This dissertation examines the relation between emotional functioning and meaning making in bereavement. Emotional functioning (i.e., awareness, expression, and regulation of emotions) has been traditionally considered crucial in grief coping (Pennebaker, 1990; Raphael, 1983). At the same time, bereaved people who were able to find a meaning in their loss experience were found to show better adjustment and were less likely to develop grief complications than those who did not find a meaning (Davis, Wortman, Lehman, & Silver, 2000; Tolstikova, Fleming, & Chartier, 2005). The present research aimed to build a more inclusive model of grief coping by examining the interplay of emotional functioning and meaning making in grief in the same sample of people. The emotionally focused approach to human functioning developed by L. Greenberg (Greenberg, 2004) forms the theoretical foundation for the study. This approach proposes that emotional arousal, awareness, expression, and regulation provide grounds for meaning construction and eventually help to assimilate a shattering event. Following Greenbergs conceptualization (Greenberg, Auszura, & Herrmann, 2007), the first set of studies of the present dissertation examined productive and unproductive emotional functioning in grief. Three hundred and fifteen bereaved people were recruited through the online bereavement support websites to help develop and validate the Productive-Unproductive Emotional Processing in Grief questionnaire (PUG). The PUG scores were further used to predict meaning making in grief. It was shown that bereaved individuals who were engaged in productive emotional processing of grief and demonstrated good emotional regulation were more capable of making sense of their loss six months later.<p> The data for the first set of studies were collected via the Internet. While the Internet method of data collection has been previously used in grief research, its validity and reliability had not been assessed. Thus, Study 4 of the present dissertation reviewed the use of the Internet in bereavement research and examined the reliability and validity of online data collection. The demographic characteristics and grief scores of the Internet participants were compared to those completed by traditional paper-and-pencil method. The study demonstrated that the online survey results were comparable to the traditional paper-and-pencil survey method.

The present study investigated the claim that positive mood broadens the scope of attention to include irrelevant information, and if so, whether this loosening of attentional control has longer term cognitive consequences. In Experiment 1, participants in an induced happy mood were more influenced by distracting information that interfered with responses in the global-local task, particularly when this information was global in nature. Experiment 2 demonstrated that, when previously irrelevant information became solutions on a subsequent task, implicit memory for this distraction was positively correlated with naturally-occurring positive mood. This study corroborates findings that individuals in a happy mood are more affected by distracting irrelevant information. Furthermore, this widened scope of attention can facilitate performance on a subsequent task, a finding with implications for the relationship between positive mood and creativity.

This research aimed to help caregivers easily recognize physiological indicators of pediatric anxiety. To this purpose, we first elucidated the physiological indicators of anxiety in children by presenting an anxiety-inducing task while recording biosignals. We discovered patterns suggestive of cardiac reciprocal inhibition, increased respiration rate, and increased electrodermal activity. These patterns informed the optimization of an existing auditory prototype for presenting biosignals to caregivers (biosongs), which maps physiological features to musical elements. The effectiveness of the optimized biosongs for conveying anxiety was evaluated by quantifying the accuracy with which adults could distinguish anxious and calm states by listening to music translated from children's physiological signals. High overall sensitivity (90%), specificity (78%), and accuracy (84%) were achieved, suggesting the promise of biosongs as an effective anxiety screening tool. This technology could lead to profound improvements in caregiving contexts, including anxiety management during medical procedures, and home-based monitoring for chronic conditions.

This research aimed to help caregivers easily recognize physiological indicators of pediatric anxiety. To this purpose, we first elucidated the physiological indicators of anxiety in children by presenting an anxiety-inducing task while recording biosignals. We discovered patterns suggestive of cardiac reciprocal inhibition, increased respiration rate, and increased electrodermal activity. These patterns informed the optimization of an existing auditory prototype for presenting biosignals to caregivers (biosongs), which maps physiological features to musical elements. The effectiveness of the optimized biosongs for conveying anxiety was evaluated by quantifying the accuracy with which adults could distinguish anxious and calm states by listening to music translated from children's physiological signals. High overall sensitivity (90%), specificity (78%), and accuracy (84%) were achieved, suggesting the promise of biosongs as an effective anxiety screening tool. This technology could lead to profound improvements in caregiving contexts, including anxiety management during medical procedures, and home-based monitoring for chronic conditions.

The present study investigated the claim that positive mood broadens the scope of attention to include irrelevant information, and if so, whether this loosening of attentional control has longer term cognitive consequences. In Experiment 1, participants in an induced happy mood were more influenced by distracting information that interfered with responses in the global-local task, particularly when this information was global in nature. Experiment 2 demonstrated that, when previously irrelevant information became solutions on a subsequent task, implicit memory for this distraction was positively correlated with naturally-occurring positive mood. This study corroborates findings that individuals in a happy mood are more affected by distracting irrelevant information. Furthermore, this widened scope of attention can facilitate performance on a subsequent task, a finding with implications for the relationship between positive mood and creativity.

My dissertation examines a fundamental but poorly understood aspect of emotional intelligence: its potential cultural-relativity. Significant differences in emotional intelligence test scores have been found between different cultural groups. To explain these past findings, I develop a theory of how and why different cultural groups—specifically, Westerners and East Asians—hold different conceptions of emotional intelligence. In effect, I argue that what is considered emotionally intelligent behaviour by members of one ethnic group may not be considered emotionally intelligent behaviour by members of another group due to contrasting cultural values and beliefs. Empirically, I test this theory through a two-part investigation. In Study 1, I measure cultural values and show that they mediate the relation between ethnicity and emotional intelligence test scores. In Study 2, I experimentally manipulate (prime) cultural beliefs to test whether they cause different judgments of what is considered emotionally intelligent behaviour. Some evidence for the hypothesis that culture helps account for ethnic differences in emotional intelligence was found through Study 1’s measurement-of-mediation design, however, not through Study 2’s experimental-causal-chain design. Theoretically, my dissertation helps challenge the implicit assumption that emotional intelligence is universal by explaining how and why it is culturally-relative. Practically, my dissertation provides some evidence that current tests of emotional intelligence may be culturally-biased and hence adversely impact non-Western candidates when used as part of selection and promotion decisions.

Syftet med den här uppsatsen har varit att undersöka emotionernas roll i vår etik. Detta har jag undersökt med hjälp av filosofen Martha Nussbaum, vilken har utformat en väl tilltagen teori om både emotioner och dess roll i etik. Genom att sätta upp tre punkter på vad en teori om emotioners roll i etik bör innehålla, (1. innehåll, 2. giltighet, 3. a) motivation och b) handling) har jag tolkat och analyserat Nussbaums teori, som hon skriver om i sina böcker Hiding from humanity: disgust, shame, and the law och Upheavals of thought: the intelligence of emotions. Nussbaums teori har behandlat alla punkter jag ställde upp och bör därmed anses vara komplett, om än inte helt övertygande på alla punkter. Det hon kommit fram till är: En emotion består av kognitiva processer som genom sitt fokus på ett medvetet objekt bildar övertygelser och värderingar om sådant som berör det vi tillskriver vara viktigt. Emotionen har inte ensamt giltighet att besluta huruvida en handling är rätt eller fel. a) Den har en stark motiverande funktion, men innebär inte att en 3 b) handling måste äga rum. Nussbaums teori är väl utarbetad när hon förklarar varför det är viktigt att emotionen bör ha en roll i vår etik. Teorin är dock mindre utarbetad, och mindre övertygande, när det gäller att förklara hur det ska gå till när vi adapterar emotionerna på etiken.

Research Question: Anger is believed to be a powerful motivator of group mobilization. The objective of this dissertation is to examine the role of anger in assisting individuals to overcome the collective action problem. Theory: I utilize Intergroup Emotional Theory in order to build and test hypotheses on when and how anger will lead to mobilization. Methods: I test my hypotheses through four experiments. Experiment 1 examines how individual level anger impacts mobilization. In Experiment 2, I implement a test to induce anger towards an out-group. In Experiment 3, I then examine how anger towards an out-group impacts mobilization under the contexts of threat and competition. In Experiment 4, I look at different threatening contexts and how anger towards an out-group, limited information, and discrimination all work together to impact mobilization. Results: In Experiment 1, I found that when an angry subject is asked to take action in a task unrelated to that anger, the subject fails to mobilize. In Experiment 2, I built and tested two experimental manipulations of out-group anger and was successful in inducing anger directed towards an out-group. Having successfully induced out-group anger, Experiment 3 then demonstrated that out-group anger increases mobilization under competition, but not under threat. The mobilizing effects of out-group anger was limited under threat because subjects also felt angry towards their own in-group. Lastly, I reexamine different variations of threat on mobilization. I attempt to reduce increases in in-group anger by limiting information and discriminating against the angry group, but as I stack the deck against the angry group, they responded by mobilizing less. Conclusions: The potential for anger to mobilize may be contingent upon the level of out-group and in-group anger within a group. These findings collectively shed light on how out-group anger can either facilitate action or lead to inaction.

According to folk psychology, instrumental music regularly elicits emotions in listeners. Philosophers and psychologists such as Kivy, Konecni and Zangwill have questioned the existence of these musically elicited emotions, arguing that instrumental music elicits moods or aesthetic judgments rather than emotions. I defend the folk psychological position against these skeptics. The first chapter sets up the debate surrounding musically elicited emotions, while chapters two and three defend the thesis that instrumental music elicits emotions against the critics’ arguments. Chapter four outlines the implications of this defense for a variety of fields.

Jesse Prinz proposes that attended intermediate-level representations (AIRs) are sufficient for conscious awareness. He extends this claim to emotion, arguing that attention is the mechanism that separates conscious from unconscious emotions. Prior studies call this entailment into question. However, they do not directly address the intermediate-level requirement, and thus cannot decisively refute the AIR theory of consciousness. This thesis tests that theory by manipulating participants’ attention to different features of subliminally processed words while recording both behavioral and electroencephalogram (EEG) data. Both measures suggest that subliminally processed stimuli are attended according to participants’ conscious intention to complete a task. In addition, the EEG data demonstrate that intermediate-level neural activity was modulated by the subliminal stimuli. Thus, these results suggest that AIRs are not sufficient for conscious emotion. This finding undermines Prinz’s AIR theory, and its account of the distinction between conscious and unconscious emotion.