The normative moral code is considered to be such that it applies universally to all or at least to all who can understand and govern their behavior by it. All or almost all common folk think of and use their own moral codes as them being normative in that for example there simply seem to them to exist “oughts” that apply to all and that there simply, straightforwardly are “things” that are right and wrong, good and bad. Gert Bernard and Gert Joshua have written an article on the topic of defining morality, with the title of “The Definition of Morality”. The authors suggest that the terms ‘normative morality’ refer to a code of conduct that, given some specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons. The authors take this formulation as entailing true and important definitional features of what normative morality is, although the authors think of this basic definition, conception as not being complete and that some additional feature hence is lacking but that any such candidate addendum to the definitional basic schema that they surveyed within the article seemed to be controversial, contested. Normative morality seems apt to investigate by creating thought-experiments wherein the participants are for example, envisioned choosing to endorse, put forward or act in accordance with a moral code. Within this large investigative project into normative morality with the help of thought-experiments it seemed to me that there was an under-representation of thought-experiments exhibiting some worthwhile and relevant features and I felt that it was a warranted project to create a thought-experiment which concurrently exhibited these features. Such an experiment could be thought of as an unusual “puzzle-piece” which could be valuable in contributing to furthering the completion of the “puzzle”, i.e. what normative morality is and its moral code. These three features were: i) a high degree of aptness for investigating a major part of or the complete normative moral code and ii) a high degree of freedom pertaining to the participants, e.g. their actions, thoughts etc., as well as iii) a high degree of confidence or warrant concerning what the participants would do, think, feel etc. within the thought-experiment. A thought-experiment, the Normative Moral Codes Workshop (NMCW) was hence created, which was aimed at investigating normative morality and its code and which exhibited these features. It is a thought-experiment mimicking an actual empirical study wherein the participants are given the task to together put forward the moral code for them, that would apply to them and that would cover a major or complete part of what they consider their moral codes to entail. The participants employed within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment were all currently living adult persons who I knew well. The core or main aim of this essay was to investigate whether it would or would not be the case that most or all participants within my run of the thought-experiment the NMCW would decide to put forward the code together with the chosen formulation of the thesis being, that it would not be the case that most or all participants would put forward the code within my run of the NMCW thought-experiment. Part of the core aim was also to elucidate why the thesis was supported or not supported as well as how strong the support was for the outcome of the experiment, i.e. the outcome of a code being put forward or not. The essay also has some minor aims which radiate out from the core aim (see below). As the thought-experimenter, I then reported on the events that I envisioned as happening within my run the NMCW thought-experiment as my selected participants grappled with the task and their decision to put or not put forward the code together that would apply to them. The finding was that the thesis was supported and that the support was robust in that I could identify several reasons the participants had against putting forward the code and I found very little in terms of reasons among the participants for putting forward the code. The essay also had some minor aims to selectively discuss a few further relevant and interesting issues radiating out from the core aim. These minor aims revolved around discussing some selected salient features of the NMCW including how they could relate to the outcome. One such selected salient feature was the feature of the employed participant sample of my run of the NMCW. I for example, discussed the potential extension of it not being the case that most or all participants would decide to put forward the code, if the participant sample would have been modified but still employed currently living5adults and I ended up being of the opinion that pertaining to most potential samples a similar outcome as the one envisioned within my run of the NMCW would be expected. I also wanted to discuss some further selected salient features of the NMCW within the context of addressing whether the NMCW, given its features ought to be considered an unsound, inapt experiment for investigating normative morality, given Gert’s and Gert’s conception of normative