<p> This thesis is an empirical exploration into a range of issues related to the economics of the utilization of physician services. Physicians play an important role in a health care system as physicians are a patient's primary point of contact with the health care system and physicians are predominantly responsible for directing how patients use other health care resources. In particular, physicians are at the center of Canada's universal public insurance system with first dollar coverage for medically necessary physician and hospital services.</p> <p> The thesis comprises three separate essays. The first essay has a methodological focus on statistically modeling and predicting the use of general practitioners (GPs) when use is measured as the number of GP visits. The essay compared a state-of-the-art parametric latent class negative binomial model to a nonparametric kernel conditional density estimator, and evaluated how well each was able to fit the observed data and predict physician use.</p> <p> The second and third essays look at more substantive policy questions. The second essay investigates how the supply of GPs and specialists affects the mix of physician services received by individuals. A persistent concern in many health care systems is how variations in the supply of physicians will impact the use of physician services. The results suggest concerns about concerns of patient access and receipt of care in the presence of a shortage of specialists may be mitigated, all else equal, if patients are able to substitute GP services for specialist services.</p> <p> The third essay examines income-related inequity in the use of physician services by asthmatics and diabetics, relative to the general population, and the contributions of different factors to income-related inequality using the concentration index approach.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>\textbf{Chapter 1}\\</p> <p>This paper explores the implications of the mismatch hypothesis in the context of the labor market using a survey on newly licensed US lawyers called the After the JD Study. Using a triple difference approach, I measure the impact of diversity quotas on marginal minority workers’ future salaries, promotion rates, and leaving rates for occupation and job. With middling statistical power, my findings are in line with the mismatch hypothesis in that beneficiaries of the diversity quota policy are made ex-ante worse off. My findings are also in line with recent literature on diminishing racial outcome gaps by skill.</p> <p><br></p> <p>\textbf{Chapter 2}\\</p> <p>In this paper, we provide theoretical framework for three models of Digital Media Firm behavior called \textit{Premium}, \textit{Free-to-Play}, and \textit{Play-to-Earn} as well as suggest an empirical measure of firm ponzi-likeness. First, we study a baseline model optimal price and quality of a digital product, the premium model. Second, we extend the baseline model where some customers, called minnows, receive the product for free and other customers, called whales, pay a price for a better version of the product, this is the free-to-play model. Finally, we explore a model where customers receive a security-like asset from the firm and this asset acts like a negative price while also subsidizing the firm's revenue. This final model provides an environment for much research. We show that, even when firms are ponzi-schemes in this final model, quality of the product need not be at a minimum. We also briefly discuss how one would measure the ponzi-likeness of a digital media firm in the third model setting. </p> <p><br></p> <p>\textbf{Chapter 3}\\</p> <p>In this paper, I explore unique measures of racial prejudice and their impact on black wages in the labor market using the General Social Survey, Current Population Survey and the NLSY79. I generate two variables to proxy for racial prejudice which are extracted from the GSS and the NLSY79. The first variable, drawn from the GSS, measures prejudice sentiment towards blacks and the second, drawn from the NLSY79, measures individual experience with racial discrimination. I use these measurements to proxy for racial prejudice and its impact on the black-white wage gap. I find that these variables are two distinctly different measures of racial discrimination in the labor market, providing a powerful instrument for measuring racial discrimination in the labor market. They also provide the insight that, while racial prejudice may be high in certain occupations and regions, this sentiment does not directly impact black outcomes. Specifically, wages are more sensitive to racial prejudice in WC jobs than in BC jobs. </p>

