The involvement of religious dimensions in armed conflict reduces the space for resolution and threatens the durability of peace. Yet, there are empirical cases showing that it is possible to address the challenges posed by religious dimensions. There are various avenues to secure durable peace for conflicts involving religious dimensions. Recent studies have focused on the usage of politico-religious solutions. Their findings are however limited to a series of case studies and still have multiple unknowns. This thesis aims to contribute to this body of research with the research question: How do politico-religious arrangements impact peace durability for intrastate armed conflicts involving religious dimensions? Building on previous research on the termination of civil wars and the resolution mechanisms for religious conflicts, this thesis develops a theoretical argument proposing that the provision of politico-religious solutions increases the likelihood of peace duration. A large-N analysis of 107 settlements from 1975 to 2018 related to 30 dyadic conflicts with religious dimensions, shows that there insufficient statistical evidence to support the proposed relationship. The findings question the generalisability of previous research and propose new avenues to further research the applicability of politico-religious solutions.

This dissertation examines the following research question: Which types of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace? And are those effects conditional upon other factors? I argue that the effects are conditional upon the types of political parties that exist in the post-conflict environment. Although this explanation is contrary to scholars that speak of political parties as products of the electoral system, political parties often predate the choice of electoral system. Especially in post-conflict states, political parties play an important role in the negotiation process and hence in the design of the electoral rules. I argue that the effects of electoral rules on peace duration are mitigated by the degree to which a party system is broad (nonexclusive) or narrow (exclusive). I develop a theoretical model that led to three hypotheses focusing on the independent role that political parties play in mitigating the effects of electoral rules on peace duration. To test these hypotheses, I use the Cox proportional hazard model on 57 post-conflict states from 1990 to 2009 and had competitive elections. The empirical results show support for the main argument of this study. First, the findings show that electoral rules alone do not increase or decrease the risk of civil war outbreak, yet when interacting with the degree to which political parties are broad or narrow, there is a significant effect on the outbreak of civil war. Second, the results show that post-conflict states with party centered electoral systems (closed list PR system) are less likely to have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the parliament are controlled by broad-based parties. In addition, I conduct a comparative case study analysis of two post-conflict states, Angola (1975-1992) and Mozambique (1975-1994), using the most similar systems (MSS) research design.

本文主要關注：何種原因造成2011年阿拉伯之春期間的內戰發生與否。在評估由Boix、Collier和Hoeffler，以及Fearon和Laitin所提出的內戰理論後，我發現單獨適用Collier和Hoeffler即可有效又簡約地解釋阿拉伯之春期間的情況。此外，我認為「和平持續期」(peace duration)和「半民主」(anocracy)可能是內戰的必要條件。為了進一步確認理論的解釋力，我將焦點轉移至探索造成理論預測例外（如阿爾及利亞和利比亞）的原因。最後，我提出對理論發展和政策的一些建議。 / The main concern of this study lies in what is the cause behind whether civil war broke out during the Arab Spring (2011). By evaluating civil war theories by Boix, Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin, I find that applying the theory by Collier and Hoeffler alone can effectively and parsimoniously explains the situation during the Arab Spring. In addition, I identify two variables: “peace duration” and “anocracy”, which might be the necessary conditions behind the civil wars during the Arab Spring. To further assure the explanatory power of theories, I switch the focus to explore the reasons why there are exceptions, such as Algeria and Libya, out of the theoretical prediction. Finally, I present some recommendations for theoretical development and policy.