morality, since if this was the case the outcome of the experiment ought to be disregarded, given no weight. Although, I did find potential targets for criticism of the NMCW experimental design I did not find any reasons strong enough to disqualify the NMCW experiment as an experiment inapt, unsound for investigating normative morality, given the features of normative morality entailed within the suggested basic definition provided by Gert and Gert. Finally, I also aimed to selectively discuss some aspects of what it could mean pertaining to the conception of normative morality, according to Gert and Gert, that the thesis was supported. For example, given one interpretation the outcome could be taken to provide support for the non-existence of a normative moral code, but given another be taken to mean that addenda has to be identified and added to the basic conception of normative morality and that such addenda would be such that they would disqualify the NMCW (and its outcome) as a sound and apt thought-experiment to be employed in investigating normative morality. I also attempted to briefly illustrate how the NMCW thought-experiment could be used as a substratum facilitating the identification and clarification of such potential addenda to the basic conception of normative morality, suggested by Gert and Gert, and I also suggest some potential candidate features of the NMCW that further potential specifications added to the basic conception of morality ought to be able to disqualify, exclude as acceptable features of experiments aimed at investigating normative morality. In this way, an unusual, under-represented kind of thought-experiment, “puzzle-piece” when it comes to the large investigative project of employing experiments in order to acquire further insight into normative morality, i.e. “the puzzle”, can regardless of whether it seems to fit or does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, still be employed in such a way as to potentially provide further insight into “the puzzle”. This since even when a “puzzle-piece” does not seem to fit the “puzzle”, “seeing” and understanding how and why could provide us with information about the “puzzle”. / Den normativa moraliska koden anses vara sådan att den gäller universellt för alla eller åtminstone för alla som kan förstå den och reglera sitt beteende i enlighet med den. Alla eller nästan alla vanliga människor tänker och använder sig av sina moraliska koder som om dessa koder vore normativa, normerande genom att det t. ex. för dem helt enkelt verkar finnas ”måsten” som gäller alla och att det ”rakt upp och ner” verkar finnas ”saker” som helt enkelt är rätt och fel, gott och ont. Gert Bernard och Gert Joshua har skrivit en artikel kring ämnet hur man kan definiera moralen med titeln “The Definition of Morality” (sv. ”Moralens Definition”). Författarna föreslår att termen ’normativ moral’ (eller den ’normativa moralen’ i bestämd form) gäller en kod som reglerar hur man bör uppföra sig som givet vissa specificerade förhållanden är sådan att alla rationella personer skulle omfamna och förespråka den. Författarna anser att denna formulering innehåller viktiga och sanna egenskaper hos definitionen kring vad normativ moral är, även om författarna anser att denna basala, grundläggande definition, konception inte är fullständig och att därför vissa ytterligare definitions egenskaper, specifikationer saknas men att alla granskade kandidat-tillägg till denna basala definition som undersöktes inom artikeln verkade vara kontroversiella, enligt författarna. Normativ moral verkar lämplig för att undersökas genom att skapa tankeexperiment inom vilka deltagarna tex kan föreställas stödja, lägga fram eller agera i enlighet med en moralisk kod. Inom detta stora undersökande projekt av normativ moral med hjälp av tankeexperiment så verkade det enligt mig som om det fanns en under-representation av tankeexperiment som uppvisade vissa värdefulla och relevanta egenskaper och jag ansåg att det var ett rättfärdigat projekt att skapa ett tankeexperiment som uppvisade dessa värdefulla och relevanta egenskaper. Ett dylikt experiment kunde anses vara en ovanlig ”pusselbit” som kunde vara ett värdefullt bidrag till slutförandet av ”pusslet”, dvs vad normativ moral är och dess kod. De tre under-representerade egenskaperna var i) en hög grad av lämplighet för att undersöka en stor del av den normativa moraliska koden6eller den kompletta koden och ii) en hög grad av deltagarfrihet, exempelvis avseende deltagarnas handlingar, tankar osv samt iii) en hög grad av förtroende eller rättfärdigande avseende vad deltagarna skulle göra, tänka, känna osv inom tankeexperimentet. Tankeexperimentet, den Normativa Moraliska Kods Workshoppen (NMKW) skapades därför med målsättningen att undersöka den normativa moralen, dess kod samt att experimentet då skulle uppvisa de ovan nämnda egenskaperna. Det är ett tankeexperiment som liknar, ”speglar” en riktig empirisk studie inom vilka deltagarna ges uppgiften att tillsammans stödja och lägga fram den moraliska kod som skulle gälla för dem, reglera deras uppförande och som till en stor del eller fullständigt skulle täcka, innehålla det som de ansåg att deras moraliska koder innehöll. Deltagarna som användes inom min körning av tankeexperimentet var alla nu levande vuxna person som jag ansåg att jag kände väl. Kärn- eller huvudmålsättningen med uppsatsen var att undersöka huruvida det skulle eller inte skulle vara fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare inom min körning av NMKW tankeexperimentet skulle bestämma sig för att tillsammans lägga fram och stödja en kod, med den valda formuleringen för tesen enligt, det skulle inte vara fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare skulle lägga fram och stödja koden inom min körning av NMKW experimentet. Som en del av kärnmålsättningen var det att utreda varför tesen var eller inte var stödd samt utreda hur starkt stödet var för utfallet av experimentet, dvs utfallet att en kod lades fram eller inte lades fram. Uppsatsen har även mindre eller bi-målsättningar som strålar ut från uppsatsens huvudmålsättning (se nedan). I min roll som tanke-experimenteraren så rapporterade jag sedan kring vilka händelser som jag föreställde mig, som jag ”såg” uppträda inom tanke-experimentet NMKW då mina valda deltagare tog sig an uppgiften som de ombads att utföra, dvs att tillsammans lägga fram och stödja den kod som skulle komma att gälla dom själva, att appliceras på dom själva. Fyndet var att tesen stöddes och att detta stöd var robust eftersom jag kunde identifiera flera skäl hos deltagarna mot att lägga fram koden medan jag fann mycket litet i form av skäl hos deltagarna för att lägga fram koden. Uppsatsen hade även en del mindre målsättningar att selektivt diskutera några ytterligare relevanta och intressanta spörsmål som strålade ut från uppsatsens huvud-målsättning. Dessa mindre målsättningar kretsade kring att diskutera vissa valda tydliga, centrala egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet samt hur dessa kunde tänkas vara relaterade till experimentets utfall. En sådan egenskap vara den specifika deltagargruppen som användes vid min körning av experimentet. Jag diskuterade till exempel, den potentiella extensionen av utfallet att det inte var fallet att de flesta eller alla deltagare valde att lägga fram koden, ifall deltagargruppen modifierades men fortfarande bestod enbart av nu levande vuxna människor och min värdering var att ett liknande utfall, som vid min körningen av NMKW, verkade troligt för de flesta potentiella grupper av deltagare. Jag ville också diskutera vissa valda tydliga, centrala egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet inom kontexten kring huruvida NMKW experimentet givet dessa egenskaper, borde anses vara ett osunt, olämpligt experiment för att undersöka den normativa moralen, givet Gerts och Gerts konception av denna. Detta, eftersom om detta vore fallet så borde utfallet av experimentet förkastas och inte ges någon vikt. Trots att jag hittade potentiella saker att kritisera hos den experimentella designen hos NMKW så hittade jag inte några tillräckligt starka skäl för att diskvalificera NMKW experimentet som ett olämpligt, osunt experiment för att undersöka den normativa moralen, givet den normativa moralens egenskaper beskrivna, täckta inom Gerts och Gerts föreslagna basala, grundläggande definition av denna. Slutligen så ville jag även selektivt diskutera vissa aspekter kring vad det kunde betyda för konceptionen av den normativa moralen, enligt Gert och Gert, att tesen stöddes. Exempelvis, så givet en tolkning så kunde utfallet ses som ett stöd för icke-existensen hos den normativa moraliska koden, medan givet en annan tolkning så kunde utfallet anses betyda att ytterligare addenda till den basala definitionen av den normativa moralen måste identifieras och adderas till definitionen och att dylika addenda skulle komma att vara sådana att de skulle diskvalificera NMKW experimentet och dess utfall som ett sunt och lämpligt experiment att användas för att studera den normativa moralen, nu med dess extenderade specifikation. Jag försökte sedan att illustrera hur NMKW tankeexperimentet kunde användas som ett substrat för att underlätta identifieringen och förtydligandet av dylika potentiella tillägg till den basala konceptionen av den normativa moralen enligt Gerts och Gerts förslag, och jag föreslog även vissa potentiella kandidat egenskaper hos NMKW experimentet som dylika ytterligare tillägg till den basala konceptionen borde kunna diskvalificera, exkludera som acceptabla egenskaper hos experiment designade för att undersöka den7normativa moralen. På detta sätt så kan en ovanlig, underrepresenterad typ av tankeexperiment, ”pusselbit” när det gäller det stora undersökningsprojektet som använder sig av experiment för att erhålla ytterligare insikter inom den normative moralen, dvs ”pusslet”, oberoende om det verkar passa eller inte passa in i ”pusslet”, ändå användas på ett sådant sätt så att det potentiellt kan leda till ytterligare insikter kring ”pusslet”. Detta eftersom även när en ”pusselbit” inte verkar passa in i ”pusslet” så kan ”seendet”, förtydligandet och förståelsen kring hur och varför, ändå potentiellt förse oss med information om ”pusslet”.

