"The information ratio is a very controversial topic in the business world. Some portfolio managers put a lot of weight behind this risk-analysis measurement while others believe that this financial statistic can be easily manipulated and thus shouldn't be trusted. In this paper, an attempt will be made to show both sides of this issue by defining the information ratio, applying this definition to real world situations, explaining some of the negative impacts on the information ratio, comparing this ratio to other statistical measures, and showing some ways to improve a portfolio manager's information ratio. "

In this dissertation, I investigate whether corporate governance affects the negative association between investment and future excess returns. Shareholders are concerned with the effectiveness of the firm's governance regime as a tool to reduce agency costs. In the absence of strong control over firm assets, managers may choose to invest in value-decreasing projects. The probability that managers select value-decreasing projects is an increasing (decreasing) function in investment activity (governance regime). At the time of investment, the capital market prices expected returns to the investment activity conditioned on the governance regime in place. This study examines future risk-adjusted returns to investment activities conditioned on low and high governance regimes. If the market correctly prices the governance environment and the expected returns to expenditures at time t, there should be no future risk-adjusted returns to either governance or expenditure information. I find that for firms with low external monitoring, and separately, for firms with high shareholder rights, lower (higher) investment activity results in positive (negative) future risk-adjusted returns. Implementing a trading strategy which holds low investment firms and shorts high investment firms results in 7.1% and 5.6% annual risk-adjusted returns when conditioned on low institutional holdings and high shareholder right, respectively. This study also provides preliminary evidence that outside blockholder and activist ownership is effective in mitigating the negative association between investment activity and future excess returns through the shareholder rights mechanism. Finally, I provide evidence that the diversification discount associated with multi-segment firms is generally invariant to investment activity levels.

The following dissertation contains two distinct empirical essays which contribute to the overall field of Financial Economics. Chapter 1 titles as “Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology and Firm Performance”. We investigate the influence of CEO political orientation on corporate lobbying efforts. Specifically, we study whether CEO political ideology, in terms of manager-level campaign donations, determines the choice and amount of firm lobbying involvement and the impact of lobbying on firm value. We find a generous engagement in lobbying efforts by firms with Republican leaning-managers, which lobby a larger number of bills and have higher lobbying expenditures. However, the cost of lobbying offsets the benefit for firms with Republican CEOs. We report higher agency costs of free cash flow, lower Tobin’s Q, and smaller increases in buy and hold abnormal returns following lobbying activities for firms with Republican managers, compared to Democratic and Apolitical rivals. Overall, our results suggest that the effects of lobbying on firm performance vary across firms with different managerial political orientations. Chapter 2 titled as “Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence from Employee” Litigations. We utilize employee litigations and other work-related complaints to examine if lobbying firms are favored in judicial process. We gather 27,794 employee lawsuits (after initial court hearing) between 2000 and 2014 and test the relationship between employee allegations and firms’ lobbying strategies. We find that employee litigations increase the number of labor-related bills in our sample. We document that the increase in employee lawsuits may drive firms into lobbying to change policy proposals. We also find robust evidence that the case outcome is different for lobbying firms compared to non-lobbying rivals, which may protect the shareholder wealth in the long run. Our results present that lobbying activities may make a significant difference in employee allegations. Our findings highlight the benefit of building political capital to obtain a biased outcome in favor of politically-connected firms.

This paper examines tracking stock issuances, a relatively uncommon method of equity restructuring. I utilize likely the entire population of tracking stock issuances on US exchanges – from the first ever in October 1984 to the most recent one in November 2009 – in order to analyze the effect that they have on the shortrun excess returns of issuing companies. I analyze the excess returns of companies that issue tracking stock that trade in the US, one year before and one year after completion of their restructuring. The results of this paper indicate that companies perform worse relative to a benchmark market index in the year following their tracking stock restructuring. However, it is important to note that the number of observations studied is relatively small, as there have been only 41 issuances of tracking stock since the first recorded case. This suggests that more data and greater research are necessary in order to more accurately measure the effects of tracking stock restructurings. With the limited data available, I find that there is a statistically significant decrease in excess stock returns following tracking stock issuances.

During the last decade, investments into the Swedish mutual fund market have increased substantially. The increased popularity of actively managed Swedish equity funds among households and investment companies, correspondingly, funds need to deliver substantial results, raised the importance to evaluate these funds’ performance. This thesis adds to the scarce empirical literature on Swedish equity mutual fund performance. Employing the Fama-French three factor model, it analyzes whether actively managed Swedish equity mu- tual funds outperform the Fama-French benchmarks net- and gross of management fees. The study uses time-series data and constructs equally-weighted portfolios of the 42 Swe- dish based actively managed equity mutual funds investing in Sweden for the period 2003- 2013. The portfolios’ excess returns are calculated by estimating the Fama-French three factor model by means of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. The empirical results show that actively managed equity mutual funds over performed the Fama-French three factor benchmarks by an average annualized net- and gross excess return of 3.60 and 4.67 percent respectively. Sorting out the funds by the performance into deciles, the find- ings indicate that management fees influence the performance of the equity mutual funds in the sample of our study. The conclusion is made such that there is an indication that Swedish equity funds’ managers are able to add value above passive investing.

Este trabalho testa a validade da Hipótese das Expectativas, segundo a qual as taxas de juros de longo prazo são formadas pela média das expectativas sobre as taxas de curto prazo futuras. O estudo baseia-se em dois artigos reconhecidos internacionalmente: Fama e Bliss (1987) e Cochrane e Piazzesi (2005). Os testes são realizados utilizando-se retornos em excesso e taxas forward mensais para títulos com prazo de vencimento entre dois e cinco anos. A base de dados consiste em observações mensais da taxa à vista de contratos futuros de DI. Os resultados apontam para a rejeição da HE para o caso brasileiro. Uma combinação linear de taxas forward é capaz de explicar a variação dos retornos em excesso com R² de até 0,63 para um título com maturidade em dois anos. / This work tests the validity of Expectations Hypothesis (EH), which posts that the long-term rates are an average of future expectations of short-term rates. The study is based on two internationally recognized papers: Fama e Bliss (1987) and Cochrane e Piazzesi (2005). The tests are performed using monthly observations on excess returns and forward rates for 2 to 5 year bonds. The data consists in monthly observations of ID future contracts yields. The results suggest rejection the EH for the Brazilian case. A linear combination of forward rates is able to explain excess returns variation with R² up to 0.63 for 2-year bonds.

Este trabalho testa a validade da Hipótese das Expectativas, segundo a qual as taxas de juros de longo prazo são formadas pela média das expectativas sobre as taxas de curto prazo futuras. O estudo baseia-se em dois artigos reconhecidos internacionalmente: Fama e Bliss (1987) e Cochrane e Piazzesi (2005). Os testes são realizados utilizando-se retornos em excesso e taxas forward mensais para títulos com prazo de vencimento entre dois e cinco anos. A base de dados consiste em observações mensais da taxa à vista de contratos futuros de DI. Os resultados apontam para a rejeição da HE para o caso brasileiro. Uma combinação linear de taxas forward é capaz de explicar a variação dos retornos em excesso com R² de até 0,63 para um título com maturidade em dois anos. / This work tests the validity of Expectations Hypothesis (EH), which posts that the long-term rates are an average of future expectations of short-term rates. The study is based on two internationally recognized papers: Fama e Bliss (1987) and Cochrane e Piazzesi (2005). The tests are performed using monthly observations on excess returns and forward rates for 2 to 5 year bonds. The data consists in monthly observations of ID future contracts yields. The results suggest rejection the EH for the Brazilian case. A linear combination of forward rates is able to explain excess returns variation with R² up to 0.63 for 2-year bonds.

Este trabalho testa a validade da Hipótese das Expectativas, segundo a qual as taxas de juros de longo prazo são formadas pela média das expectativas sobre as taxas de curto prazo futuras. O estudo baseia-se em dois artigos reconhecidos internacionalmente: Fama e Bliss (1987) e Cochrane e Piazzesi (2005). Os testes são realizados utilizando-se retornos em excesso e taxas forward mensais para títulos com prazo de vencimento entre dois e cinco anos. A base de dados consiste em observações mensais da taxa à vista de contratos futuros de DI. Os resultados apontam para a rejeição da HE para o caso brasileiro. Uma combinação linear de taxas forward é capaz de explicar a variação dos retornos em excesso com R² de até 0,63 para um título com maturidade em dois anos. / This work tests the validity of Expectations Hypothesis (EH), which posts that the long-term rates are an average of future expectations of short-term rates. The study is based on two internationally recognized papers: Fama e Bliss (1987) and Cochrane e Piazzesi (2005). The tests are performed using monthly observations on excess returns and forward rates for 2 to 5 year bonds. The data consists in monthly observations of ID future contracts yields. The results suggest rejection the EH for the Brazilian case. A linear combination of forward rates is able to explain excess returns variation with R² up to 0.63 for 2-year bonds.

No / Motivated by an extensive literature showing that government bond yields exhibit a strong non-Markov property, in the sense that moving averages of long-lagged yields significantly improve the predictability of excess bond returns. We then develop a systematic approach of constructing non-Markov Gaussian dynamic term structure models (GDTSMs) under the Heath-Jarrow-Morton (HJM) framework. Compared to the current literature, our approach is more flexible and parsimonious, enabling us to estimate an economically significant non-Markov effect that helps predict excess bond returns both in-sample and out-of-sample.

This paper investigates the determinants of excess returns using dividend yields as a proxy in a cross-sectional setting. First, we find that types of industry and the current business cycle are determining factors of returns. Second, our results suggest that dividend yield serves a signaling mechanism indicating “healthiness” of a firm among prospective investors. Third we see that there is a positive relationship between dividend yield and risk, especially in the utility and financial sectors. And finally, using actual excess returns, instead of dividend yield in our model shows that all predictors of dividend yield were also significant predictors of excess returns. This connection between dividend yield and excess returns support our use of dividend yield as a proxy for excess returns.