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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Why Immoral Art Cannot Morally Harm Us

Caruso, Maria 12 August 2014 (has links)
Both philosophers and literary critics have championed artworks as necessary to moral education. As a result many of these critics believe that art that is bad or immoral can causally affect our character, resulting in moral harm. Moral harm is the idea that artworks possess a strong disposition to affect our moral beliefs such that we are less able to distinguish between what is good and what is bad. I examine this concept of moral harm and argue that immoral artworks do not have this kind of causal power over our moral beliefs. Proponents of the moral harm thesis are in error to attribute such a power to artworks. Additionally, I propose a definition of immoral artworks consistent with moral harm, as well as discuss the distinction between immoral artworks and artworks that are merely elicit disgust or offense.
2

Art, Moral Value, and Significance

Thompson, Ryan Mitchell January 2012 (has links)
Debate concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics has re-emerged in contemporary aesthetic literature. All of the major contemporary positions, I argue, treat this relationship as existing between the "moral value" of art and its aesthetic value. Throughout this thesis I analyse the various "value- based" positions (ethicism, moderate moralism, and contextualism) and examine whether their accounts of this relationship hold. My aim is to explore whether an alternative account - in which the aesthetic value of art can be enhanced or negated through its "moral significance", rather than its "moral value" - is plausible. I argue, that given the failure of these value- based positions we should favour a "significance- based contexutalist" approach that is better equipped to account for the complexity of both our engagement with art, and the moral reflection that it invites.

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