Some environmental engineers do not understand how to perceive profitable opportunities in redeveloping the large number of contaminated brownfield sites in New Jersey. The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to find effective decision-making strategies that help environmental engineers acquire profitable environmental redevelopment projects. The target population consisted of 4 environmental engineers in an environmental organization in Camden County, New Jersey who possessed proven decision-making strategies that helped them acquire profitable environmental redevelopment projects in the past 5 years. The conceptual framework for this study was the multiple criteria decision method (MCDM). Semistructured interviews were conducted with the engineers, and company documents were additional sources of data gathered. Triangulation and member checking were used to ensure the trustworthiness of interpretations. Five themes emerged from the analyses relating to strategies for an MCDM assessment in project management, a go/no-go assessment in project selections, education and training, ethics as an organizational value, and project management. These findings may lead to social change in Camden County, New Jersey community organizations, such as schools, daycare centers, and local businesses, which may benefit from the knowledge and safety recommendations of remediation decision making. Furthermore, these findings may provide opportunities for environment organizations to teach and train stakeholders on environmental processes while providing profitable opportunities to shareholders through sustainable practices.

Submitted by Daniella Santos (daniella.santos@fgv.br) on 2008-11-18T13:35:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Luis _Saporta_2008.pdf: 714856 bytes, checksum: 6d539d601783deaee9d41dca8fdf4f62 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Antoanne Pontes(antoanne.pontes@fgv.br) on 2008-11-18T13:39:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Luis _Saporta_2008.pdf: 714856 bytes, checksum: 6d539d601783deaee9d41dca8fdf4f62 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2008-11-18T13:39:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Luis _Saporta_2008.pdf: 714856 bytes, checksum: 6d539d601783deaee9d41dca8fdf4f62 (MD5) / In this work, we study the role that the perception of law enforcement has in agents’ decisions to invade public areas and explore in a predatory way the forest within. We developed a microeconomic model of choice under uncertainties, in which farmers compare their payoff of invasion with their payoff of following the rules. The payoff of invasion is calculated from the gain/loss resulted of being caught or not in this process, weighed by the probability of each event, which is a function of the government spending in law enforcement institutions. Following this, we calculate the ideal amount of government spending in order to achieve the maximum yield in the agricultural sector, as deforestation results in more land, but also decreases the productivity of the sector. Then, we make an analysis of mechanism design and deforestation, deriving the best direct mechanism from a Nash Equilibrium in a complete information game. Finally, we describe the real mechanisms that the Brazilian government has to reduce deforestation, and propose the ways these mechanisms can be used in different regions of the Amazon. / Nesse trabalho, estudamos o papel que a percepção de impunidade tem sobre os agentes que escolhem invadir áreas públicas na Amazônia para explorar de forma predatória os recursos florestais e ocupar a terra. Para isso, foi desenvolvido um modelo microeconômico de escolha sob incerteza, em que os fazendeiros comparam os payoffs provenientes da invasão ou de seguir a lei. O payoff da invasão foi calculado do ganho/perda resultante de ser pego ou não no ato ilegal, pesando as probabilidades de cada um desses eventos ocorrer (que é função dos gastos do governo com fiscalização na região). Em seguida, foi calculado a quantidade ótima de gastos do governo em fiscalização, levando em conta um governo interessado em maximizar a produção agropecuária regional, já que, por um lado, o desmatamento resulta em maior disponibilidade de terra para o setor agropecuário, porém, por outro, diminui a produtividade dado seu impacto sobre a qualidade ambiental. Depois, fazemos uma analise sobre desenho de mecanismo e desmatamento, desenvolvendo o melhor mecanismo direto de um Equilíbrio de Nash no jogo de informação perfeita, para em seguida descrever as opções de mecanismos possíveis para o governo brasileiro lidar com o desmatamento na Amazônia.