Diss. : Philosophische Fakultät : Zürich : 1982. - Bibliogr. p. 169-173. Index. Résumé en anglais. -

Pī. Ec. Ḍī.--Jabalapura--Rānī Durgāvatī viśvavidyālaya, 1977. / Notes bibliogr.

Submitted by Geandra Rodrigues (geandrar@gmail.com) on 2018-01-19T17:18:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 fabiorobertogoncalvesdeoliveiramedeiros.pdf: 2842304 bytes, checksum: a8a61cfaeff0309b518b03c5df2a0dde (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2018-01-24T11:26:43Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 fabiorobertogoncalvesdeoliveiramedeiros.pdf: 2842304 bytes, checksum: a8a61cfaeff0309b518b03c5df2a0dde (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-24T11:26:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 fabiorobertogoncalvesdeoliveiramedeiros.pdf: 2842304 bytes, checksum: a8a61cfaeff0309b518b03c5df2a0dde (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-24 / Essa dissertação busca elucidar a investigação da relação entre a psicologia analítica, do fundador Carl Gustav Jung, e o budismo, em sua vertente conhecida como budismo Mahāyāna. Para isso, serão analisados detalhadamente três aspetos fundamentais. O primeiro aspecto refere-se à motivação de Jung para o diálogo com as religiões do oriente em geral, fundada num diagnóstico criterioso sobre a crise espiritual do ocidente e sua tradição cristã. O segundo aspecto refere-se ao diálogo direto estabelecido com o pensamento budista em suas diversas vertentes, em especial o budismo Mahāyāna, no contexto do orientalismo prevalente na Europa de sua época. E o terceiro e último aspecto, refere-se às semelhanças e diferenças entre os processos de transformação propostos, de um lado, pela psicologia analítica através da noção de individuação e, de outro, pelo budismo Mahāyāna através do chamado o caminho do Bodhisattva - bodhisattvamārga. Dessa forma, com base nos estudos sobre a psicologia analítica e sobre o budismo Mahāyāna, identifica-se que, de um lado, este último serviu de algum forma de apoio para o primeiro e, de outro lado, ambos os sistemas apresentam propostas afins no que tange aos objetivos de uma transformação espiritual. Com este estudo proposto apontaremos que elas são de alguma forma convergentes e que se enriquecem com o diálogo mútuo. / This dissertation seeks to elucidate the investigation of the relationship between analytical psychology, founder Carl Gustav Jung, and Buddhism, in its slope known as Mahāyāna Buddhism. For this, three key aspects will be analyzed in detail. The first aspect concerns Jung's motivation for dialogue with Eastern religions in general, based on a careful diagnosis of the spiritual crisis of the West and its Christian tradition. The second aspect refers to the direct dialogue established with Buddhist thought in its various aspects, especially Mahāyāna Buddhism, in the context of orientalism prevalent in Europe of its time. And the third and final aspect refers to the similarities and differences between the processes of transformation proposed on the one hand by analytic psychology through the notion of individuation and, on the other hand, Mahāyāna Buddhism through the so-called Bodhisattva-bodhisattvamārga path . Thus, on the basis of the studies on analytical psychology and Māhāyana Buddhism, one identifies that, on the one hand, the latter served some form of support for the former, and on the other, both systems present similar proposals in the Which relates to the goals of a spiritual transformation. With this proposed study we will point out that they are somehow convergent and that they are enriched by mutual dialogue.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2018-09-20T15:32:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 rodrigoyurigomesteixeira.pdf: 1358867 bytes, checksum: e5a630d4971872c192ec1fccc3f29568 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2018-10-16T11:51:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 rodrigoyurigomesteixeira.pdf: 1358867 bytes, checksum: e5a630d4971872c192ec1fccc3f29568 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-10-16T11:51:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 rodrigoyurigomesteixeira.pdf: 1358867 bytes, checksum: e5a630d4971872c192ec1fccc3f29568 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-14 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Essa pesquisa empreende uma leitura do Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra, um importante texto da tradição do budismo Mahāyāna, buscando compreender os fundamentos do ideal do bodhisattva de acordo com esse sūtra. O ideal do bodhisattva é uma forma de conceber a prática espiritual budista que envolve a proposição de objetivos, métodos e motivações para a prática. No "Sūtra dos Ensinamentos de Vimalakīrti" o ideal do bodhisattva é fundamentado a partir de dois elementos: prajñā (sabedoria) e upāya (habilidade em métodos). Ao fundamentar o ideal do bodhisattva na interação dinâmica entre esses dois fatores da vida espiritual, o Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra mobiliza aspectos muito importantes da filosofia nãodualista Mahāyāna. Além disso, o ideal do bodhisattva oferece suporte para uma compreensão Mahāyāna acerca da dinâmica e diversidade da tradição budista. / This research undertakes a reading of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra, an important text in the Buddhist Mahāyāna tradition, seeking to understand the fundamentals of the bodhisattva ideal according to that sūtra. The bodhisattva ideal is a way of conceiving the buddhist spiritual practice which proposes objectives, methods and motivation for the practice. In the "Teachings of Vimalakīrti Sūtra" the bodhisattva ideal is founded upon two elements: prajñā (wisdom) and upāya (skillful means). In founding the bodhisattva ideal on the dynamic interaction between these two factors of the spiritual life, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra brings together very import aspects of the Mahāyāna non-dualist philosophy. Furthermore, the bodhisattva ideal supports a Mahāyāna understanding of the dynamics and diversity of the Buddhist tradition.

The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) saw China transition from the medieval to the early modern period. This transition was marked by rampant piracy, a boom in book publishing, and other developments that challenged traditional social and economic habits, thereby forcing China to evolve. Buddhism during the time was similarly stressed, facing government suppression early in the Ming, and facing steeper competition for donations and patronage throughout the dynasty. In response, Ming Buddhism adapted itself to the changing times in numerous ways: the rise of lay societies and an increase in devotional practice being two important examples. One of the most prominent figures of late Ming Buddhism is Yunqi Zhuhong (1535-1615). In 1587 Zhuhong wrote the "Fanwangjing xindipin pusajie yishu fayin," a commentary on the Brahma Net Sutra, which contains a list of ten major and forty-eight minor "bodhisattva precepts" taken by both lay and monastic Buddhists in East Asia. Therefore, Zhuhong's commentary allowed him to interpret the common moral framework of all Buddhists in his local and extended community. This dissertation offers a translation and analysis of key portions of Zhuhong's commentary on the Brahma Net Sutra in order to understand his philosophy of violence. By unearthing Zhuhong's arguments regarding when killing is or is not acceptable this dissertation aims to begin bringing Chinese philosophies of violence into conversation with western just war thought. Additionally, Zhuhong's philosophy of violence demonstrates what I term "Chan realism," which is an amalgam of moral and political realism. Understanding Zhuhong's philosophy of violence therefore also allows us to better understand the competing religious and political loyalties faced by those living in the late Ming. Lastly, by translating Zhuhong's philosophy of violence and analyzing his realism, this dissertation aims to increase our understanding of the novelty and innovation occurring within Chinese Buddhism during the Ming Dynasty.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Kansas, 1997. / Co-Chairs: Chu-tsing Li; Marsha Weidner. Includes bibliographical references.

