Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 161-169). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, June 2000. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 1999. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 110-113). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users. Address: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9947970.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Purdue University, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-111).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Western Ontario, 1991. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-148).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Minnesota, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 122-127).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 174-185).

This research attempts to evaluate the stability of money demand functions and estimate monetary inflation models in the East African Community (EAC), using quarterly aggregate data that range from 2000Q1 to 2012Q3. We used Johansen co-integration analysis to estimate and analyse the stability of the M3 money demand model for each country member of the EAC. From this estimation, we derived a country-specific measure of money overhang. We compared its forecasting power of future inflation with that of money stock growth, and money stock available in the economy. Regarding country-specific money demand functions, with the exception of Uganda, we identified a reasonable and stable country-specific M3 money demand model. Also, for predicting future inflation, the estimation results showed that M3 money stock growth is more reliable in Burundi and in Kenya, while M3 money overhang is preferable in Rwanda and M3 money stock in Tanzania. As both country-specific and regional (EAC area) information on monetary quantity growth and its impact on price level is important to know in a monetary union, we considered the EAC area as a single market and attempted to estimate the aggregate (EAC area) demand functions for broad money M2 and M3 using Johansen co-integration analysis. The estimated long-run aggregate money demand models M2 and M3 appeared to be stable over the sample period. However, the aggregate M2 and M3 at the EAC level were proven to be weakly exogenous, which should discard them for consideration at the EAC level as the intermediate targets variables in order to achieve the overall objective of price stability in the EAC region. Instead, short-term interest rate should be given a prominent role in monetary policy framework at the EAC level.

This dissertation includes four independent essays. Essay one (chapter two) considers a two-echelon, two-supply chain (SC) system in which manufacturers supply a generic product to their exclusive retailers, who then use service level and retail price to compete for heterogeneous consumers. We question: how do varied consumer preferences get reflected not only in differentiated products/services, but through them to the choice of SC structure that delivers them? We find that SCs can strategically manipulate the product/service strategy and SC structure to hedge themselves from horizontal competition. The key finding is that in a market where consumers have stronger diminishing marginal utility on service, then less differentiated products/services will be observed, and only decentralized supply chains can be the market equilibrium. This is in contrast to the well-known result in marketing that choosing vertical integration is always a Nash equilibrium, and that choosing decentralization can only be a Nash equilibrium when product substitutability is high. Essay two (chapter three) explores the classical revenue management problem in a competitive context, with both price and seat inventory competition. The main question is how should management make strategic marketing (pricing) and operational (seat allocation) decisions in such a competitive market? Do the conventional approaches (models and algorithms based on a monopoly market) give us the appropriate strategies? We find that in a market where price competition dominates, managers should set a lower price and safety protection level for full fare customers than in a monopoly or alliance market. In a market where seat inventory competition dominates, managers should set a higher price and safety protection level than a monopoly or alliance would. Interestingly, in a market where the two levels of competition are more evenly matched, managers should set a lower price and a higher safety protection level than a monopoly. We also explore the effect of the degree of competition and the market structure on the strategic decisions, and whether there is a first adopter advantage or second adopter disadvantage with revenue management. Essay three aims to extend the understanding of the Newsvendor model to a competitive framework. In a market with both price and inventory competition, newsvendors can gain customers with price and secure the sales with availability. We find that the newsvendors should adjust their inventory (safety stock or total inventory) and pricing strategies responsively to the nature of the competitive market. The profits of the newsvendors and their suppliers are also different under different competitive contexts. Both the Nash equilibrium strategy and the players' profits are influenced by the demand correlation and variability, but in different ways under different competitive scenarios. These observations provide some theoretical basis for the strategic selection made by newsvendors operating in certain competitive markets. Essay four (chapter five) explores the issue of competitors cooperating. It is a commonplace observation that even the most competitive firms often find it in their best interests to cooperate. An example of cooperation in operations management is when two supply chains agree in advance to transship or 'pool' surplus product for use by another. The alternative is to let their customers switch unsatisfied demand to a competitor. Which is preferable, and how does such a preference depend on the many parameters, prices, the nature of competition, the degree of competition, wholesale prices etc? To get answers, we study a stylized model under three market environments: a market with an exogenous retail price, an endogenous retail price, and with price competition. The summary answer is that strong price competition between substitutable goods should lead to caution in signing transshipment contracts. But with little price competition and particularly where retailers are free to set the transshipment price, then transshipment is probably the way to go. We also address the issue of an optimal transshipment price in each scenario, and compare the Nash equilibrium strategies between competing and transshipping. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate