This thesis investigates the topic of elected members of the United Nations Security Council by addressing the research question under what conditions is an elected member of the United Nations Security Council likely to influence decisions in maintaining international peace and security? In investigating the explanatory power of the theoretical argument ‘representative legitimacy’, which suggests that elected members making their proposed actions legitimate by anchoring these with the broader UN membership are more likely to face less opposition and thus increase the likelihood for influence, it tests the hypothesis an elected member anchoring its proposed actions with the broader UN membership is more likely to influence the UNSC decisions. The study is conducted through a structured, focused comparison of three elected members, New Zealand 2015-2016, Japan 2016-2017, and Sweden 2017-2018, and their influence in decisions made on the Syrian conflict. Chosen on a most similar case-design with dependent variable variation, and analyzed through resolutions, meeting records and statements, the empirics give partial support for the hypothesis. The results suggest that representative legitimacy can be a condition under which an elected member is likely to influence the Council, however, one case suggests that representative legitimacy is not necessary.