This dissertation empirically studies the interplay of government policies, finance, and economic development. More specifically, it considers the impact of corporate taxes on employment, of bank regulation on financial information sharing on banking stability and of banking crises on democracy. Two of the chapters focus on Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. The third one takes a more global perspective. Chapter 1 evaluates the impact of corporate income tax rates (CIT) on employment at the firm level for a sample of SSA countries. It finds that on average, firms employ more workers in countries with higher CIT rates. This is consistent with the fact that corporate tax revenues allow governments to provide public goods and infrastructure which are crucial to firm activities. We report estimation results to support this assumption. More specifically, while the marginal effect of CIT decreases with income level or with government expenditures, it increases with the level of democracy. Furthermore, we also find that the effect of CIT rates on employment works partially through improvements in the business environment in which firms operate. Chapter 2 assesses the effects of government policies setting the extent to which credit information on the credit history of borrowers is shared among lenders. It shows that credit information sharing stabilizes banks. Moreover, despite foreign banks having an informational disadvantage over domestic banks due to information frictions and would hence benefit more from credit information sharing, the results indicate that both types of banks are affected in the same way. This suggests that foreign banks rely on alternative strategies to compensate for their informational disadvantage in local markets. Lastly, Chapter 3 documents the impact of banking crises on the level of democracy. It provides evidence that democracy improves in the 10-year window following the occurrence of a banking crisis. The results also highlight the presence of several non-linearities. First, severe banking crises have larger effects on democracy than moderate ones. Second, the positive effect of banking crises on democracy is mostly driven by non-democratic countries. Finally, the bulk of the effect materializes from the third year after the crisis occurred. / Cette thèse étudie empiriquement l'interaction des politiques gouvernementales, de la finance, et du développement économique. Plus précisément, il examine l'impact de la fiscalité des entreprises sur l'emploi, de la réglementation bancaire relative au partage d'informations sur le crédit sur la stabilité bancaire, et des crises bancaires sur la démocratie. Les deux premiers chapitres se focalisent sur les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne. Le troisième adopte une perspective plus globale pour couvrir. Le premier chapitre évalue l'impact des taux d'imposition des sociétés (IS) sur l'emploi au niveau de l'entreprise pour un échantillon de pays d'Afrique subsaharienne. Ses résultats montrent qu'en moyenne, les entreprises emploient plus de travailleurs dans les pays où les taux de taxation des entreprises sont plus élevés. Cela s’explique par le fait que les recettes de l'impôt sur les sociétés permettent aux gouvernements de financer des biens publics et des infrastructures qui sont essentiels aux activités des entreprises. Nous présentons des résultats d'estimation pour soutenir cette hypothèse. Plus précisément, alors que l'effet marginal de l'IS diminue avec le niveau de revenu ou avec les dépenses publiques, il augmente avec le niveau de démocratie. En outre, nous constatons également que l'effet des taux d'IS sur l'emploi s'explique en partie par l'amélioration de l'environnement des affaires dans lequel opèrent les entreprises. Le second chapitre évalue les effets des politiques gouvernementales fixant la mesure dans laquelle les informations sur les antécédents de crédit des emprunteurs sont partagées entre les prêteurs. Il montre que le partage d'informations sur le crédit permet de stabiliser les banques. De plus, bien que les banques étrangères aient un désavantage informationnel par rapport aux banques nationales en raison de frictions d'information et bénéficieraient donc davantage du partage d'informations sur le crédit, les résultats indiquent que les deux types de banques sont affectées de la même manière. Cela suggère que les banques étrangères s'appuient sur des stratégies alternatives pour compenser leur désavantage informationnel sur les marchés locaux. Enfin, le chapitre 3 documente l'impact des crises bancaires sur le niveau de démocratie. Il fournit la preuve que la démocratie s'améliore dans la fenêtre de 10 ans suivant l’occurrence d'une crise bancaire. Les résultats mettent également en évidence la présence de plusieurs non-linéarités. Premièrement, les crises bancaires graves ont des effets plus importants sur la démocratie que les crises modérées. Deuxièmement, l'effet positif des crises bancaires sur la démocratie est principalement attribuable aux pays non démocratiques. Pour finir, l'essentiel de l'effet se matérialise à partir de la troisième année après la survenance de la crise. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished