Dans cette thèse, nous étudions l’immoralisme dans l’œuvre romanesque d’André Gide. Le premier chapitre est consacré non seulement à l’approche théorique et méthodologique mais aussi à l’analyse de la subversion que nous considérons comme l’un des vecteurs de l’immoralisme dans l’œuvre romanesque d’André Gide. Le second chapitre et la seconde partie relèvent de la sémiotique du sensible, des passions et la sémiotique tensive. De même, dans la seconde partie, nous démontrons que l’immoraliste est un sujet en tension en déterminant les différentes passions auxquelles se rattache le thème de l’immoralisme dans l’œuvre romanesque d’André Gide. La troisième partie traite de l’échec de l’immoralisme. En nous basant sur l’étude de la passion du désespoir, de la pitié, des simulacres passionnels, des modalités véridictoires, la forme de vie de l’anticonformisme, la forme de vie de la volupté, la forme de vie de l’errance et de l’éthique individualiste, nous notons que l’immoralisme est un échec et conduit à l’impossible bonheur. C’est d’ailleurs, la raison pour laquelle, le sujet immoraliste finit par renoncer à ses valeurs individuelles pour se conjoindre à celles de l’actant collectif. / In this thesis, we study the immoralism in André Gide’s romantic work. The first chapter is devoted not only to the theoretical and methodological approach but also to the analysis of subversion which we consider as one of the vectors of immoralism in André Gide’s romantic work. The second chapter and the second part make out the semiotics of the sensitive, passions and tensive. Similarly, in the second part, we demonstrate that immoralist is a subject in tension by determining the different passions to which is linked the theme of immoralism in André Gide’s romantic work. The third part deals with the failure of immoralism. Based on the study of the passion of despair, pity, passional simulacra, veridictory modalities, the life form of anticonformism, the life form of pleasure, the life form of wandering and individualistic ethic, we note that immoralism is a failure and leads to the impossible happiness. This is also the reason why the immoralist subject eventually renounces his individual values to be conjoined with those of the collective actant.

With this dissertation, firstly, I address the issue of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) so-called ‘immoralism’. When he calls himself an ‘immoralist’ and even ‘the first immoralist’ (EH Destiny 2), he seems to be the first philosopher to consider morality as something negative, something we had better got rid of. Yet, he favours ‘noble morality’ and ‘higher moralities’ which he insists ought to be possible (BGE 202). I shall interpret Nietzsche’s explicit claim of ‘immoralism’ and his ‘campaign against morality’ as a rejection of a particular kind of morality ¾ Christian morality ‘that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself’ (EH Destiny 4). His ‘immoralism’ does not reject the idea of an ethical life. Nietzsche favours a ‘supra-moral’ version of life (GM II 2&BGE 257). The move from a moral to a supra-moral orientation to life implies a kind of self-overcoming, a process which has both a ‘negative’ (‘destructive’) and a ‘positive’ (‘productive’) side. Firstly, I shall give an account of the ‘negative’ side, which involves Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality. In his Genealogy, Nietzsche criticizes the man of ressentiment, the metaphysical two-worlds distinction: ‘true world’ and ‘apparent world’, and the ascetic ideal of the will to truth, which he considers as a will to nothingness (GM III 28). His notion of perspectivism advocates a plurality of values and perspectives as opposed to any notion of an absolute truth. Then, I shall look into his ‘positive’ ethic, as exemplified in the figures of Zarathustra and the Übermensch, and the paradox of the Übermenschas ‘the annihilator of morality’ (EH Books 1) and as ‘the designation of a type of supreme achievement’ (EH Books 1). By proclaiming a process of ‘self-overcoming of morality’ (BGE 32), I believe that Nietzsche proposes an experimental morality in order to improve mankind. He considers morality as a pose, as progress (BGE 216), and ‘mere symptomatology’ (TI ‘Improvers’ of Mankind 1). Morality is the effect, or symptom of a continuous improvement within an individual. Nietzsche seeks to make us become aware of our continuous self-improvement, that we should invent our own virtue (A 11) in order to become what we are. Nietzsche envisions the possibility of evolving a magnanimous and courageous human type who is capable of giving style to his character (GS 290), the supreme human achievement ¾ the Übermensch. His idea of the Übermensch implies a never-ending struggle for self-perfection and self-fulfilment. There are affinities between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Buddhism, such as emphasizing practice, the recognition of the transient nature of human existence, and an emphasis on impermanence. Buddhist teachings show various feasible ways to attain enlightenment and buddhahood. The path to enlightenment and buddhahood can be shown to share some features with Nietzsche’s process of self-overcoming, which leads to self-transformation and self-perfection. The emphasis on the practice of the spirit of Bodhisattva by Humanistic Buddhism seems to lend itself as complement to Nietzsche’s philosophy, a notion I explore in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. / Dissertation (MA (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Philosophy / unrestricted

Debate concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics has re-emerged in contemporary aesthetic literature. All of the major contemporary positions, I argue, treat this relationship as existing between the "moral value" of art and its aesthetic value. Throughout this thesis I analyse the various "value- based" positions (ethicism, moderate moralism, and contextualism) and examine whether their accounts of this relationship hold. My aim is to explore whether an alternative account - in which the aesthetic value of art can be enhanced or negated through its "moral significance", rather than its "moral value" - is plausible. I argue, that given the failure of these value- based positions we should favour a "significance- based contexutalist" approach that is better equipped to account for the complexity of both our engagement with art, and the moral reflection that it invites.