<p>On 1 June 2010, a new Block Exemption Regulation (BER) and new Guidelines that affect the practical use of selective distribution systems enter into force. The BER exempts vertical agreements, such as selective distribution agreements, from the prohibition of Article 101 (1) TFEU. It is significant for individual market players to obtain knowledge of what impact the new BER and the new Guidelines have for the practical use of selective distribution systems.</p><p>The Commission has amended the new BER and the new Guidelines in the light of the development the last decade. Two main changes are noticed that affect the content of the new legislative documents. Firstly, it is established that many distributors have obtained larger market shares. Secondly, it is stated that Internet sales have increased largely. The basic principles of the new versions of the BER and the Guidelines are identical with the former versions but the present changes are although noticeable for companies and their selective distribution systems.</p><p>The new BER contains a new market share rule that is more restrictive than the corresponding rule in the former BER. However, the new market share rule is not an expression of a less tolerant approach towards selective distribution systems; rather an amendment necessary due to the development of distributors’ market shares.</p><p>The growth of distribution in the Internet the last ten years is reflected in the new Guidelines. The Commission’s approach towards the Internet as a distribution method seems in general to be positive. It is noticeable that the Commission wants that parties of selective distribution agreements shall be able to benefit from all the positive effects of online sales at the same time as the Commission tries to preserve the positive effects of selective distribution.</p><p>This thesis describes and examines the practical use of selective distribution systems. Different reasons for companies to use selective distribution systems and effects of the new BER and Guidelines are in particular examined.</p>

On 1 June 2010, a new Block Exemption Regulation (BER) and new Guidelines that affect the practical use of selective distribution systems enter into force. The BER exempts vertical agreements, such as selective distribution agreements, from the prohibition of Article 101 (1) TFEU. It is significant for individual market players to obtain knowledge of what impact the new BER and the new Guidelines have for the practical use of selective distribution systems. The Commission has amended the new BER and the new Guidelines in the light of the development the last decade. Two main changes are noticed that affect the content of the new legislative documents. Firstly, it is established that many distributors have obtained larger market shares. Secondly, it is stated that Internet sales have increased largely. The basic principles of the new versions of the BER and the Guidelines are identical with the former versions but the present changes are although noticeable for companies and their selective distribution systems. The new BER contains a new market share rule that is more restrictive than the corresponding rule in the former BER. However, the new market share rule is not an expression of a less tolerant approach towards selective distribution systems; rather an amendment necessary due to the development of distributors’ market shares. The growth of distribution in the Internet the last ten years is reflected in the new Guidelines. The Commission’s approach towards the Internet as a distribution method seems in general to be positive. It is noticeable that the Commission wants that parties of selective distribution agreements shall be able to benefit from all the positive effects of online sales at the same time as the Commission tries to preserve the positive effects of selective distribution. This thesis describes and examines the practical use of selective distribution systems. Different reasons for companies to use selective distribution systems and effects of the new BER and Guidelines are in particular examined.

La Commission européenne a fait le choix de réguler le secteur de la distribution automobile par un règlement d'exemption par catégorie, considéré comme un instrument de concurrence favorisant la sécurité juridique. L'objectif poursuivi était le suivant : combattre les effets anticoncurrentiels des accords verticaux du secteur par une intervention directe sur le contrat de distribution. La réforme opérée en 2010 a rompu cet équilibre, la Commission a abandonné son approche sectorielle au profit d'une politique concurrentielle davantage globale et économique. En ce qui concerne le secteur de la vente, le règlement n°1400/2002 perdurera jusqu'au 31 mai 2013, le secteur sera alors soumis au règlement général n°330/2010, au règlement n°461/2010 et à leurs lignes directrices. Les services de l'après-vente sont immédiatement concernés par le nouveau règlement automobile n°461/2010 et par le règlement général n°330/2010 ainsi qu'à leurs lignes directrices respectives. La première règle emportant alignement du secteur automobile sur le règlement général est la généralisation du seuil de 30 % en deçà duquel doivent se situer les parts de marché du constructeur et du distributeur réunies. La Commission abandonne la promotion du multimarquisme dès lors que le constructeur sera en droit d'exiger de son distributeur une obligation d'approvisionnement à hauteur de 80 %. Le point de réforme important reste celui lié à l'abandon des règles relatives à la durée des accords, aux délais de préavis, aux conditions de rupture et au règlement non juridictionnel des litiges. En matière d'après-vente, des règles spécifiques plus strictes que celles prévues par le règlement général, notamment en ce qui concerne l'information technique, les pièces détachées, le refus d'honorer la garantie et l'accès aux réseaux de réparateurs agréés, ont été conservées. / The european Commission has taken the choice to regulate the car sector by an exemption regulation, considered as an effective antitrust tool in order to provide a juridic security. The objective pursued was to fight the anticompetitive effects of vertical agreements by a direct intervention in the contract of distribution. The reform maked in 2010 has upset this balance, the Commission has given up her sectonial approach for a competition policy more than a global and economic one. Concerning the vehicle distribution, the exemption regulation 1400/2002 will come into force until 31 may 2013, then the sector will be submited to the exemption regulation 330/2010, the exemption regulation 461/2010 and their guidelines. The after sales services will be immediately submited to the new exemption regulation 461/2010 and by the exemption regulation 330/2010 and also their guidelines. The first rule who will permit to treat the car distribution like an y other market is the generalization of the uniform market share threshold of 30 % for the motor vehicle supplier and his distributor. The Commission gives up the objective of multi-brand distribution as far as the vehicle supplier can require from his distributor a buying obligation for 80 %. The key of the reform remain the giving up of the rules concerning the terme of the contract, the minimum period of notice, the rupture of contract and the right to refer disputes concerning the fulfilment of their contractual obligations to an independent expert or arbitrator. Concerning after sales services, specific rules more strict than those provided by the general exemption, particularly concerning the technical informations, spared parts, the refuse to honour warranties on motor vehicles and the access to the networks remains of sales services, have been kept.

