Este trabalho visa contribuir para a compreensão dos incentivos que permeiam os agentes envolvidos no financiamento de campanhas eleitorais. Por meio de evidências empíricas reunidas a partir do contexto do financiamento de campanhas brasileiras, a compra de ações de empresas de capital aberto por parte do governo é analisada como possível mecanismo de compensação do financiamento de campanhas eleitorais. A análise é feita comparando a participação do governo no capital de sociedades anônimas doadoras e não doadoras de recursos para financiamento de campanhas usando o método de Diferenças em Diferenças. Por meio dessa metodologia, identificou-se, particularmente na eleição de 2010, um efeito positivo do financiamento eleitoral sobre o investimento do governo em ações de empresas financiadoras. / This study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating the incentives that pervade agents involved in electoral campaign funding. By means of empirical evidence gathered from the Brazilian electoral financing context, government investment in stocks is analyzed as a possible compensation mechanism for electoral campaign financing. The study investigates government investments in stocks comparing corporations that have supported electoral campaigns and those that have not, by applying the Differences-in-Differences method. By this method, a positive effect of electoral financing on government investment in companies stocks was identified in the 2010 electoral cycle. However, the empirical tests suggest no effect in 2002 and 2006 elections.

Este trabalho visa contribuir para a compreensão dos incentivos que permeiam os agentes envolvidos no financiamento de campanhas eleitorais. Por meio de evidências empíricas reunidas a partir do contexto do financiamento de campanhas brasileiras, a compra de ações de empresas de capital aberto por parte do governo é analisada como possível mecanismo de compensação do financiamento de campanhas eleitorais. A análise é feita comparando a participação do governo no capital de sociedades anônimas doadoras e não doadoras de recursos para financiamento de campanhas usando o método de Diferenças em Diferenças. Por meio dessa metodologia, identificou-se, particularmente na eleição de 2010, um efeito positivo do financiamento eleitoral sobre o investimento do governo em ações de empresas financiadoras. / This study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating the incentives that pervade agents involved in electoral campaign funding. By means of empirical evidence gathered from the Brazilian electoral financing context, government investment in stocks is analyzed as a possible compensation mechanism for electoral campaign financing. The study investigates government investments in stocks comparing corporations that have supported electoral campaigns and those that have not, by applying the Differences-in-Differences method. By this method, a positive effect of electoral financing on government investment in companies stocks was identified in the 2010 electoral cycle. However, the empirical tests suggest no effect in 2002 and 2006 elections.

Despite the fact that the issue has been discussed for several decades, there are still no rules in Sweden mandating political parties and candidates to disclose received donations. Because of this lack of transparency, Sweden is not fulfilling some of its international obligations and has fallen behind in the international trend to increase the transparency of election campaign finance. The lack of disclosure rules in Sweden has led to extensive criticism, most notably from the Council of Europe´s group of states against corruption, Greco, who criticized Sweden in light of the guidelines on the subject from the Council of Europe. At this writing, a new proposal for disclosure rules is being prepared at the Department of Justice, DoJ. The proposal is to be presented in spring 2013. For the time being, the only thing that exists regarding transparency of election finance in Sweden is an agreement from 2000, struck between some of the parties in parliament, to voluntarily disclose some of their received donations. In 2004 a government report proposed implementing disclosure rules. The proposal received extensive criticism from the reviewing bodies regarding its compliance with the rights protection in the Swedish Instrument of Government, RF. RF provides absolute protection against the government forcing individuals to disclose their opinions in political matters and absolute protection against the government keeping records of individuals' political opinions. Since these rights are absolute, they can be restricted only by constitutional amendment. It is uncertain if disclosure rules can be considered infringements under these absolute provisions, but even if they are considered infringements, it is likely that the disclosure provisions can be designed so as not to violate the RF absolute protections. Furthermore, RF provides relative protection of the freedom of expression and association. Disclosure rules would probably not infringe the freedom of expression but are likely to be considered infringements of the freedom of association. Restrictions of the freedom of association can only be implemented in the order specified in RF and since the order for restricting the freedom of association is very rigid, it is unlikely that such a restriction would be allowed under the current RF. The DoJ has expressed that the pending proposal will not include a proposal for a constitutional amendment. For Sweden to fulfill its international obligations in regards of transparency in campaign finance, more extensive disclosure rules must be implemented than those included in the agreement between some parties in parliament and those included in the 2004 proposal. The DoJ has expressed, however, that the pending proposal will be modeled upon both the voluntary agreement and the 2004 proposal. It is therefore not entirely unlikely that the pending proposal will be either illegal under the constitution or not far reaching enough, or both. / I Sverige saknas regler som kräver av politiska partier och kandidater att redovisa mottagna donationer (redovisningskrav). Detta trots att frågan diskuterats under flera decennier. Frånvaron av redovisningskrav innebär att Sverige inte uppfyller vissa av sina internationella åtaganden och att Sverige halkat efter i den mycket tydliga internationella trenden att öka transparensen kring valkampanjernas finansiering. Frånvaron har även lett till omfattande kritik, framförallt från Europarådets grupp mot korruption, Greco, som kritiserat bristen utifrån Europarådets riktlinjer i ämnet. I skrivande stund bereds vid Justitiedepartementet ett förslag till redovisningskrav som kommer att presenteras under våren 2013. Tills vidare är det enda som finns avseende transparens i valkampanjfinansieringen en överenskommelse från 2000, mellan några av partierna i Riksdagen om att frivilligt redovisa vissa mottagna bidrag. År 2004 föreslog en offentlig utredning införandet av redovisningskrav. Förslaget mötte omfattande kritik från remissinstanserna gällande dess förenlighet med regeringsformens, RF:s, rättighetsskydd. RF innehåller ett absolut skydd mot att det allmänna tvingar en enskild att tillkännage sin politiska åskådning och ett absolut skydd mot att det allmänna registrerar en enskilds politiska åskådning. Eftersom dessa skydd är absoluta kan de endast inskränkas genom grundlags-ändring. Det är osäkert om redovisningskrav kan anses vara inskränkningar av dessa absoluta skydd. Om redovisningskrav är inskränkningar av dessa absoluta rättigheter torde det ändock vara möjligt att utforma kraven så att de är förenliga med skydden. RF innehåller även relativa skydd för yttrandefrihet och föreningsfrihet. Redovisningskrav skulle förmodligen inte vara en inskränkning av RF:s skydd för yttrandefriheten men troligtvis vara en inskränkning av RF:s skydd för föreningsfrihet. Detta innebär att inskränkningen endast får göras enligt i RF stadgad ordning. Eftersom möjligheterna att inskränka föreningsfriheten enligt RF är mycket små är det tveksamt om en sådan inskränkning är möjlig att införa utan grundlagsändring. Justitiedepartementet har dock uttryckt att det nya förslaget inte kommer att inkludera något förslag till grundlagsändring. För att Sverige ska uppfylla sina internationella åtaganden avseende öppenhet i valfinansieringen måste mer långtgående redovisningskrav införas än de som ingår i den frivilliga överenskommelsen och som föreslogs av utredningen 2004. Justitiedepartementet har dock uttryckt att just utredningen från 2004 och den frivilliga överenskommelsen ska ligga till grund för de nya redovisningskraven. Det är alltså inte helt osannolikt att det kommande förslaget till redovisningskrav kommer att vara antingen oförenlig med regeringsformen eller inte tillräckligt långtgående, eller både och