Analyzing the distributions of wages for whites, blacks and Hispanics reveals the existence of a wage gap throughout the distribution. There are also clear cognitive and noncognitive skill differences across groups. Do differences in the distributions of these skills explain differences in the distributions of wages? Do predicted distributions of wages resulting from rewarding blacks and Hispanics as if they were white help explain the observed wage gap? Using data from the NLSY79, I look at the impacts of noncognitive skills on wages for blacks, Hispanics and whites. I estimate the entire distribution of wages conditional on skills for blacks and Hispanics to see if there is a difference in wages individuals with the same level of cognitive and noncognitive skills. I find that all cognitive and noncognitive measures examined are important in explaining the wage penalty paid by blacks and Hispanics and that, for blacks, predicting their wages conditional on skills approximates the distribution of actual wages. Do employers recognize noncognitive skills at the onset (interview) or is there a learning process? How does learning about these noncognitive skills occur over time? This paper uses data from the NLSY79 to incorporate measures of noncognitive skills into a model of employer learning described originally by Altonji Pierret (2001). Measures of noncognitive skills include the Rosenberg Self Esteem Score, the Rotter Locus of Internal Control Score, the Coding Speed Score, and the CES-Depression Scale. I find that employers observe an initial signal of self esteem and schooling and that, over time, employers learn about cognitive skills and motivation, placing less emphasis on these initial observations. Does learning transfer perfectly across employers or is there a degree to which learning resets as employees change jobs throughout their careers? In this paper, I use data from the NLSY79 to look for evidence of asymmetric employer learning. I use tests developed by Schonberg (2007) and Pinkston (2009) to look for asymmetric learning in the model from Altonji Pierret (2001) augmented in Petre (2013b) to incorporate noncognitive skills in addition to cognitive skills. I find mixed evidence that learning done by a prior employer might not transfer completely to a new employer. / text

Doctor of Philosophy / This thesis reports two tests of information-based theories of the returns to education, in the labour market for young Australians. The first is a test of whether these returns increase discontinuously with credentials such as high school graduation and university degrees. The second is a test of employer learning based upon how the returns to education, and to measures of ability not initially observed by employers, evolve with experience. These tests are conducted using a new data source which tracks individuals during the years in which they are entering and establishing themselves in the labour market, the period during which such credential and learning effects are most likely to be important. It is found that there are large and highly significant credential returns to completion of bachelor’s degrees, of 14% for males and 10% for females. For males, around 39% of the returns to 15 years of education (relative to 9 or fewer years) are attributable to credential effects, while the corresponding figure for females is 36%. These effects are stronger among workers who were recruited through hiring channels that convey less initial information to employers. There is also evidence that post-secondary admission or attendance without completion of a credential may itself have a sorting effect in the labour market. In the employer learning estimates, when parental education is used as a measure of ability observed by the researcher but not initially by employers, it is found to become increasingly correlated with wages as experience accumulates. However, no such result is found when a standardised test score is used as the ability variable – apparently because the information captured by this score is already observed by employers at the time of labour market entry. When the model is estimated separately by occupational class, the finding of employer learning holds only among white-collar workers. This may be due to the types of attributes that are reflected in parental education as a measure of initially unobserved ability.

Doctor of Philosophy / This thesis reports two tests of information-based theories of the returns to education, in the labour market for young Australians. The first is a test of whether these returns increase discontinuously with credentials such as high school graduation and university degrees. The second is a test of employer learning based upon how the returns to education, and to measures of ability not initially observed by employers, evolve with experience. These tests are conducted using a new data source which tracks individuals during the years in which they are entering and establishing themselves in the labour market, the period during which such credential and learning effects are most likely to be important. It is found that there are large and highly significant credential returns to completion of bachelor’s degrees, of 14% for males and 10% for females. For males, around 39% of the returns to 15 years of education (relative to 9 or fewer years) are attributable to credential effects, while the corresponding figure for females is 36%. These effects are stronger among workers who were recruited through hiring channels that convey less initial information to employers. There is also evidence that post-secondary admission or attendance without completion of a credential may itself have a sorting effect in the labour market. In the employer learning estimates, when parental education is used as a measure of ability observed by the researcher but not initially by employers, it is found to become increasingly correlated with wages as experience accumulates. However, no such result is found when a standardised test score is used as the ability variable – apparently because the information captured by this score is already observed by employers at the time of labour market entry. When the model is estimated separately by occupational class, the finding of employer learning holds only among white-collar workers. This may be due to the types of attributes that are reflected in parental education as a measure of initially unobserved ability.

