different deviations in every historical context. As a matter of fact, the unique factors pertaining to time and place are experienced during each political period in the history of Egypt influenced resurgence. This study contends that the motivational factors for the development of Islamic resurgent movements during the 20th and 21st century may be said to be a response to Westernisation brought about by external sources, government and civil society or the West itself. On the other hand, animosity towards a foreign culture seems to be more a reaction against the manner in which the foreign culture has been imposed and not to be directed in the first place against those that represent the foreign culture. Thus, it is not so much aimed against the Western world as against the manner in which the political and socio-economic conditions in the Muslim world have been allowed to develop, albeit with Western help. Even though some argue that the objectives of resurgent movements of an Islamic dispensation are idealistic, not attainable and a threat to the West, this manner of arguing misses the point. The thesis maintains that, in the absence of an inclusive and acceptable political and socio-economic system, an external system has been adopted, and this has added to alienation. As a result both the government and the system have been rejected. Positively stated, the objectives of Islamic resurgent movements seem to have been to achieve an inclusive political system within the frame of reference of the Islamic religion. The aim was not so much to achieve an Islamic state, as a dispensation in which the stipulations of Islam were central aspects. For resurgent movements, Islam had to be more than tokenism providing legitimacy to leaders. In achieving their objectives a variety of modi operandi have been applied, ranging from moderate measures to calling for total-Jihad. A multifaceted society has also determined the differences in modus operandi and objectives of the Islamic resurgent movements. The approaches of Islamic resurgent movements are diverse and they do not have a common agenda or modus operandi. To analyse the objectives of Islamic resurgent movements according to their violent manifestations only is to misunderstand their arguments. These movements are usually seeking a system inclusive of Islam simply because it is their way of life, their culture. Radical and moderate reactions have been determined by convictions based on different diagnoses of the problems at hand as well as different diagnoses of how to deal with the problems within the appropriate spheres of politics, religion and socio-economics. Because Islam provides unity to man, resurgent movements will always seek their objectives of getting rid of political and socio-economic exclusion and replacing it with a system inclusive of all. However, Muslims will have to find a way of achieving their aims and objectives in a modern world. In this process, the outside world can facilitate, but not dictate. Unless future governmental changes in Egypt provide a political and socially integrated society and have promised goods and services delivered, resurgence will continue to appear in various formats. At the same time, generating a workable system would have to take place in relative isolation without coercion from the West for political gain or political dominance. / Prof. J.F.J. van Rensburg

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This thesis is an internal organisational history of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt between 1973 and 2013. Based on memoires of Brotherhood leaders, as well as oral history interviews conducted in 2012 and 2013 with different rank-and-file members and dissidents, the thesis situates the life trajectories and personal experiences of these individuals within a larger national and international context. The purpose is to provide a historical account that is able to explain the reasons for the Brotherhood's cataclysmic failure of the summer of 2013. In accounting for the fall, my key argument centres on the internal rivalry between two political factions representing different "schools of thought", or visions, about the kind of organisation the Brotherhood was supposed to be. Representatives of the respective coalitions competed against each other over hegemony and organisational resources, basing their claims on contrasting intellectual traditions, political cultures and organisational values that had co-existed, sometimes uncomfortably, within the ranks of the Society since the times of Hasan al-Banna. The adherents of the "Qutbist" school of thought put forward the idea of a closed, pyramid-shaped and exclusive organisation, while those closer to 'Omar al-Tilmisani's model aspired to a reformed Society that was open to outsiders, and where internal progression was based on meritocracy, transparency and some form of democracy. I argue that it is through the holistic analysis of the complex dynamics between internal organisational politics, the use of ideology, and the personal experiences of key organisational members, that we are best able to grasp the Brotherhood's failed experience in governance in 2013.

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