Este trabalho tem por propósito central investigar as razões da instabilidade ministerial no Segundo Reinado (1840-1889), bem como o papel desempenhado, na produção desse fenômeno, pelas relações entre o governo e a Câmara dos Deputados. A partir do exame de todos os episódios de substituição de gabinetes no período histórico mencionado, elabora-se uma classificação das razões de retirada dos ministérios, com foco na eventual atuação política da Coroa e da Câmara dos Deputados nesses eventos. Ao contrário do que supõe a literatura convencional, que salienta o papel autônomo da Coroa na substituição dos governos, o trabalho constata que conflitos, efetivos ou potenciais, entre gabinetes e o Poder Legislativo, em especial a Câmara, foram os principais fatores associados à rotatividade governamental no Segundo Reinado. Explora-se, a partir daí, a hipótese de que a introdução de regras eleitorais distritalizadas, no sistema político da época, a partir da década de 1850, em substituição ao regime prévio de listas, ao alterar os incentivos a que estavam submetidos os principais agentes políticos imperiais, desempenhou um papel central na geração daqueles conflitos, concorrendo, assim, para explicar o fenômeno da instabilidade governamental inicialmente referido. / The main purpose of this work is to investigate the reasons of the ministerial instability in the Second Empire (1840-1889) as well as the role played in the production of this phenomenon by the relations between the Government and the House of Representatives. From the studies of all episodes of cabinet replacements during the historical period mentioned, a classification of the reasons that motivated its withdrawals were elaborated, focusing on the eventual political action of the Crown and the House of Representatives in these events. To the contrary of what is believed by conventional literature, which highlights the independent role of the Crown in the substitution of the governments, this text notices that real or potential conflicts between the cabinets and the Legislative Power, in special the House, were the main factors associated with government turnover during the Second Empire. It explores, from there, the hypothesis that the introduction of district electoral rules in the political system of that time, starting from the 1850s, in substitution of the former regime of slates (chapas), changing the incentives which the main imperial political agents were submitted, played a leading role in those conflicts, contributing thus to explain the instability mentioned before.

Este trabalho tem por propósito central investigar as razões da instabilidade ministerial no Segundo Reinado (1840-1889), bem como o papel desempenhado, na produção desse fenômeno, pelas relações entre o governo e a Câmara dos Deputados. A partir do exame de todos os episódios de substituição de gabinetes no período histórico mencionado, elabora-se uma classificação das razões de retirada dos ministérios, com foco na eventual atuação política da Coroa e da Câmara dos Deputados nesses eventos. Ao contrário do que supõe a literatura convencional, que salienta o papel autônomo da Coroa na substituição dos governos, o trabalho constata que conflitos, efetivos ou potenciais, entre gabinetes e o Poder Legislativo, em especial a Câmara, foram os principais fatores associados à rotatividade governamental no Segundo Reinado. Explora-se, a partir daí, a hipótese de que a introdução de regras eleitorais distritalizadas, no sistema político da época, a partir da década de 1850, em substituição ao regime prévio de listas, ao alterar os incentivos a que estavam submetidos os principais agentes políticos imperiais, desempenhou um papel central na geração daqueles conflitos, concorrendo, assim, para explicar o fenômeno da instabilidade governamental inicialmente referido. / The main purpose of this work is to investigate the reasons of the ministerial instability in the Second Empire (1840-1889) as well as the role played in the production of this phenomenon by the relations between the Government and the House of Representatives. From the studies of all episodes of cabinet replacements during the historical period mentioned, a classification of the reasons that motivated its withdrawals were elaborated, focusing on the eventual political action of the Crown and the House of Representatives in these events. To the contrary of what is believed by conventional literature, which highlights the independent role of the Crown in the substitution of the governments, this text notices that real or potential conflicts between the cabinets and the Legislative Power, in special the House, were the main factors associated with government turnover during the Second Empire. It explores, from there, the hypothesis that the introduction of district electoral rules in the political system of that time, starting from the 1850s, in substitution of the former regime of slates (chapas), changing the incentives which the main imperial political agents were submitted, played a leading role in those conflicts, contributing thus to explain the instability mentioned before.

In this research, I analyze the effects of candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules on elite recruitment into the national legislatures of Germany and the United States. This dissertation is both theory-driven and constitutes exploratory research, too. While the effects of electoral rules are frequently studied in political science, the emphasis is thereby on electoral rules that are set post-election. My focus, in contrast, is on electoral rules that have an effect prior to the election. Furthermore, my dissertation is comparative by design. The research question is twofold. Do electoral rules have an effect on elite recruitment, and does it matter? To answer these question, I create a large-N original data set, in which I code the behavior and recruitment paths and patterns of members of the American House of Representatives and the German Bundestag. Furthermore, I include interviews with members of the said two national legislatures. Both the statistical analyses and the interviews provide affirmative evidence for my working hypothesis that differences in electoral rules lead to a different type of elite recruitment. To that end, I use the active-politician concept, through which I dichotomously distinguish the economic behavior of politicians. Thanks to the exploratory nature of my research, I also discover the phenomenon of differential valence of local and state political office for entrance into national office in comparative perspective. By statistically identifying this hitherto unknown paradox, as well as evidencing the effects of electoral rules, I show that besides ideology and culture, institutional rules are key in shaping the ruling elite. The way institutional rules are set up, in particular electoral rules, does not only affect how the electorate will vote and how seats will be distributed, but it will also affect what type of people will end up in elected office.

This dissertation examines the following research question: Which types of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace? And are those effects conditional upon other factors? I argue that the effects are conditional upon the types of political parties that exist in the post-conflict environment. Although this explanation is contrary to scholars that speak of political parties as products of the electoral system, political parties often predate the choice of electoral system. Especially in post-conflict states, political parties play an important role in the negotiation process and hence in the design of the electoral rules. I argue that the effects of electoral rules on peace duration are mitigated by the degree to which a party system is broad (nonexclusive) or narrow (exclusive). I develop a theoretical model that led to three hypotheses focusing on the independent role that political parties play in mitigating the effects of electoral rules on peace duration. To test these hypotheses, I use the Cox proportional hazard model on 57 post-conflict states from 1990 to 2009 and had competitive elections. The empirical results show support for the main argument of this study. First, the findings show that electoral rules alone do not increase or decrease the risk of civil war outbreak, yet when interacting with the degree to which political parties are broad or narrow, there is a significant effect on the outbreak of civil war. Second, the results show that post-conflict states with party centered electoral systems (closed list PR system) are less likely to have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the parliament are controlled by broad-based parties. In addition, I conduct a comparative case study analysis of two post-conflict states, Angola (1975-1992) and Mozambique (1975-1994), using the most similar systems (MSS) research design.