Nosso objetivo principal, nesta tese, é fornecer um esboço de reconstrução programática do livro Os Limites da Liberdade, escrito por James Buchanan, aplicando os recursos da Metodologia da Teoria da Ciência e do Programa de Pesquisa, visando, especificamente, definir a nossa estrutura conceitual, que pretende reconstruir o problema e o modo de organizar a concepção de Estado ou da ordem constitucional, na perspectiva do autor James Buchanan. O núcleo da concepção deste autor é baseada na tese ontológica que considera o indivíduo uma entidade livre, auto-interessada e racional, dentro de uma perspectiva analógica, ligada com a noção econômica do mercado. O processo de reconstrução, deste trabalho, acompanha a idéia de emergência da cooperação, traduzida na ordem política pela noção do meio-termo entre a Anarquia e o Leviatã. Isto é feito buscando-se as regras metodológicas e as teses programáticas que controlam o equilíbrio ou balanço democrático da ordem política, em relação a esses dois extremos ou limites institucionais. A imagem deste equilíbrio, que é modelada pela analogia com a idéia econômica de mercado, está definida, apropriadamente, na expressão anarquia ordenada. A regra fundamental deste sistema institucional propõe otimizar a delegação de autoridade para o cidadão controlar poderes políticos, resgatando as premissas fundamentais da democracia, no sentido de evitar qualquer possibilidade da anarquia e do controle excessivo do Leviatã. A idéia básica da anarquia ordenada consiste em valorizar a racionalidade e a capacidade de negociação dos indivíduos, que são conhecedores de seus próprios interesses e limitados pelo interesse dos outros participantes. A operacionalização da anarquia ordenada é fundamentada no desenvolvimento de um projeto institucional que disponibiliza tecnologias, regras, sistemas e critérios de decisão que, supostamente, podem resolver problemas relacionados ao conflito dos interesses públicos e privados, através da interação democrática dos indivíduos. Nesta perspectiva, são elementos relevantes no contexto público do desenho institucional da anarquia ordenada, os sistemas político e judiciário, onde as tecnologias legais e as inovações legislativas podem desempenhar significativo papel na implementação da visão democrática da anarquia ordenada. / Our first aim at this thesis is to provide an outline of a rational reconstruction of the book The Limits of Liberty by James Buchanan with the methodological resources of the Methodology of Theory of Science and the Research Program with the purpose of defining our conceptual framework out of which we pretend to build up the problem and the specific way of organizing the conception of state or institutional order in Buchanan\'s view. The core of this conception is based upon the ontological thesis according to which the only entity existing is the individual, free, self interested and rational and also the guideline of pursuing the analogy with the notion of market in economics.This process of reconstruction follows, therefore, the idea of a emergency of cooperation that it is translated into the notion of political order as a middle way between anarchy and Leviathan. This is done pursuing the methodological rules and theses that controls its balance or skewness at the political order towards one of the boundaries.The image of this balance, that is moulded by this analogy with the idea of market, is properly defined as ordered anarchy. The main rule coordinating the other rules, a radical one, is that one should optimize the delegation of authority for citizen to control the political powers in order to work out the basic postulates of democracy in order to avoiding, on the one hand, any possibility of anarchy and in the other hand, Leviathan\'s excessive control. It follows the basic idea of valuing the rationality and capacity of negotiation of the individual who knows best its own interest but it is also limited by the interest of the others. The operationalization of this rule is based upon the development of a institutional design with resources of technologies, rules and systems and criteria of decision that are suposed to solve the problems related to the conflict of public and private interests coming from the interactions among the individuals in the ordered anarchy. In this perspective, a relevant element of this institutional design is that one of the electoral and judiciary system inside of which the technologies and its innovations will play a very meaningfull role for implementing this view of ordered anarchy.

