Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1972. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliography.

The idea that some sub-set of the properties of an object captures what it is to be that thing i.e. that it has an essence which is there to be discovered and about which we can be mistaken - is a commonsense assumption that we use all the time. However, philosophers of this century have regarded the realism about essence with skepticism, arguing that we impose essences on things by the way we define our concepts as opposed to discovering them. Essences are supposedly characteristics of our concepts rather than of objects in the world. This was the orthodox view until a group of philosophers of language developed the theory of direct reference. They claimed that proper names and certain other words refer non-connotatively which entails that the real properties of objects are crucial to the establishment of the reference of such terms. It can be shown that the properties involved in reference determination must be all and only the necessary properties of those objects. This discovery has been taken to mark the rehabilitation of the notion of essence, with an object’s essence being taken to be that set of properties which it must have in all possible worlds in which it exists. I will argue that the theory of direct reference is correct up to the point at which it assimilates the necessary properties of objects to their essences. I will show that the set of an object’s necessary properties cannot fulfill the role reserved for the concept of essence in metaphysical hypotheses concerning the nature of objects. I will go on to show that a sub-set of a thing’s necessary properties can fulfill this role and I will suggest that we identify the members of this sub-set by testing their ability to furnish the kinds of explanations we expect from essences. I will demonstrate how this can be done using the Aristotelian idea that the notion of essence is required in order to explain how it is that objects can persist through change.

Edition commerciale de : Dissertation : Philosophie : Freiburg : 1982-1983. / Bibliogr. p. 440-448. Index.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008. / Title from file title page. Christie J. Hartley, Andrew I. Cohen, committee co-chairs; Andrew Altman, committee member. Electronic text (70 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed August 1, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 68-70).

Thesis(M.S.)--Auburn University, 2008. / Abstract. Includes bibliographic references (p.43-46).

published_or_final_version / Humanities / Master / Master of Philosophy

‘Essentialism’ and ‘constructivism’ are two epistemological perspectives that have been used in the philosophical analysis of mystical experience. ‘Essentialism’ attempts to establish mystical experience as a distinct category of experience, cutting across cultural boundaries. ‘Constructivism’ attempts to establish mystical experience as unique to its various cultural contexts. The two viewpoints are variously held in opposition. ‘Constructivism’ often appears as something of an assumed perspective and is rarely, if ever, defended (in any depth) by the individuals whose views it apparently represents. Recent ‘essentialist’ thinkers (‘non-constructivists’) have taken issue with this tendency to assume ‘what is to be proved’, and have reasoned in attempts to establish ‘constructivisim’ as inappropriate to certain experiences that appear to be found recurring in reports of mystical experiences across cultures. However, those analyses have been concerned to recommend their own (‘essentialist’ / ‘non-constructivist’) position and have, therefore, operated with a certain amount of bias, despite elements of commendable intent. Indeed it is in virtue of these commendable elements i.e. by exploring the epistemological assumptions of authors who attempt to make mystical experience culture specific, that ‘essentialists’ posit and provide justification for the classification of ‘constructivism’ as a distinct philosophical approach to the data of enquiry. ‘Constructivists’ (so-called), on the other hand, tend to emphasise the importance and role of context in their discussions, and in some cases reject the classification of their views as particularly ‘constructivist’. The thesis examines the reasonable defensibility of ‘nonconstructed’ mystical experience from three perspectives: ‘essentialist’, ‘constructivist’ and ‘contextualist’ – outlining considerations for anyone approaching the material via each, and addressing the relevant issues of diversity at tension between these recognisable philosophical viewpoints.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1987. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 230-237).

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 220-231) Also available in print.