Notre analyse porte sur la notion d’éveil au sein du Sûtra de Vimalakîrti. Premièrement, nous présentons et comparons les modèles d’éveil exposés dans ce texte, soit la figure du bouddha et – surtout – celle du bodhisattva; nous analysons leurs deux grands traits caractéristiques, c’est-à-dire la connaissance transcendante et les méthodes habiles, puis élaborons leur rôle par rapport à l’éveil. Il apparaît d’emblée que la connaissance transcendante est une connaissance non discursive de la réelle nature de toute chose et qu’elle est une condition nécessaire à l’éveil, alors que les méthodes habiles – aussi appelées expédients salvifiques – constituent la myriade de moyens rusés et provisoires conçus et employés par les bouddhas et bodhisattva dans le but d’amener les êtres ignorants à l’éveil et d’ainsi les libérer de l’attachement et de la souffrance. Dans le second chapitre, nous caractérisons l’état de conscience de l’éveillé à l’aide de notions telles la non-dualité, la non-discrimination et la non-pensée, puis présentons la conception de la pratique méditationnelle soutenue dans notre sûtra. Nous montrons que l’état d’éveil est un état de conscience non discriminateur au sein duquel l’identité personnelle et les phénomènes – ou la dualité sujet-objet – sont reconnus comme étant des illusions ou, plus précisément, des constructions mentales et langagières. Ainsi, la méditation apparaît comme étant une méthode habile provisoire dont les buts sont essentiellement la déconstruction du paradigme dualiste de la pensée discursive et la réalisation qu’il n’existe, ultimement et paradoxalement, aucune réelle entrave à l’éveil et aucune pratique méditationnelle nécessaire à l’expérience de l’éveil. / Our analysis pertains to the notion of awakening in the Vimalakîrti Sûtra. Firstly, we present and compare the models of awakening exposed in this text, namely the figure of the buddha and – especially – that of the bodhisattva; we analyze their two major characteristic traits, that is to say transcendent knowledge and skillful means, and elaborate on their relation to awakening. We quickly find that transcendent knowledge is a non discursive knowledge of the real nature of all things and that it is a necessary condition to awakening, whereas skillful means – also called salvific expedients – constitute the myriad of clever and merely provisory means conceived and used by buddhas and bodhisattva in order to bring all ignorant beings to awakening and thus to liberate them from attachment and suffering. In the second chapter, we characterize the state of consciousness of the awakened through notions such as non-duality, non-discrimination and no-mind, and present the conception of meditational practice upheld in our sûtra. We show that the state of awakening is a non discriminating state of consciousness in which personal identity and phenomena – or the subject-object duality – are recognized as illusions or, more precisely, as mental and linguistic constructions. Meditation thus appears to be a provisory skillful mean, the goals of which are the deconstruction of discursive thought’s dualist paradigm and the realization that, ultimately and paradoxically, there exist no real obstacles to awakening and no necessary meditational practice to the experience of awakening.

This diploma thesis concerns the iconography of early Buddhist art in India, especially in the region of ancient Gandhāra. It follows the development of representation of Buddha and bodhisattva from an aniconic type to establishment of anthropomorphous form during the reign of the Kushaṇas. It outlines the influence of the Hellenistic world on this form and tries to give a summary about the mixture of the symbolic and stylistic patterns as well as their further development in the later Buddhist art.

Notre analyse porte sur la notion d’éveil au sein du Sûtra de Vimalakîrti. Premièrement, nous présentons et comparons les modèles d’éveil exposés dans ce texte, soit la figure du bouddha et – surtout – celle du bodhisattva; nous analysons leurs deux grands traits caractéristiques, c’est-à-dire la connaissance transcendante et les méthodes habiles, puis élaborons leur rôle par rapport à l’éveil. Il apparaît d’emblée que la connaissance transcendante est une connaissance non discursive de la réelle nature de toute chose et qu’elle est une condition nécessaire à l’éveil, alors que les méthodes habiles – aussi appelées expédients salvifiques – constituent la myriade de moyens rusés et provisoires conçus et employés par les bouddhas et bodhisattva dans le but d’amener les êtres ignorants à l’éveil et d’ainsi les libérer de l’attachement et de la souffrance. Dans le second chapitre, nous caractérisons l’état de conscience de l’éveillé à l’aide de notions telles la non-dualité, la non-discrimination et la non-pensée, puis présentons la conception de la pratique méditationnelle soutenue dans notre sûtra. Nous montrons que l’état d’éveil est un état de conscience non discriminateur au sein duquel l’identité personnelle et les phénomènes – ou la dualité sujet-objet – sont reconnus comme étant des illusions ou, plus précisément, des constructions mentales et langagières. Ainsi, la méditation apparaît comme étant une méthode habile provisoire dont les buts sont essentiellement la déconstruction du paradigme dualiste de la pensée discursive et la réalisation qu’il n’existe, ultimement et paradoxalement, aucune réelle entrave à l’éveil et aucune pratique méditationnelle nécessaire à l’expérience de l’éveil. / Our analysis pertains to the notion of awakening in the Vimalakîrti Sûtra. Firstly, we present and compare the models of awakening exposed in this text, namely the figure of the buddha and – especially – that of the bodhisattva; we analyze their two major characteristic traits, that is to say transcendent knowledge and skillful means, and elaborate on their relation to awakening. We quickly find that transcendent knowledge is a non discursive knowledge of the real nature of all things and that it is a necessary condition to awakening, whereas skillful means – also called salvific expedients – constitute the myriad of clever and merely provisory means conceived and used by buddhas and bodhisattva in order to bring all ignorant beings to awakening and thus to liberate them from attachment and suffering. In the second chapter, we characterize the state of consciousness of the awakened through notions such as non-duality, non-discrimination and no-mind, and present the conception of meditational practice upheld in our sûtra. We show that the state of awakening is a non discriminating state of consciousness in which personal identity and phenomena – or the subject-object duality – are recognized as illusions or, more precisely, as mental and linguistic constructions. Meditation thus appears to be a provisory skillful mean, the goals of which are the deconstruction of discursive thought’s dualist paradigm and the realization that, ultimately and paradoxically, there exist no real obstacles to awakening and no necessary meditational practice to the experience of awakening.