Master of Science / Department of Statistics / Paul I. Nelson / A Bonferroni and an ordered P-value solution to the problem of controlling the experiment-wise Type I error rate are studied and compared in terms of actual size and power when carrying out correlated tests. Although both of these solutions can be used in a wide variety of settings, here they are only investigated in the context of multiple testing that specified pairwise comparisons of means, selected before data are collected, are all equal to zero in a completely randomized, balanced, one factor design where the data are independent random samples from normal distributions all having the same variance. Simulations indicate that both methods are very similar and effective in controlling experiment wise type error at a nominal rate of 0.05. Because the ordered P-value method has, almost uniformly, slightly greater power, it is my recommendation for use in the setting of this report.

I extend the Katz and Shapiro (1985) oligopoly model with network effects to encompass products with differing technological levels. I focus on a version of the model in which firms can invest in order to improve the probability that they advance their technology from a low level to a high level. I find that better available technology, lower adoption costs, and stronger network effects increase the rate of technological advancement and social welfare. Incompatible networks have lower total surplus but higher adoption rates. The investment competition dissipates to some degree the potential producer rents from successful advancement, particularly in the incompatible network case where increased competition can result in lower total welfare. A policy imposing a technology standard (via a high type technology requirement) yields the highest adoption rates, but negatively affects overall welfare. Analysis of the optimal tax/subsidy policy shows that taxes are optimal in most cases, since the private incentive to advance technology outweighs the social incentive. Negotiations in the real world can rarely be represented by a simple bargaining session between two parties. Agent bargaining, when one player represents another party in a bargaining situation for some form of compensation, is one such complicating circumstance from the real world. I explore the effects that this third entity has on the outcome of negotiations. I conduct a laboratory experiment emulating a simple example of agent bargaining. I test a hypothesis formulated using sequential-Nash-bargaining and also propose behavioral explanations for the observed behavior. I find that sequential-Nash-bargaining does a poor job of explaining our observations, and that using a weighted minimization of the differences between each of the three parties as a focal point provides a promising alternative.

This thesis presents theoretical work on armed group activity and empirical work on post-conflict recovery. In chapter two, I develop a general equilibrium model of violence to explain observed variation in coercive practices in conflict zones. Armed groups own land in the resource sector and allocate military resources between conflict and coercion, which assign de facto ownership over land and labour respectively. I find that coercion is higher if labour is scare relative to land, production is labour-intensive, or if one group is dominant relative to others. Furthermore, contrary to other studies, I find that coercion could decreases with price if military power is sufficiently decentralised, since conflict draws resources away from coercion. In chapter three, I evaluate a reconciliation program in post-conflict Sierra Leone. The program provides a forum for villagers to air war-time grievances, and also forges institutions designed to improve conflict resolution and build social capital. I find that respondents who received the intervention are more forgiving and are more charitable in their views of ex-combatants. Furthermore, conflict resolution improved and involvement in village groups and activities increased. However, psychological health---depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety---deteriorated. This study has direct implications for the design of transitional justice programs, as well as programs that aim to promote institutional change. In chapter four, I experimentally vary foreigner presence across behavioural games conducted in 60 communities in Sierra Leone, and assess its effect on standard measures of generosity. I find that foreigner presence substantially increases player contributions in dictator games, by an average of 19 per cent. Furthermore, the treatment effect is smaller for players who hold positions of authority; and subjects from villages with greater exposure to development aid give substantially less and are more inclined to believe that the behavioural games were conducted to test them for future aid. In chapter five, I use a model of repeated bargaining with one-sided asymmetric information to investigate the difficulties of reaching and sustaining power sharing agreements. I show that asymmetric information can explain the persistence of conflict, since learning slows down when there are future opportunities for bargaining.

