Thesis (M.Psych./Ph.D.)--University of Western Australia, 2007.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2009. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Including bibliographical references (leaves 117-126).

Thesis (M.A.)--Eastern Illinois University, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-100).

Thesis (M. A.)--University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2005. / Title from PDF title page screen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-56)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego and San Diego State University, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 178-193).

No description available.

The purpose of this study was to determine whether relationships exist among self-esteem, emotional intelligence, and exercise frequency, duration, and adherence. To establish such relationships, 64 University of Central Florida students completed experimental packets designed to test their levels of self-esteem, emotional intelligence, and exercise behavior. The responses were analyzed using SPSS and the Pearson correlation coefficient. Significant positive correlations were found between self-esteem and exercise frequency, duration, and adherence. Further significant positive correlations were found between emotional intelligence and exercise duration and adherence, and between emotional intelligence and self-esteem. These are important findings. The research suggests emotional intelligence may be a variable relevant to individual exercise goals as well as self esteem. In addition the study supports past research concerning the relationship between exercise and self-esteem.

In hierdie studie is Tourettesindroom as neuro-genetiese toestand aangespreek en die wyse waarop dit in verskillende leer-, gedrags- en emosionele problema by begaafde Tourettesindroomlyers manifesteer. Begaafde Tourettesindroomlyers se relasievorming en leefwereldstigting word gekonstitueer met hul kognitiewe en affektiewe vermoans asook genetiese potensiaal, wat vir beida hul Tourettesindroom en begaafdheid verantwoordelik is. Die verwarring tussen begaafde Tourettesindroomlyers se superieure intellek en hul emosionele onvolwassenheid is die oorsaak van hul relasieprobleme. Negatiewe betekenisgewing en betrokkenheid by hulle relasievorminge bel"nvloed elke faset van hul menswees en gee aanleiding tot die degradering van hul siening van hul eie waarde. Gebrekkige kennis oor begaafdheid en Tourettesindroom veroorsaak dat waardevolle potensiaal en talente vir Suid-Afrika verlore gaan. Daarom moet daar daadwerklike pogings aangewend word om kennis oor begaafde Tourettesindroomlyers aan ouers, skole en universiteite, beskikbaar te stel met 'n konstruktiewe plan van aksie ter ondersteuning van die betrokkenes en tot voordeel van Suid-Afrika. / This study addresses Tourette syndrome as a neuro-genetic condition and the manner whereby it manifests itself in various learning, behavioural and emotional problems experienced by gifted Tourette syndrome sufferers. Their relationship-formation and life world are constituted by their cognitive, emotive and genetic capacity which manifests itself in Tourette syndrome and giftedness. The emotional immaturity which accompanies their superior intellect causes disorientation which results in problems in their relationships. Negative connotations and involvement in their relationship-formation influences each facet of their being and gives rise to the lowering of their perception of their self worth. In South Africa, valuable potential and talent is lost because of an inadequate knowledge of giftedness and Tourette syndrome. Efforts must be directed towards making information about gifted Tourette syndrome sufferers available to parents, schools and universities. A constructive plan of action is necessary that will support gifted Tourette syndrome sufferers to the benefit of South Africa. / Psychology of Education / M. Ed. (Sielkundige Opvoedkunde)

This dissertation explores Wittgenstein’s views on the mind-body problem. It is possible to provide an examination of Wittgenstein’s approach by tracing the evolution of the theory of mind and the mind-body problem, by considering the current ways of dealing with the mind-body problem, and Wittgenstein’s critique of the notion of the mind. Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of philosophy and the relationship between philosophy and psychology make it possible to understand and as this dissertation argues – see beyond – the conceptual confusion that has since arisen out of philosophic tradition that perpetuates a ‘myth of the mind’. Schools of thought such as the Cartesians and cognitivists have attempted, through the construction of various elaborate theories, to solve the ‘riddle’ of the mind and to address the so-called ‘mind-body problem’. Cognitive science, in particular, has used the tradition and the myth of the mind as a basis for its research. Wittgenstein shows that such thinking is particularly muddled. By examining Wittgenstein’s approach to the mind-body problem, it is argued here that theories based on the tradition of the ‘myth of the mind’ are inherently flawed. Wittgenstein uses his methods, consisting of his notions of ‘grammar’, ‘language games’ and the re-arrangement of concepts, to extrapolate meaning and to see through the conceptual confusions that the use of language causes and that give rise to the mind-body problem . / Psychology / M.A. (Psychology)

This dissertation starts from one core question: Should we let ourselves be guided by our emotions when we make ethical decisions? I give a positive answer to this question. This is not a new proposal. However, my dissertation lays out a novel argument, one that tries to avoid cognitivism about emotions. That is, I argue that there is a kind of emotion that is not cognitive or belief-like, and that can nevertheless act as a normative guide for us. By showing that such emotions can be normative guides, I aim to show that normativity should not be identified with rationality or cognition. The way in which non-cognitive emotions can be normative guides, I argue, is by disrupting engrained habits and beliefs when necessary. This is the second new suggestion I make in this dissertation: that an important aspect in normative guidance has been neglected so far, namely the importance of being able to reconsider one’s ways in light of new circumstances. Philosophers have put a lot of effort into showing how we can have stable commitments and beliefs over time. But not much has been said about how we can break open such commitments and beliefs again if they are not appropriate anymore. I argue that this is a far-reaching omission. We live in a constantly changing world, and our circumstances demand of us different kinds of habits and beliefs as time goes by. I argue that as a result of these considerations, we need to introduce a virtue that has not been considered so far, the virtue of flexibility. Like the virtue of stability in Aristotle, I argue, the virtue of flexibility is a meta-virtue, a good-maker of all virtues.