With this dissertation, firstly, I address the issue of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) so-called ‘immoralism’. When he calls himself an ‘immoralist’ and even ‘the first immoralist’ (EH Destiny 2), he seems to be the first philosopher to consider morality as something negative, something we had better got rid of. Yet, he favours ‘noble morality’ and ‘higher moralities’ which he insists ought to be possible (BGE 202). I shall interpret Nietzsche’s explicit claim of ‘immoralism’ and his ‘campaign against morality’ as a rejection of a particular kind of morality ¾ Christian morality ‘that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself’ (EH Destiny 4). His ‘immoralism’ does not reject the idea of an ethical life. Nietzsche favours a ‘supra-moral’ version of life (GM II 2&BGE 257). The move from a moral to a supra-moral orientation to life implies a kind of self-overcoming, a process which has both a ‘negative’ (‘destructive’) and a ‘positive’ (‘productive’) side. Firstly, I shall give an account of the ‘negative’ side, which involves Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality. In his Genealogy, Nietzsche criticizes the man of ressentiment, the metaphysical two-worlds distinction: ‘true world’ and ‘apparent world’, and the ascetic ideal of the will to truth, which he considers as a will to nothingness (GM III 28). His notion of perspectivism advocates a plurality of values and perspectives as opposed to any notion of an absolute truth. Then, I shall look into his ‘positive’ ethic, as exemplified in the figures of Zarathustra and the Übermensch, and the paradox of the Übermenschas ‘the annihilator of morality’ (EH Books 1) and as ‘the designation of a type of supreme achievement’ (EH Books 1). By proclaiming a process of ‘self-overcoming of morality’ (BGE 32), I believe that Nietzsche proposes an experimental morality in order to improve mankind. He considers morality as a pose, as progress (BGE 216), and ‘mere symptomatology’ (TI ‘Improvers’ of Mankind 1). Morality is the effect, or symptom of a continuous improvement within an individual. Nietzsche seeks to make us become aware of our continuous self-improvement, that we should invent our own virtue (A 11) in order to become what we are. Nietzsche envisions the possibility of evolving a magnanimous and courageous human type who is capable of giving style to his character (GS 290), the supreme human achievement ¾ the Übermensch. His idea of the Übermensch implies a never-ending struggle for self-perfection and self-fulfilment. There are affinities between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Buddhism, such as emphasizing practice, the recognition of the transient nature of human existence, and an emphasis on impermanence. Buddhist teachings show various feasible ways to attain enlightenment and buddhahood. The path to enlightenment and buddhahood can be shown to share some features with Nietzsche’s process of self-overcoming, which leads to self-transformation and self-perfection. The emphasis on the practice of the spirit of Bodhisattva by Humanistic Buddhism seems to lend itself as complement to Nietzsche’s philosophy, a notion I explore in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. / Dissertation (MA (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Philosophy / unrestricted