Thesis--Columbia University, 1927. / Vita. Published also as Studies in history, economics, and public law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, no. 289.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1967. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Columbia University, 1927. / Vita. Published also as Studies in history, economics, and public law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, no. 289.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Queensland, 2002. / Includes bibliography.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1974. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Miami University, Dept. of Political Science, 2004. / Title from second page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-165).

No description available.

This dissertation analyzes the institution of president of republic. It describes specifics of this institution, located between "chief of state" and executive body. Then the dissertation studies his relationship to executive power. It covers analysis of presidential constitutional powers, but also other aspects, influencing presidential position and power in constitutional system. Necessary part of this analysis is study of constitutional position of president. This study comes from parliamentary character of constitutional system and presidential powers in this system. It also includes comparison of chosen parliamentary systems. Then the dissertation analyzes specific phenomenon of Czech president. In this country president traditionally has weak constitutional power, but in contrast he disposes with strong authority in public, and this authority gives him big informal influence in political relationships. It can empower his position very well. Dissertation analyzes historical sources of this phenomenon, development of constitutional power of president and also traditions and constitutional use in praxis. It takes a thing about the role of all presidents in all [very diverse] regimes during Czechoslovak and Czech statehood. Development of presidential tradition after assumption of actual constitution is...

Este trabalho avalia o impacto do processo legislativo no emendamento da Constituição brasileira de 1988, até 2010. O objetivo é melhor explicar o contínuo crescimento e detalhamento da Constituição. Para tanto, foram elaboradas hipóteses a partir da literatura sobre a interação entre Executivo e Legislativo no sistema político brasileiro. As duas principais hipóteses testadas são 1) dominância do Executivo no emendamento constitucional, a partir do funcionamento do presidencialismo de coalizão; e 2) influência do poder legislativo no emendamento constitucional, ilustrando os custos do processo decisório e a relação entre a heterogeneidade de uma base política parlamentar e seu impacto na produção legislativa. Para a construção do banco de dados, foi utilizada a Metodologia de Análise Constitucional (MAC). Aplicou-se a metodologia às propostas de emenda constitucional (PECs) que se tornaram emendas à Constituição, assim como a todos os substitutivos aprovados nas fases deliberativas internas ao Congresso Nacional. Dessa maneira, foi possível avaliar cada mudança realizada em cada dispositivo das PECs oferecidas e aprovadas ao longo do processo legislativo, assim como o quanto cada fase contribuiu para a definição do texto final das emendas e para o detalhamento e crescimento do texto constitucional. Os resultados permitiram a comprovação da preponderância da hipótese 2 em detrimento da 1, demonstrando a importância do Poder Legislativo na definição de matéria legislativa constitucional, em detrimento das propostas do Poder Executivo. Além disso, foi possível realizar uma crítica às teorias comparativas que relacionam o impacto da regra de emendamento nas taxas de emendamento das Constituições, demonstrando que, pelo menos no caso brasileiro, a combinação de maiorias qualificadas e heterogeneidade parlamentar levou a um aumento no emendamento da Constituição de 1988. / This work evaluates the impact of the legislative process on the brazilian constitution, from 1988 to 2010. Its objective is to better explain the continuous growth and growing specificity of the constitution. In order to do that, hypotheses were elaborated from the literature on the interaction between the Executive and Legislative branches of the brazilian political system. The two main hypotheses tested here are 1) Is the Executive dominant in the constitutional amendment process, through the mechanism of coalitional presidency; and 2) the influence of the Legislative on the constitutional amendment, illustrating the costs of the decision making process and the relation between an heterogeneous parliamentary base, and its impact on the legislation. To test these two hypotheses, a data set was gathered, using the Methodology of Constitutional Analysis (MCA). The MCA was applied to all the constitutional amendment proposals (CAPs) that eventually became constitutional amendments, as well as to all the substitute versions of the CAPs that were approved on the various deliberative forums inside the National Congress. By doing that, it was possible to evaluate each change made to the PECs that eventually became amendments to the constitution, as well as how each moment of the legislative process contributed to the growth of the constitutional text. The results proved the prevalence of the hypothesis 1 over the hypothesis 2, thus demonstrating the importance of the Legislative branch in defining the contents of the constitution. Furthermore, it was possible develop a criticism on the current comparative theories on constitutional amendment that relates formal procedures of amendment and constitutional rigidity to rate of constitutional amendment. At least in the brazilian case, we observed that the combination of qualified majorities and parliamentary heterogeneity further spurred, and didnt restrict, constitutional amendment

