I find a significant positive compensation premium for executives employed by firms headquartered in Catholic counties. I document that the compensation premium holds only for board member executives and that it is related to weaker corporate governance in Catholic regions. In addition, I explore several corporate governance measures and reveal that weaker corporate governance is a result of more developed connection networks among executives in Catholic regions. I document that even though a denser executive's social network is associated with worse operating performance, it enables the executive to reach higher pay. Therefore, I suggest that executives in Catholic regions are using their more developed social networks and weaker corporate governance to extract additional rents from the firm. My findings are consistent with a larger development of social ties in more community-focused Catholic regions than in more individualistic Protestant regions. I contribute by showing how religion deters efficiency of the top executive labor market through social ties.

Submitted by Franciele Moreira (francielemoreyra@gmail.com) on 2018-04-18T12:27:09Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Rafel Manoel de Oliveira - 2018.pdf: 1757956 bytes, checksum: 464aaa8d736398dec87202c9df822548 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2018-04-18T15:24:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Rafel Manoel de Oliveira - 2018.pdf: 1757956 bytes, checksum: 464aaa8d736398dec87202c9df822548 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-18T15:24:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Rafel Manoel de Oliveira - 2018.pdf: 1757956 bytes, checksum: 464aaa8d736398dec87202c9df822548 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-27 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / This study aimed to verify if the acquisitions made by family companies generate better performance than those performed by non-family companies, and if there is a difference between the post-acquisition compensation of executives of family companies and executives from non- family companies of Brazilian companies listed in B3 in the period from 2009 to 2016. The research is supported mainly in the agency relations and the alignment of interests between the principal and the agent, studied by the Agency Theory. Data were collected through Thomson Reuters Ikon and the company reference form. Enterprises were classified as familiar or unfamiliar through the involvement and essential approaches. To achieve the objectives, three multiple regressions were estimated: two related to the performance of acquisitions, with data stacked and a sample of 244 acquisitions (86 companies), and one referring to executive compensation, with a sample of 96 companies with panel data not balanced. The results indicated that: i) Brazilian family firms tend to perform better with corporate acquisitions events compared to non-family acquisitions; and (ii) corporate acquisitions have a greater positive impact on the total remuneration of non-family business executives than on family firms. The results are consistent with the Agency Theory, which says that the gap between ownership and control creates agency conflicts and offers greater opportunities for expropriation by managers. / Este estudo buscou verificar se as aquisições realizadas por empresas familiares geram melhor desempenho do que aquelas realizadas por empresas não familiares, e se existe diferença entre a remuneração pós-aquisição de executivos de empresas familiares e de executivos de empresas não familiares de companhias brasileiras listadas na B3, no período de 2009 a 2016. A pesquisa se suporta principalmente nas relações de agência e no alinhamento de interesses entre o principal e o agente, estudados pela Teoria da Agência. Os dados foram coletados por meio da Thomson Reuters Ikon e pelo formulário de referência das empresas. As empresas foram classificadas como familiares ou não familiares por meio das abordagens de componente de envolvimento e abordagem essencial. Para cumprir os objetivos, foram estimadas três regressões múltiplas: duas referentes ao desempenho de aquisições, com dados empilhados e amostra de 244 aquisições (86 empresas), e uma referente à remuneração dos executivos, com uma amostra de 96 empresas, com dados em painel não balanceado. Os resultados indicaram que: i) as empresas brasileiras familiares tendem a ter desempenho superior com eventos de aquisições corporativas em relação às não familiares; e ii) as aquisições corporativas têm um maior impacto positivo na remuneração total dos executivos de empresas não familiares do que na de empresas familiares. Os resultados são consistentes com a Teoria da Agência, que diz que distanciamento entre a propriedade e o controle gera conflitos de agência e oferece maiores oportunidades de expropriação por parte dos gestores.