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This study presents a picture of the social, political and economic life of the Gloucestershire county community on the eve of, and during the civil war, and discusses the causes and effects of the conflict in the Gloucestershire context. / Chapter One describes the county in 1640, studying its physical features, wealth and pursuits and social structure. The second chapter offers a survey of the 'county community,' the prominent county families who formed a small but most powerful and influential group in the county. / Chapter Three attempts to classify the established county gentry in terms of landed income and to consider how far it is possible to describe the class as 'rising' during the early seventeenth century. The fourth chapter covers the personal lives of the resident peers and major gentry, considering the strength and impact of kinship and marriage bonds among the leading families. / Chapter Five considers the role of the gentry is governors of the shire. The sixth chapter traces the development of opposition in the county to the policies of the Caroline government. / Chapter Seven presents a narrative of 1640-42. The next chapter suggests that, at the beginning of the civil war, the elite gentry families began losing their predominance in county affairs due to external commitments and divisions among them. / The ninth chapter describes military rule in Gloucestershire between 1642 and 1646. Finally, the last chapter assesses some of the effects of civil war.

Liverpool and Baltimore in the 1980s were amongst the poorest cities in the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. Since the 1960s, the ports on which they had built their economies and their reputations had all but collapsed and thousands of manufacturing jobs had been relocated or slashed. Property-led regeneration did more for the investors behind projects and the tourists who enjoyed them than for the cities' working classes. In such cities, battered by forces largely beyond their control, what could people disadvantaged by race and/or economic status do to compete for the resources necessary to improve their living conditions and wield power on a citywide level? This thesis explores the capacity of poor and middle-income people's pressure groups to successfully accomplish their goals in Liverpool and Baltimore during the 1980s. To do so, it examines three case study groups in Liverpool, the Merseyside Community Relations Council, the Eldonian Community Association, and the Anti-Cuts Campaign; and one in Baltimore, Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development. It follows their trajectories under unusually authoritarian local political regimes, the Militant Tendency-directed Labour city council in Liverpool and the Schaefer mayoral administration in Baltimore, through local elections in 1987, and finally under the more open local political regimes following those elections. Their success depended on three sets of factors. First, strong leadership and an animating cause were necessary conditions for groups to cohere, but were not sufficient to ensure their success. That further depended on a group's goals and the distribution of resources necessary to accomplish those goals, which in turn shaped the strategies each group chose to pursue its agenda. Third and finally, the effectiveness of those strategies depended on the group's ability to access and influence the resource-holders identified and, finally, on the scope for action of those resource-holders themselves.

In 1655, Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell's Council of State commissioned a group of army officers for the purpose of "securing the peace of the commonwealth." Under the authority of the Instrument of Government, a written constitution not sanctioned by Parliament, the Council sent army major-generals into the counties to raise new horse militias and to support them financially with a tax on Royalists which the army officers would also collect. In counties such as Essex--the focus of this study--the major-generals were assisted in their work by small groups of commissioners, mostly local men "well-affected" to the Interregnum government. In addition to their militia and tax duties, the men were instructed to see to the implementation and furtherance of a variety of central government policies. Barely a year after its inception, a bill sanctioning the scheme was voted down in January 1657 by a Parliament unconvinced that the work done by the major-generals was in the best interests of the nation. This thesis examines the development and inception of the major-generals initiative by the Council of State, the work the major-generals and their commissioners engaged in, and the nature and cause of the reaction to their efforts in the shires. In the years and centuries following the Stuart Restoration, the major-generals were frequently portrayed as agents of Cromwellian tyranny, and more recently scholars have argued that the officers were primarily concerned with the promulgation of a godly reformation. This study looks at the aims and work of the major-generals largely through an analysis of state papers and Essex administrative records, and it concludes that the Council and officers were preoccupied more with threats to order and stability than with morals. Additionally, by examining the court records and work of the justices of the peace in Essex, this study shows that in regard to improving order the major-generals' work was unremarkable for its efficacy and but little different than previous law- and statute-enforcement activity traditionally carried out by local administrators. Based on this assessment of the major-generals' efforts to improve order as both limited and completely un-revolutionary, this thesis argues that the strongly negative reaction to the major-generals by the parliamentary class was due more to the officers' and government's encroachment on gentry power and local privilege than either the abrogation of the liberties of the people or any modest efforts to foist godliness on the shires. Religion was a major issue during the English Civil Wars, but the demise of one of the Interregnum government's most ambitious attempts to improve security in the localities was rooted not in sectarian distempers but rather in the gentry's preoccupation with keeping central government from meddling in local matters or taxing anyone in their class without parliamentary approval.

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