Este trabalho avalia o impacto do processo legislativo no emendamento da Constituição brasileira de 1988, até 2010. O objetivo é melhor explicar o contínuo crescimento e detalhamento da Constituição. Para tanto, foram elaboradas hipóteses a partir da literatura sobre a interação entre Executivo e Legislativo no sistema político brasileiro. As duas principais hipóteses testadas são 1) dominância do Executivo no emendamento constitucional, a partir do funcionamento do presidencialismo de coalizão; e 2) influência do poder legislativo no emendamento constitucional, ilustrando os custos do processo decisório e a relação entre a heterogeneidade de uma base política parlamentar e seu impacto na produção legislativa. Para a construção do banco de dados, foi utilizada a Metodologia de Análise Constitucional (MAC). Aplicou-se a metodologia às propostas de emenda constitucional (PECs) que se tornaram emendas à Constituição, assim como a todos os substitutivos aprovados nas fases deliberativas internas ao Congresso Nacional. Dessa maneira, foi possível avaliar cada mudança realizada em cada dispositivo das PECs oferecidas e aprovadas ao longo do processo legislativo, assim como o quanto cada fase contribuiu para a definição do texto final das emendas e para o detalhamento e crescimento do texto constitucional. Os resultados permitiram a comprovação da preponderância da hipótese 2 em detrimento da 1, demonstrando a importância do Poder Legislativo na definição de matéria legislativa constitucional, em detrimento das propostas do Poder Executivo. Além disso, foi possível realizar uma crítica às teorias comparativas que relacionam o impacto da regra de emendamento nas taxas de emendamento das Constituições, demonstrando que, pelo menos no caso brasileiro, a combinação de maiorias qualificadas e heterogeneidade parlamentar levou a um aumento no emendamento da Constituição de 1988. / This work evaluates the impact of the legislative process on the brazilian constitution, from 1988 to 2010. Its objective is to better explain the continuous growth and growing specificity of the constitution. In order to do that, hypotheses were elaborated from the literature on the interaction between the Executive and Legislative branches of the brazilian political system. The two main hypotheses tested here are 1) Is the Executive dominant in the constitutional amendment process, through the mechanism of coalitional presidency; and 2) the influence of the Legislative on the constitutional amendment, illustrating the costs of the decision making process and the relation between an heterogeneous parliamentary base, and its impact on the legislation. To test these two hypotheses, a data set was gathered, using the Methodology of Constitutional Analysis (MCA). The MCA was applied to all the constitutional amendment proposals (CAPs) that eventually became constitutional amendments, as well as to all the substitute versions of the CAPs that were approved on the various deliberative forums inside the National Congress. By doing that, it was possible to evaluate each change made to the PECs that eventually became amendments to the constitution, as well as how each moment of the legislative process contributed to the growth of the constitutional text. The results proved the prevalence of the hypothesis 1 over the hypothesis 2, thus demonstrating the importance of the Legislative branch in defining the contents of the constitution. Furthermore, it was possible develop a criticism on the current comparative theories on constitutional amendment that relates formal procedures of amendment and constitutional rigidity to rate of constitutional amendment. At least in the brazilian case, we observed that the combination of qualified majorities and parliamentary heterogeneity further spurred, and didnt restrict, constitutional amendment