Nosso objetivo principal, nesta tese, é fornecer um esboço de reconstrução programática do livro Os Limites da Liberdade, escrito por James Buchanan, aplicando os recursos da Metodologia da Teoria da Ciência e do Programa de Pesquisa, visando, especificamente, definir a nossa estrutura conceitual, que pretende reconstruir o problema e o modo de organizar a concepção de Estado ou da ordem constitucional, na perspectiva do autor James Buchanan. O núcleo da concepção deste autor é baseada na tese ontológica que considera o indivíduo uma entidade livre, auto-interessada e racional, dentro de uma perspectiva analógica, ligada com a noção econômica do mercado. O processo de reconstrução, deste trabalho, acompanha a idéia de emergência da cooperação, traduzida na ordem política pela noção do meio-termo entre a Anarquia e o Leviatã. Isto é feito buscando-se as regras metodológicas e as teses programáticas que controlam o equilíbrio ou balanço democrático da ordem política, em relação a esses dois extremos ou limites institucionais. A imagem deste equilíbrio, que é modelada pela analogia com a idéia econômica de mercado, está definida, apropriadamente, na expressão anarquia ordenada. A regra fundamental deste sistema institucional propõe otimizar a delegação de autoridade para o cidadão controlar poderes políticos, resgatando as premissas fundamentais da democracia, no sentido de evitar qualquer possibilidade da anarquia e do controle excessivo do Leviatã. A idéia básica da anarquia ordenada consiste em valorizar a racionalidade e a capacidade de negociação dos indivíduos, que são conhecedores de seus próprios interesses e limitados pelo interesse dos outros participantes. A operacionalização da anarquia ordenada é fundamentada no desenvolvimento de um projeto institucional que disponibiliza tecnologias, regras, sistemas e critérios de decisão que, supostamente, podem resolver problemas relacionados ao conflito dos interesses públicos e privados, através da interação democrática dos indivíduos. Nesta perspectiva, são elementos relevantes no contexto público do desenho institucional da anarquia ordenada, os sistemas político e judiciário, onde as tecnologias legais e as inovações legislativas podem desempenhar significativo papel na implementação da visão democrática da anarquia ordenada. / Our first aim at this thesis is to provide an outline of a rational reconstruction of the book The Limits of Liberty by James Buchanan with the methodological resources of the Methodology of Theory of Science and the Research Program with the purpose of defining our conceptual framework out of which we pretend to build up the problem and the specific way of organizing the conception of state or institutional order in Buchanan\'s view. The core of this conception is based upon the ontological thesis according to which the only entity existing is the individual, free, self interested and rational and also the guideline of pursuing the analogy with the notion of market in economics.This process of reconstruction follows, therefore, the idea of a emergency of cooperation that it is translated into the notion of political order as a middle way between anarchy and Leviathan. This is done pursuing the methodological rules and theses that controls its balance or skewness at the political order towards one of the boundaries.The image of this balance, that is moulded by this analogy with the idea of market, is properly defined as ordered anarchy. The main rule coordinating the other rules, a radical one, is that one should optimize the delegation of authority for citizen to control the political powers in order to work out the basic postulates of democracy in order to avoiding, on the one hand, any possibility of anarchy and in the other hand, Leviathan\'s excessive control. It follows the basic idea of valuing the rationality and capacity of negotiation of the individual who knows best its own interest but it is also limited by the interest of the others. The operationalization of this rule is based upon the development of a institutional design with resources of technologies, rules and systems and criteria of decision that are suposed to solve the problems related to the conflict of public and private interests coming from the interactions among the individuals in the ordered anarchy. In this perspective, a relevant element of this institutional design is that one of the electoral and judiciary system inside of which the technologies and its innovations will play a very meaningfull role for implementing this view of ordered anarchy.

This dissertation is an attempt at establishing a bridge between biology and physics leading naturally from the field of phase transitions in physics to the cooperative nature of living systems. We show that this aim can be realized by supplementing the current field of evolutionary game theory with a new form of self-organized temporal criticality. In the case of ordinary criticality, the units of a system choosing either cooperation or defection under the influence of the choices done by their nearest neighbors, undergo a significant change of behavior when the intensity of social influence has a critical value. At criticality, the behavior of the individual units is correlated with that of all other units, in addition to the behavior of the nearest neighbors. The spontaneous transition to criticality of this work is realized as follows: the units change their behavior (defection or cooperation) under the social influence of their nearest neighbors and update the intensity of their social influence spontaneously by the feedback they get from the payoffs of the game (environment). If units, which are selfish, get higher benefit with respect to their previous play, they increase their interest to interact with other units and vice versa. Doing this, the behavior of single units and the whole system spontaneously evolve towards criticality, thereby realizing a global behavior favoring cooperation. In the case when the interacting units are oscillators with their own periodicity, homeodynamics concerns, the individual payoff is the synchronization with the nearest neighbors (i.e., lowering the energy of the system), the spontaneous transition to criticality generates fluctuations characterized by the joint action of periodicity and crucial events of the same kind as those revealed by the current analysis of the dynamics of the brain. This result is expected to explain the efficiency of enzyme catalyzers, on the basis of a new non-equilibrium statistical physics. We argue that the results obtained apply to sociological and psychological systems as well as to elementary biological systems.