This dissertation consists of three essays in labor economics and contract theory. The first essay examines whether one’s wage is based on information about the performance of one’s personal contacts. I study wage determination under two assumptions about belief formation: individual learning, under which employers observe only one’s own characteristics, and social learning, under which employers also observe those of one’s personal contacts. Using data on siblings in the NLSY79, I test whether a sibling’s characteristics are priced into one’s wage. If learning is social, then an older sibling’s test score should typically have a larger adjusted impact on a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa. The empirical findings support this prediction. Furthermore, I perform several exercises to rule out other potential factors, such as asymmetric skill formation, human capital transfers, and role model effects. The second essay analyzes the influence of macroeconomic conditions during childhood on the labor market performance of adults. Based on Census data, I document the relationship of unemployment rates in childhood to schooling, employment, and income as an adult. In addition, a sample from the PSID is used to study how the background attributes of parents raising children vary over the business cycle. Finally, information from the NLSY79-CH is examined in order to characterize the impact of economic fluctuations on parental caregiving. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a negative effect of the average unemployment rate in childhood on parental investments in children and the stock of human capital in adulthood. The third essay studies the bilateral trade of divisible goods in the presence of stochastic transaction costs. The first-best solution requires each agent to transfer all of her good to the other agent when the transaction cost reaches a certain threshold value. However, in the absence of court-enforceable contracts, such a policy is not incentive compatible. We solve for the unique maximal symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which agents can realize some gains from trade by transferring their goods sequentially. Several comparative statics are derived. In some cases, the first-best outcome can be approximated as the agents become infinitely patient. / Economics

This dissertation consists of three essays studying employer learning and statistical discrimination of young workers in the U.S. labor market. The first chapter outlines the dissertation by discussing the motivations, methods, and research findings.<br /><br />Chapter two develops a framework that nests both symmetric and asymmetric employer learning, and derives testable hypotheses on racial statistical discrimination under different processes of employer learning. Testing the model with data from the NLSY79, we find that employers statistically discriminate against black workers on the basis of both education and race in the high school market where learning appears to be mostly asymmetric. In the college market, employers directly observe most parts of the productivity of potential employees and learn very little over time.<br /><br />In chapter three, we investigate how the process of employer learning and statistical discrimination varies over time and across employers. The comparison between the NLSY79 and the NLSY97 cohorts reveals that employer learning and statistical discrimination has became stronger over the past decades. Using the NLSY97 data, we identify three employer- specific characteristics that influencing employer learning and statistical discrimination, the supervisor-worker race match, supervisor\'s age, and firm size. Black high school graduates face weaker employer learning and statistical discrimination if they choose to work for a black supervisor, work for an old supervisor, or work in a firm of small size.<br /><br />In the last chapter, we are interested in the associations between verbal and quantitative skills and individual earnings as well as the employer learning process of these two specific types of skills. There exist significant differences in both the labor market rewards and employer learning process of verbal and quantitative skills between high school and college graduates. Verbal skills are more important than quantitative skills for high school graduates, whereas college-educated workers benefit greatly from having high quantitative skills but little from having high verbal skills. In addition, employers directly learn verbal skills and continuously learn quantitative skills in the high school market, but almost perfectly observe quantitative skills in the college market. / Ph. D.

This thesis consists of three self-contained essays. Essay 1: This essay estimates wage assimilation among non-western immigrants in Sweden, controlling for selection into employment by including individual fixed effects. Furthermore, using matched employer-employee panel data covering the complete Swedish labor market, this essay decomposes wage catch-up into relative wage growth within and between workplaces and occupations. The results show that failing to control for selection into employment is likely to underestimate relative wage growth of immigrants, as early entrants in the labor market differ from later entrants along unobservable dimensions. Even after 30 years in the country, the group of non-western immigrants still earns substantially lower wages than natives. Wages catch up mainly within workplaces and occupations, suggesting that improved signals of productivity, rather than improved knowledge of job options, are of importance for the wage growth of non-western immigrants. Essay 2: Earlier research has shown that immigrant- and minority entrepreneurs have difficulties accessing capital through the formal financial markets. This essay studies what role immigrant employees within the local bank sector have for the probability of immigrants to run their own businesses. I use linked employer-employee data covering the whole Swedish labor market for the years 1987 to 2003 and utilize a nationwide refugee dispersal policy to get exogenous variation in the exposure to co-ethnic bank employees. Results suggest that there is a positive relation between co-ethnic bank employees and the probability of being self-employed. This effect is most pronounced for immigrants who arrived with low education, for males and for those residing in metropolitan regions. The effects are substantial and robust to a wide set of controls for labor market characteristics of the ethnic group at the local level. These results provide evidence of an ethnic component in the formal credit markets. Essay 3 (with Oskar Nordström Skans): This essay investigates the impact of a collective agreement stipulating a one shot increase in establishment-specific wage levels in a public-sector setting where wages otherwise are set according to individualized wage bargaining. The agreement stipulated that wages should increase in proportion to the number of low-paid females within each establishment. We find that actual wages among incumbents responded to the share of females with a wage below the stipulated threshold, conditional on the separate effects of the share of low wage earners, and the share of females. We find clear evidence of path-dependence in wages, covered workers remained on higher wage levels 4 years after the agreement took effect. The increase in wages resulted in a reduced probability of exit among young workers with relatively good grades and a lower frequency of new hires at the establishment level.