L'objectif poursuivi par la Commission européenne à travers la réglementation de la concurrence consiste en l'intégration des marchés nationaux en un marché communautaire unique. À cet effet, l'exécutif européen a très tôt érigé le secteur automobile en vecteur privilégié de cette unification, établissant un régime concurrentiel des restrictions verticales insérées dans les accords de production et de distribution automobile plus efficient que ne l'est le régime général des restrictions verticales. Désireuse, dans un premier temps, d'appréhender toujours plus finement les réalités économiques du secteur, la Commission a par la suite pris conscience de l'importance des services après-vente dans le processus concurrentiel. Il y a alors là les deux pans du régime automobile. D'une part, une appréhension de la conjoncture économique du secteur, d'autre part une prise en compte de la nature complexe du bien automobile. Cette dernière, commune à tous les biens intégrant des droits intellectuels et auxquels sont intrinsèquement liés des services après-vente, justifie donc des règles de concurrence particulières ne bénéficiant pourtant qu'au seul bien automobile. L'objectif de ce travail de recherche s'est alors axé sur la distinction des deux pans du régime automobile afin d'identifier les dispositions commandées par la nature complexe, pour ensuite proposer leur application à l'ensemble des biens complexes. / The European Commission's object through the regulations of the competition consists of the integration of the national markets within a unique community market. For that purpose, the European executive did present as soon as possible the car industry as a privileged vector of this unification, setting up a competitive system of the vertical limitations within the agreements of production and distribution more efficient than is the overall system. Willing, at first, to arrest always shrewdly the economic realities of the sector, the Commission came around the importance of after-sales services in the competitive process afterward. Here are then both sections of the car industry system. On one hand, an apprehension of the economic situation of the sector, on the other hand a consideration of the complex nature of the car goods. This last one, as for all the goods including intellectual rights and to whom are intrinsically linked after-sales services, justifies therefore particular rules of competition and yet benefiting the car industry only. The goal of this research work was then focused on the distinction of both sections of the car industry system, to identify the rules commanded by the complex nature in order to propose their application to the whole of the complex goods thereafter.

Les accords verticaux correspondent pour l'essentiel au monomarquisme, à la distribution exclusive, à l'achat exclusif, à la distribution sélective, à la franchise et à la concession. Bien que leur diversité soit grande, ils constituent la plupart du temps des accords "de" concurrence car ils développent la concurrence intermarques. L'objectif principal de cette étude est de rechercher et d'analyser les critères d'appréciation des accords verticaux de distribution en droit de la concurrence français, communautaire et argentin. En droit de la concurrence communautaire, les accords de distribution font l'objet d'une importante réglementation et d'une riche jurisprudence. Les règles relatives aux accords verticaux ont subi une réforme qui a abouti à l'adoption d'un nouveau règlement d'exemption par catégorie (Règlement n° 330/2010) accompagné de nouvelles Lignes directrices sur les restrictions verticales. De nombreux accords verticaux bénéficient ainsi d'une exemption catégorielle leur conférant une présomption de légalité et en l'absence que ces accords bénéficient d'un règlement d'exemption par catégorie, ils demeurent tout de même exemptables, à condition que soit établi un bilan économique positif, notamment en raison de gains d'efficience. À la différence du droit communautaire de la concurrence, le droit argentin de la concurrence relatif aux accords verticaux n'a pas adopté de règlements d'exemption par catégorie et les autorités de concurrence argentines procèdent à une analyse au cas par cas des accords au travers de la règle de raison ainsi qu'à une analyse de leur incidence sur l'intérêt économique général. / Vertical agreements mostly correspond to single branding, exclusive distribution, exclusive purchase, selective distribution, franchising and concession. Although their variety is large, most of the time they constitute competition agreements because they increase inter-brand competition. The main aim of this study is to look for and to analyse the assessment criteria of distribution vertical agreements in French, European and Argentine Competition Laws. In European Competition Law, an important set of regulations and a rich case-law exist concerning distribution agreements. The rules concerning vertical agreements have been reformed ; as a consequence of this reform, a new Block Exemption Regulation (Regulation No 330/2010) has been adopted and accompanied by new Guidelines on Vertical Restraints. Lots of vertical agreements also benefit from Block Exemption which confers them a presumption of legality and in case these agreements do not benefit from the Block Exemption Regulation, they still can be exempted on the condition that a positive economic balance should be established, notably in view of efficiency gains. Unlike European Competition Law, the Argentine Competition Law concerning vertical agreements has not adopted Block Exemption Regulation and the Argentine competition authorities analyse each agreement in the light of the Rule of Reason and analyse their impact on the general economic interest.