Thesis (Ph. D.)--Syracuse University, 2009. / "Publication number: AAT 3381590."

<p> Egoism is the view that self-interest is the exclusive standard of morally right action. In this dissertation, I present two arguments for egoism: a naturalistic argument and an intuitive argument.</p><p> The naturalistic argument grounds egoism in a theory of what the end of every living thing is: The end of a living thing is, I will argue, only to survive. I set the stage for and develop this argument across the first four Chapters. In Chapter 1, I present the case for the prevailing, neo-Aristotelian view of the end of a living thing: The end of a living thing is to instantiate its species. The pursuit of this end is typically understood to involve not only survival, but also flourishing, reproducing, and helping other members of one&rsquo;s species, all in species-characteristic ways.</p><p> In Chapter 2, I argue that the aforementioned species view is false. </p><p> In Chapter 3, I develop the view that the end of every living thing, including every human living thing, is only to survive.</p><p> In Chapter 4, I argue that human well-being (or self-interest), the notion of what intrinsically benefits a human being, consists in and only in survival. </p><p> In the fifth and final Chapter, I develop the intuitive argument, which adopts the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that egoism aligns well with a critical mass of our intuitions about the moral life.</p><p>

The project that resulted in this work had two main goals. The first was to sort out the most plausible form of the moral error theory, the view made popular by J.L. Mackie in his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Second, I aimed to determine the extent of its plausibility. The first three chapters of this dissertation are the result of my attempt to accomplish the first goal, and the last two chapters are a consequence of the second. In the end, I argue that the most plausible version of the error theory (viz., Richard Joyce's development of Mackie's views) is not true. Along the way, I make three additional novel contributions to the meta-ethical literature. First, I provide a close reading of Mackie's work, and I argue that he has been misinterpreted thus far in the literature. Second, I attempt to clarify the linguistic and metaphysical components of the error theory. Third, I explicate a novel view in meta-ethics that isn't a direct descendent of Mackie's views, but which is, in many important respects, similar to his view. I call the view 'moral indecisionism', since its main thesis seems to agree with Hume when he writes, "The chief obstacle ... to our improvement in the moral ... sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms."

<p> This dissertation attempts to preserve the central tenets of a global moral theory called &ldquo;the capabilities approach&rdquo; as defended by Martha Nussbaum, but to do so in a way that better realizes its own goals of identifying gender injustices and gaining cross-cultural support by providing an alternative defense of it. Capabilities assess an individual&rsquo;s well-being based on what she is able to do (actions) and who she is able to be (states of existence). Nussbaum grounds her theory in the intuitive idea that each and every person is worthy of equal respect and dignity. The problem with grounding a theory in a version of intuitionism is that it runs the risk of authoritarian moral reasoning. I argue Nussbaum, in fact, is the final arbiter who decides which intuitions are mistaken, which are not, and how to interpret what people say to fit into her own framework. This method of justifying capabilities is most problematic in cases of social inequality whereby dominant group members do not feel they need to check their intuitions against non-dominant group members, and even if they did, they are not forced to take the non-dominant group&rsquo;s intuitions seriously. </p><p> I find capabilities as a global moral theory to be very promising, and I agree with Nussbaum that a list of capabilities is beneficial for identifying people who are not able to live a truly dignified human life. However, I am also sympathetic to the criticism of defending capabilities using a version of intuitionism. So, I offer an alternative method of justifying the capabilities rooted in the discourse ethics tradition. This method seeks all persons that are affected by the outcome to freely and equally share their opinion. This avoids the charge of authoritarian moral reasoning, because (1) it seeks perspectives other than simply one&rsquo;s own, but unlike traditional ethics, it (2) pays special attention to the ways in which power relations shape dialogue. Ultimately, I hope to have preserved the central tenets of the capabilities approach while better realizing Nussbaum&rsquo;s commitment to defending a theory that is gender sensitive and has gained cross-cultural support.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of History, August, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 305-314). Also available on the Internet.

