• Refine Query
  • Source
  • Publication year
  • to
  • Language
  • 1
  • 1
  • Tagged with
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • 1
  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Rather a Soviet in my Bed, than Missiles Overhead : The Dutch Government during the Euromissile Crisis 1979-1985

de Lussanet de la Sablonière, Anouk January 2024 (has links)
In December 1979, NATO adopted Dual Track. This resolution had two tracks: the modernisation of NATO’s Theatre Nuclear Forces and an offer to arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. At the time, the Netherlands conditionally accepted Dual Track. Dutch opposition to nuclear modernisation was too great. The government postponed the decision for two years, linking it to the results of arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the end, the postponement would last for six years. The crisis that followed the Dual Track decision would become known as the Euromissile Crisis. The goal of this thesis is two-fold. On the one hand, the goal is to explore the reasoning behind this postponement. It will look into the domestic and international factors that influenced Dutch decision-making. The Dutch public did not want to deploy new missiles, whereas the NATO allies pressured the government to make a decision. This thesis has shown that domestic pressures were incredibly influential at the beginning of the crisis. That is why Dual Track was conditionally accepted. However, international factors, such as the need for solidarity within NATO, increased significantly over time. On the other hand, it researches how Dutch margins for manoeuvre were increased during the Euromissile Crisis. In line with New Cold War History, this thesis argues that the Netherlands was not just a small state that had to follow the path the bigger NATO states decided. There was the opportunity to push its own agenda.
2

La France et la crise des euromissiles, 1977-1987 / France and the Euromissile crisis, 1977-1987

Parisi, Ilaria 25 November 2017 (has links)
La crise des euromissiles trouve son origine en octobre 1977, lorsque le chancelier allemand Helmut Schmidt exprime son inquiétude face à l’aggravation du déséquilibre militaire en Europe, consécutive au déploiement des missiles soviétiques de moyenne portée SS-20. Plus précis que les systèmes qu’ils remplacent et dotés de têtes nucléaires multiples, les SS-20 pourraient neutraliser la mise en œuvre de l’escalade nucléaire de l’OTAN. Qui plus est, les armes de moyenne portée de l’organisation militaire intégrée versent dans un état d’obsolescence. La question qui se pose est de ce fait celle de savoir quelles sont les garanties sécuritaires que les Américains offrent à l’Europe, alors que la parité stratégique, bientôt consacrée par le traité SALT II, rend improbable l’engagement de la dissuasion centrale américaine en faveur du Vieux Continent. La montée de la menace soviétique et la méfiance européenne vis-à-vis de la protection militaire américaine sont alors les deux éléments au centre du débat atlantique qui caractérise la décennie 1977-1987 et qui se conclut par le traité de Washington, sanctionnant l’élimination de toutes les armes nucléaires soviétiques et américaines de moyenne portée d’Europe.Cette situation risque d’affecter la France pour deux raisons. Tout d’abord, l’aggravation du déséquilibre militaire engendré par les SS-20 confèrerait à Moscou un droit de véto sur toute évolution politique future du continent, que cela ait trait à la construction européenne ou à la résolution de la question allemande. Deux dossiers sur lesquels Paris n’accepte pas d’être marginalisé. Ensuite, la manifestation d’une méfiance européenne vis-à-vis de l’engagement américain en Europe semble amener certains alliés, la RFA au premier chef, à chercher un équilibre militaire propre au continent européen. Or, loin de garantir plus de sécurité, un équilibre « eurostratégique » n’aurait pour conséquence que d’éloigner la dissuasion américaine d’Europe ; en outre, il finirait par imposer des limitations aux forces nucléaires des puissances nucléaires tierces comme la France. Dès lors, la crise des euromissiles concerne la France dans la mesure où sa politique d’indépendance et sa politique de défense risquent d’être mises à mal par les évolutions du débat atlantique à propos de la sécurité de l’Europe, qui constitue l’environnement stratégique dans lequel Paris inscrit sa propre sécurité. / The origins of the Euromissile crisis date back to October 1977, when Helmut Schmidt publicly expressed his anxieties about the nuclear imbalance in Europe, following the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles. The new Soviet system was more accurate than its predecessors and equipped with three nuclear warheads. NATO’s aging nuclear medium-range missiles could not match the Soviet technology and NATO’s nuclear escalation strategy proved weakened. At a time when SALT II fixed a rough strategic nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, Europe wondered whether the American extended deterrence was still reliable. The increasing Soviet threat and the deepening European defiance vis-à-vis the American military protection were the two central elements of the Euromissile crisis, which lasted until 1987, when the Washington treaty sanctioned the elimination of all Soviet and American medium-range nuclear forces in Europe.The French concern about the Euromissile crisis was twofold. Firstly, Moscow might profit from its military superiority in Europe in order to extend its influence over the Western part of the continent. As a consequence, the Soviet Union might acquire a veto over any European political development, for example as regards the European integration process or the resolution of the German question, issues on which France was eager to play a major role. Secondly, the European distrust towards the American military protection could lead to the establishment of a “eurostrategic” balance, or a balance between the Soviet and the American nuclear weapons in Europe. This would definitely have weakened the value of the American extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, but also in due course included third country nuclear forces into the military European balance as a part of the Western military effort. In this case, France would be deprived of a major element of her defense policy. As a consequence, France got involved in the Euromissiles crisis to preserve her strategic environment from any Soviet European ambition and to defend her policy of national independence from any attempt to diminish her military force at a time of increased East-West confrontation.

Page generated in 0.0661 seconds