Este trabalho visa contribuir para a compreensão dos incentivos que permeiam os agentes envolvidos no financiamento de campanhas eleitorais. Por meio de evidências empíricas reunidas a partir do contexto do financiamento de campanhas brasileiras, a compra de ações de empresas de capital aberto por parte do governo é analisada como possível mecanismo de compensação do financiamento de campanhas eleitorais. A análise é feita comparando a participação do governo no capital de sociedades anônimas doadoras e não doadoras de recursos para financiamento de campanhas usando o método de Diferenças em Diferenças. Por meio dessa metodologia, identificou-se, particularmente na eleição de 2010, um efeito positivo do financiamento eleitoral sobre o investimento do governo em ações de empresas financiadoras. / This study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating the incentives that pervade agents involved in electoral campaign funding. By means of empirical evidence gathered from the Brazilian electoral financing context, government investment in stocks is analyzed as a possible compensation mechanism for electoral campaign financing. The study investigates government investments in stocks comparing corporations that have supported electoral campaigns and those that have not, by applying the Differences-in-Differences method. By this method, a positive effect of electoral financing on government investment in companies stocks was identified in the 2010 electoral cycle. However, the empirical tests suggest no effect in 2002 and 2006 elections.

Este trabalho visa contribuir para a compreensão dos incentivos que permeiam os agentes envolvidos no financiamento de campanhas eleitorais. Por meio de evidências empíricas reunidas a partir do contexto do financiamento de campanhas brasileiras, a compra de ações de empresas de capital aberto por parte do governo é analisada como possível mecanismo de compensação do financiamento de campanhas eleitorais. A análise é feita comparando a participação do governo no capital de sociedades anônimas doadoras e não doadoras de recursos para financiamento de campanhas usando o método de Diferenças em Diferenças. Por meio dessa metodologia, identificou-se, particularmente na eleição de 2010, um efeito positivo do financiamento eleitoral sobre o investimento do governo em ações de empresas financiadoras. / This study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating the incentives that pervade agents involved in electoral campaign funding. By means of empirical evidence gathered from the Brazilian electoral financing context, government investment in stocks is analyzed as a possible compensation mechanism for electoral campaign financing. The study investigates government investments in stocks comparing corporations that have supported electoral campaigns and those that have not, by applying the Differences-in-Differences method. By this method, a positive effect of electoral financing on government investment in companies stocks was identified in the 2010 electoral cycle. However, the empirical tests suggest no effect in 2002 and 2006 elections.

In this research I analyse how the existence of regulations that allow private funding of election campaigns have created opportunities for crime. Three specific questions are addressed here: 1. Do electoral donations increase political corruption? 2. Why do companies give electoral donations? 3. How are electoral donors compensated? To address these questions, I adopted a nested analysis. This sequential, mixed method brings together the strengths of both regression analysis and case study research, while conducting a validity check—triangulation—by convergence of results via different methods and theoretical approaches. I first conducted a cross-national comparison of 78 countries; then, I conducted a survey of 302 private companies in Colombia; and finally, I documented one case that described how campaign contributions affect the political decision-making process. The main conclusion of this research is that electoral law creates opportunities for crime, because it legalizes the entrance of interested money into politics, disqualifies donors as perpetrators, and introduces regulations with null or limited deterrent effect on the delivery of undue reciprocities. Indeed, I demonstrated that electoral financing is used as a legal bribery by private corporations. The legal character of this political instrument is perverted when undue compensation is delivered to donors. This is not a crime with a single perpetrator; rather, donors and incumbents are equally involved. However, donors are protected by electoral law, because the money delivered as corrupt incentive is classified as legal. This suggests that the law is being used as a mechanism that neutralizes donors as perpetrators. This perspective points to the manipulative use of electoral law, or creative compliance, as the term is used by McBarnet (2006).