<p> The following study discusses servant leadership in relation to the larger topic of global leadership. It derives composite definitions for each from the literature and offers a philosophical foundation for servant leadership in order to prepare for a discussion of the problem of lack of construct consensus in current servant leadership empirical research. An exhaustive literature review supplied a quantitative, cross-cultural study with established measures of reliability and validity. The current research replicated this study as it provided an instrument with a small number of constructs offering simplification for servant leadership construct consensus. Two changes were made, however, in methodology. First, respondents were tested from a newly introduced, multiple-leader model of leadership rather than the single-leader model in the original study. Secondly, culture was assigned to control variable status and a numerical value recorded for both countries. The data was then analyzed using measures consistent with the original study in order to compare results between the original single-leader and the new multiple-leader models as well as multiple-regression to see if culture can be predicted through a combined database of all respondents from both countries. The multiple-leader model provided more consistent construct evaluation across the specific high and low power-distance countries studied with generally equivalent or reduced standard deviations than the single-leader model. Culture cannot be predicted from the constructs as recorded. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to verify a lack of correlation between constructs in contrast to standard statistical program outputs.</p>

Diss. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (Habilitationsschrift)--Philipps-Universität, Marburg, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

<p> Disagreements continue over the most basic epistemic questions. Which logic is correct? What makes an argument good? We need a theory that can both explain the prevalence of such disagreements and evaluate the conduct and characters of those who participate in them. I argue that formal theories cannot supply this need. Circular arguments demonstrate the failure of formal approaches. Circular arguments are often impeccable from a formal perspective, but circular argumentation is almost always criticizable. A skilled arguer does not dismiss other viewpoints out of hand. Instead, to reason with those who reject our most basic assumptions about the logic of argumentation itself or the norms we assume when evaluating arguments for cogency or coherence we must break out of the circle of our own opinions. We must exercise a capacity for cognitive empathy. </p><p> In chapter zero, I develop a virtue-theoretic account of argumentation centered around the virtue of open-mindedness. I analyze open-mindedness in Aristotelian fashion as the mean between skepticism and dogmatism. Open-mindedness consists in the skillful deployment of empathic ability, which is in turn understood as the capacity to simulate the perspective of another. I use this same framework to analyze two more specific applications of cognitive empathy: sincerity and creativity, which are both essential to responsible argumentation. Responsible argumentation requires sincerity in our forms of expression and creativity in our efforts to resolve those disagreements we must resolve for pragmatic reasons. When it is understood as a "master virtue," open-mindedness is a way of utilizing sincerity and creativity for appropriate ends, and it is the surest route to epistemic progress. </p><p> In chapter one, I apply my virtue-theoretic account of argumentation to a dispute over the fallacy of begging the question. According to Robinson (1971), question-begging is not fallacious because it&rsquo;s fine from a formal perspective. Sorensen (1996) replies that question-begging is fallacious because it compromises the rationality of whoever is begging the question. By advancing the dialectic between Sorensen and Robinson, I aim to show that our argumentative practices must take the perspectives of others seriously, whether or not those perspectives are rational. When you beg the question against someone you fail to empathize with her. A tendency towards circularity of various sorts might be inevitable, but it needn&rsquo;t compromise open-mindedness. </p><p> In chapter two, I examine the connection between dogmatism and disagreement to address ongoing debates over the proper response to peer disagreement. How should we respond when we find ourselves disagreeing with a colleague or epistemic peer? According to the &ldquo;equal weight view,&rdquo; we should suspend belief in this kind of case. I defend this ideal from two charges: (1) that it is self-undermining, and (2) that it renders its adherents &ldquo;spineless.&rdquo; Even widespread disagreement amongst peers wouldn't force those who endorse the equal weight view into persistent agnosticism. We needn&rsquo;t compromise conciliation and cooperation, even when we find ourselves arguing with dogmatists who reject these cognitive virtues.</p><p>