Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Texas, August, 2008. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universitas Indonesia, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 375-382) and indexes.

Presidents have two major assets at their disposal when seeking to alter policy: executive orders and legislative action. There are certain advantages and disadvantages to each course. Although presidency scholars have focused extensively on presidential efforts in the legislative arena, little attention has been paid to how a president affects policy through direct action. Because executive orders have been under-researched, there has been a dearth of theory development that adequately explains when presidents will act unilaterally through executive orders and when they will instead seek legislative avenues to policy change. This project develops a parsimonious theory grounded in the transaction costs framework that explains how a president chooses between seeking congressional action versus acting unilaterally through executive orders to accomplish policy change. The theory holds that when presidents desire policy change, they balance the transaction costs executive orders and legislative action present, selecting the course that presents the greatest benefit after accounting for the transaction costs present. After outlining the theory, I test my predictions using an original data set. Each executive order from 1946 to 2004 was read and examined for policy content. Unlike most prior studies of presidential use of executive orders, this study only includes orders that affect policy in the data analyses. The series of empirical tests provide support for my theory: Presidents consider the transaction costs that executive orders and the pursuit of legislation pose and take the action that maximizes their utility when seeking policy change

Executive orders are a significant source of presidential power although scholars disagree on the nature of that power. It has been argued that executive orders are an indication of a president's failure to persuade others to act as he desires; others contend that executive orders offer "power without persuasion." This dissertation introduces the conditional model of executive order issuance and duration in order to offer a synthesis to these competing views, and to offer a better understanding of the opportunities and constraints faced by the president when choosing to act unilaterally through executive orders. The conditional theory holds that both the issuance and duration of executive orders is a function of the president's ideological proximity to Congress and the Supreme Court, and the availability of fresh policy space.

Quantitative studies of the presidential use of executive orders have attempted to determine whether presidents are more prone to resort to unilateral action when faced with legislative opposition. To date, the results have been mixed however, with studies demonstrating that the type of executive order is an important factor in understanding the conditions under which presidents will resort to unilateral action. Despite this advancement in theory, there has been little consensus regarding the actual conditions under which presidents will issue the different types of executive orders that have been identified in the literature. This thesis addresses this puzzle through an empirical analysis that engages the "Two Presidencies Thesis," which argues that presidential decision-making, action and success is conditioned by policy area (foreign and domestic) and executive order type (major, routine, or symbolic). An original dataset was constructed by coding all executive orders issued between 1953 and 2008 as related to either foreign or domestic policy. Thus, an analysis is undertaken of major executive orders, minor executive orders, foreign policy-based executive orders, domestic policy-based executive orders, and major and minor categories of each policy area. A multivariate analysis is completed using negative binomial regression given that the dependent variables are overdispersed count variables. The effects of divided government and ideological distance are the primary independent variables examined. The ideological distance variable consists of the absolute distance between the president's ideology and the ideology of the median member of the Senate. Various other control variables are included, including presidential party, election year, and approval ratings. The findings indicate that executive order type does matter in predicting presidential use of executive orders and that the prevailing political climate does influence the president's use of executive orders.

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America's founding fathers designed the Constitution as a malleable contract for governance, envisioning a republic with a struggle among co-equal actors that would serve to constrain and channel the struggle for power. The problem this study was designed to address is that presidents have used executive orders (EOs) when legislation is too difficult to pass due to divided party government, or when making sweeping changes to executive departments or agencies that historically required congressional approval. The purpose of this analysis was to explore whether a contemporary Democratic president are more likely than a Republican to use the EO as a unilateral strategy to pursue domestic/economic policy objectives during times of divided party government. This study compared the use of executive orders under divided government by Republican President Ronald Reagan and Democratic President Barack Obama, examining three EOs issued by each. Reagan and Obama viewed government differently. President Obama saw government as a solution to problems and President Reagan saw government as a source of problems. From this, I inferred that Democrats would be more likely than Republicans to favor federal government intervention in domestic/economic policy. Yet, though both presidents had different agendas and approaches, they both used the EO as a unilateral strategy under divided government. This may reflect that presidents understand that many in the public hold the president accountable for the economic performance of the United States, and economic wellbeing may lead to reelection of a president. / Master of Arts / America's founding fathers designed the Constitution as a flexible contract for control, imagining a republic with a struggle among co-equal actors that would serve to limit and guide the struggle for power. The problem this study was designed to address is that presidents have used executive orders (EOs) when laws were too difficult to pass due to divided party government, or when making far-reaching changes to departments or agencies that usually need congressional approval. The purpose of this study was to gain more insight as to whether a Democratic president was more likely than a Republican president to use executive orders to pursue domestic/economic policy goals when different parties controlled Congress and the presidency. The study examined the use of executive orders by Republican President Ronald Reagan and Democratic President Barack Obama under divided government, looking in depth at three executive orders each President issued. Reagan saw government as a source of problems and Obama saw government as a source of solutions. This led to the expectation that Democratic President Obama might use domestic/economic intervention by the federal government more often than Republican President Reagan would. Yet, although both presidents had different plans and methods, they used the executive order similarly during times of divided government. This likely reflects that presidents -- regardless of party -- understand that many in the public hold the president accountable for the economic performance of the United States, and economic wellbeing may lead to reelection of a president.

This thesis tracks the direction of the development of unilateral executive power from Nixon to Clinton. The thirty-two-year process saw a mostly continuous growth of the power of the president to act unilaterally through a variety of mechanisms seizing the ability to act first from the other branches of government and the bureaucracy. The ability to enhance presidential power depends on many factors such as one time shocks (such as Watergate) and congressional support. The minority presidency of Richard Nixon responded to democratic control of Congress by aggressive assertions of presidential power via unilateral decrees. In fights such as impoundment, wage and price controls, and affirmative action plans, Nixon attempted to increase the power of the presidency while also laying groundwork for future regulatory reforms. Nixon’s resignation and Watergate crated stiff headwinds for the development of the unilateral powers of the presidency with Congress passed meaningful attempts to claw back presidential powers that had accumulated over time. Nevertheless, the Ford and Carter presidencies still saw the groundwork laid for the next major expansion of presidential authority. Under Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush, the “Reagan Revolution” saw the Presidency gain new powers to aggressively combat the growing state. The assault on government saw the creation of modern signing statements, and harsh anti-regulatory actions. Clinton’s presidency saw a continued evolution of executive power albeit shaped by the significantly different ends trying to be achieved than under the two previous Republican presidents while also seeing new innovations in the mix of powers.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Miami University, Dept. of Political Science, 2008. / Title from third page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 214-231).

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