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Diss.--Zürich, 1994. / Bibliogr. p. 259-266.

Attempts to establish cross-culturally valid definitions of witchcraft, sorcery and destructive magic are misleading, since these phenomena do not constitute true classes, but bear only a family resemblance to each other. Moreover, the attempt to establish such definitions violates the integrity of native categories of thought, and thus obscures the understanding of the way in which thought is manifested in actions taken in specific behavioural contexts. The understanding of native categories of thought, and of the way in which these are translated into overt behaviour in specific contexts of action, is conditioned by our prior experience as the members of a particular culture and social system. Our culturally acquired notions of the nature of human society, and of reality more generally, enter into our perception of the characteristics of primitive societies. Particularly difficult for us, coming from a culture in which our notions of rationality are deeply influenced by the subject matter and methods of the natural sciences, is the understanding of behaviour associated with ideas of magic and witchcraft. A review of the history of anthropological theory indicates a wide variety in approaches towards the understanding of these phenomena. Thus magic and witchcraft have been variously interpreted as historical survivals from an earlier phase of human social evolution, as manifestations of a particular mentality peculiar to primitives, as an affective response to situations of anxiety, as a mechanism providing for the release of tensions consequent upon life in society, and as a cosmology in terms of which natural and social relationships are ordered. The scope of such interpretations has ranged from generalizations made on the basis of a wide range of phenomena, and aiming at cross-cultural validity, to interpretations of a restricted set of data from only one culture. It is with interpretations of the latter type that witchcraft and sorcery become subjects of study in their own right, instead of being subsumed under some theory purporting to hold true for the entire domain of magic and religion, or even primitive mentality as such. Tylor, Frazer and Ĺévy-Bruhl may all be regarded as having offered theories of general applicability, in contrast to Kluckhohn and Evans-Pritchard. (Malinowski stands as an intermediate figure in this respect). But while, from this point of view, Kluckhohn and Evans-Pritchard may be grouped together, their work may nevertheless be contrasted in other respects. Thus, Evans-Pritchard emphasizes the logical coherence and rationality of Zande witchcraft, of which he tries to present the sense, and which he analyses within the framework of a sociologistic and structuralist approach. Kluckhohn, on the other hand, presents Navaho witchcraft as essentially irrational, and as standing in need of an explanation which he provides in terms of a psychologistic and functionalist theory. Implicit in these anthropological approaches are definite assumptions about the nature of Western science, on the basis of which a number of oppositions have been posed between scientific thought and beliefs of a magico-religious order. An examination of the nature of scientific activity suggests that most of these assumptions are mistaken. By focusing upon the content of scientific thought, and the imagined psychology of the individual scientist, anthropologists have overlooked the structural similarities between scientific beliefs and activities, and the beliefs and activities characteristic of magic and witchcraft. As a result, they have failed to understand the most important determining characteristic of each - the social context in which such thought operates. / Arts, Faculty of / Anthropology, Department of / Graduate

The study deals with the problem of applicability of two anthropological theories, structural functionalism and interpretive anthropology of Clifford Geertz. By applicability is meant what concrete difference using of one or the other theory brings about in ethnography. Each of the theories is at first thoroughly examined with emphasis on its possible aims, assumptions, and consequences for an ethnographer. Then each theory is put to test in examination of one particular ethnography associated with the theory. Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer serves as an instance of structural functionalism. Clifford Geertz's Negara as an example of interpretative analysis. Structural functionalism is shown to provide an ethnographer with a much more definite guidance which contributes to better possibilities of verification and comparability of the results than interpretive anthropology. Apart from the main subject, the study is concerned with more general questions, especially related to non-existence of a paradigm in anthropology and some of its causes.

Students and consumers of psychological science are routinely taught that the scientific approach used in psychological research facilitates its providing the most accurate information about human behavior. Because this approach to knowledge acquisition is supposed to be based on objective evidence and systematic reasoning rather than the biased interpretation of other approaches, these other approaches are often marginalized as being inferior. Critics of these claims assert that psychological science is subject to biases just as other approaches are and that the philosophy of naturalism not only pervades, but is also hidden and largely unquestioned in mainstream psychology. This study examines this claim, beginning with a dialectical contrast between naturalistic and non-naturalistic cultures to concretize practical features of naturalism and non-naturalism. It then uses those features to frame an in-depth analysis of introductory psychology textbooks where a compendium of the important settled principles and findings of all major sub-areas of the discipline should be found. Results show that naturalistic features are to be found throughout all the sub-areas of psychology and that non-naturalistic features are absent or marginalized in the texts.