La première source de la business judgment rule a été la jurisprudence. Celle-ci a été la source des codifications incitatives et contraignantes. Nos recherches ont mis en évidence deux types de formulations de la business judgment rule. Le premier type est la formulation prétorienne lato sensu et stricto sensu. Le second type est la formulation codifiée (Model Business Corporation Act, Corporate Director's Guidebook, Principles of Corporate Governance, lois limitant la responsabilité personnelle des dirigeants). De plus, nos recherches ont dégagé 9 types de termes qui se retrouvent dans tous les types des formulations. Les 4 premiers types de termes correspondent respectivement (1) aux pouvoirs des dirigeants et à leur discrétion, (2) au statut des dirigeants, (3) aux devoirs des dirigeants, (4) aux degrés de devoirs requis et à la gravité de la transgression de ces devoirs sanctionnée (standard of conduct). Les cinq types de termes suivants correspondent respectivement (1) au droit à l'erreur, (2) à la présomption de comportement/conduite, (3) au refus d'un contrôle judiciaire, (4) à la charge de la preuve, (5) à la justification de la business judgment rule (standard of revision). Les deux différences fondamentales entre les formulations de la business judgment rule sont les suivantes. La première différence se situe au niveau des conditions d'application de la règle et concerne la relation entre le standard de conduite, c'est-à-dire le type des devoirs, le degré des devoirs et la gravité de la transgression des devoirs, et le standard de responsabilité, c'est-à-dire les devoirs examinés quand la business judgment rule s'applique. La seconde différence fondamentale entre les formulations se situe au niveau des effets de la règle et concerne l'étendue d'un contrôle judiciaire sur le résultat de l'action ou de l'omission des dirigeants, c'est-à-dire le prix grossièrement inadéquat, l'abus de discrétion, le dépassement grossier, etc. / The first source of the « business judgment rule » is the jurisprudence. The jurisprudence was the source of the « soft law » and « hard law » codifications. The research showed two types of formulations of the « business judgment rule ». The first type is the jurisprudence formulation lato sensu_and stricto sensu. The second type is the codification formulation (Mode) Business Corporation Act, Corporate Director's Guidebook, Principles of Corporate Governance, lois limitant la responsabilité personnelle des dirigeants). The research showed nine types of terms which may be found in the formulations of the « business judgment rule». The first four terms correspond respectively to (1) the powers of the governors of the corporation and their discretion ; (2) their status ; (3) their duties, and (4) the degree of their duties. This first type of terms constitutes the standard of conduct. The next five types of terms correspond respectively to (1) the right to the error; (2) the presumption of the conduct; (3) the refusal of judicial review; (4) the burden of proof; (5) the justification of the « business judgment rule ». This second type of terms constitutes the standard of revision. There are two fundamental differences between the formulations of the « business judgment rule ». The first difference is situated at the level of the conditions of application of the « business judgment rule », and concerns the relations between the standard of conduct and the standard of revision. The second difference is situated at the level of the effects of the « business judgment rule » and concerns the scope of judicial review.

A través del presente trabajo, el autor busca introducir al lector en la problemática actual sobre las transacciones entre partes relacionadas. Teniendo en cuenta dicha finalidad, el reconocido experto en Derecho societario realiza un análisis de la regulación de los distintos instrumentos existentes que apuntan a mitigar o resolver los problemas ocasionados en base a dichas transacciones. El autor inicia describiendo el panorama normativo que se encuentra en el Derecho Comparado para, luego, teniendo ello como base, realizar el escrutinio de la normativa peruana sobre el particular.   Through this work, the author seeks to introduce the reader to the current problems on transactions between related parties. With this purpose in mind, the renowned expert in Corporate Law performs an analysis of the regulation of the various existing instruments that aim to mitigate or resolve the problems caused on the basis of such transactions. The author starts describing the regulatory landscape that is in Comparative Law. Then, having this as a basis; he carries out a scrutiny of the Peruvian legislation on the particular.

Magister Legum - LLM / The so called business judgment rule (hereinafter referred to as ―the BJR or the rule‖) that serves to protect directors from liability for negative consequences of honest, reasonable business decisions that went wrong, was developed by the American judiciary in the early 19th Century.2 Percy v. Millaudon, a Louisiana Supreme Court decision quoted above, articulated what is now referred to as the BJR.3 This case provides the earliest expression of the American BJR.4 Delaware courts subsequently issued a series of cases formulating the BJR as a presumption.5 Although the earliest expression of the rule was provided by a Louisiana court, the dissertation will focus on the Delaware case law formulation of the rule.6 The essence of the BJR is that judges should not second guess directors‘ decisions if certain elements of the BJR are fulfilled.7 Courts are required to exercise caution when dealing with claims brought by either stakeholders or shareholders against directors who have made bona fide, also referred to as good faith, business decisions.8 In order to be protected by the BJR and for it to act as a safe harbour, the court will determine whether certain requirements have been met before applying the rule.9 The Delaware courts formulated the BJR as a presumption and in order for directors to be protected by the rule they must have made an informed business decision, in good faith and in the honest belief that the decision will be in the best interest of the company.10 As will be discussed later, this formulation of the rule is referred to as the traditional BJR. In addition to the aforementioned formulation, another formulation was provided by the American Law Institute (hereafter referred to as the ―ALI formulation‖).11 Initially there had been difficulties codifying the ALI version of the rule but later it was successfully codified in paragraph 4.01(c) of the ALI Corporate Governance Project.12 This formulation requires a director to ensure that he has no personal interest in the matter, he is reasonably informed of the matter prior to making the decision and he rationally believes the decision will be in the best interest of the company.13 If the director complies with the aforementioned requirements, the director will be considered to have acted in good faith.14 Directors owe fiduciary duties to the company and in instances where they breach one or more of these duties they can incur personal liability.15 The rule thus emerged because of the need to protect directors and it serves as a safe harbour for those individuals who made a decision in conformity with the aforementioned requirements.16 In commercial terms the rule bestows economic freedoms and freedom of entrepreneurship to directors guided, in any case, by ―the best interest of the company‖.17 The most commonly cited reasons for the existence of the rule are that it promotes risk taking, encourages competent persons to serve as directors, prevents judicial second-guessing and promotes judicial efficiency. It further provides directors with sufficient freedom to manage the company and it ensures that the interest of shareholders and those of directors are balanced.18