The essays presented in this dissertation strive to narrow the gap between Operations models and practice. They describe three models with seemingly paradoxical or counter-intuitive predictions and then test them in the controlled environment of the laboratory.Essay 1 studies the departure time decisions of commuters traversing a Y-shaped network with two bottlenecks, who wish to arrive at their common destination at a desired time. Imposed on the network are costs associated with arriving either too early or too late with respect to an exogenously determined arrival time as well as to the delay experienced due to the bottlenecks. The equilibrium solution implies that, for certain parameter values, expanding the capacity of the upstream bottlenecks while keeping the capacity of the other fixed may induce a shift in the endogenously-determined departure times so as to increase total travel costs. We report the results of a large-group experiment designed to test this counterintuitive hypothesis. Our experimental results are strongly supportive of this prediction.Essay 2 examines the Braess Paradox which is a counterintuitive discovery that removing a link from a network that is subject to congestion may decrease the equilibrium travel cost for each of its users. We demonstrate this phenomenon in a complex network and test it experimentally with large groups of players. Our main purpose is to compare two information conditions. In the PUBLIC condition every user is informed of the route choices and payoffs of all the users. In the PRIVATE condition, each user is only informed of her own payoff. We show that under both information conditions, aggregate route choices converge to equilibrium.Essay 3 examines the impact of information on the routing decisions that drivers make in a congestible two route traffic network. We present a model and theoretical predictions of driver choices in such a network and compare outcomes under conditions of full and no-information regarding the capacities of each route. Under certain circumstances, the model predicts a paradox: aggregate travel delays increase with the provision of a priori information regarding stochastic travel conditions. We report evidence supporting this paradox in a laboratory experiment.

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Cold atomic spins are a great platform for developing and testing control and measurement techniques. This thesis presents experimental investigations into quantum control and measurement using laser cooled cesium atoms. On the control side, we present an experimental realization of a protocol to achieve full controllability of the entire hyperfine ground manifold of cesium. In particular, we demonstrate the ability to map between arbitrary states with fidelity greater than 0.99, using a combination of static, radio frequency, and microwave magnetic fields. On the measurement side, we present an experimental realization of quantum state tomography. The tomography protocol begins by measuring expectation values of an informationally complete set of observables using a weak optical probe in combination with dynamical control. The measurement record is processed using two different state estimation algorithms, allowing us to estimate a quantum state with fidelity greater than 0.9.

Cette thèse présente trois expériences sur l'évaluation de la performance des employés.L’évaluation est un outil de management très important dans un environnement où l'employeur a une croyance initiale imparfaite de la performance de ses employés. Elle permet, entre autres, à l'employeur d'améliorer son information sur la performance de ses employés. Le premier essai porte sur la phase initiale du processus d’évaluation : Comment l'employeur révise-t-il sa croyance sur la performance de son employé à l'aide d'un signal imparfait? Les résultats montrent, qu'en moyenne, l'utilisation d'un signal imparfait aide les sujets à déterminer un état de la nature incertain. Cependant, les sujets révisent leur croyance de manière non optimale quand le signal confirme leur croyance initiale.La seconde étape du processus d'évaluation est l'entretien d'évaluation, au cours duquel l'employeur peut transférer de l'information à son employé. Ce feedback peut être manipulé par l'employeur. Le second chapitre étudie comment l'employeur manipule l'évaluation et l'impact de cette manipulation sur le choix d'effort de l'employé. Les résultats montrent que les employeurs manipulent l'information transmise à leur employé qui répond en augmentant son effort. De plus, la manipulation qui surestime l'habileté de l'employé est significativement plus utilisée que celle qui la diminue.Le dernier chapitre s'intéresse aux biais d'évaluation à l'aide d'une expérience à effort réel. Si la majorité des évaluateurs manipulent l'évaluation pour augmenter leur gain, les résultats montrent que le sentiment de culpabilité joue un rôle important dans la décision de mentir ou non. / This thesis study evaluation using the experimental method. Evaluation is an important tool for firms. It allows the employer to improve his knowledge about his employee’s performance. This presupposes that the employer has an initial belief about his employee. As this initial belief is imperfect, the evaluation provides the employer with new information about the employee. The employer can revise his judgment after the evaluation. The first question raised is how the subject updates his belief about an uncertain state of the nature after observing an imperfect signal. We find that an imperfect signal helps subjects to determine the state of the nature. However, it may also give rise to mistakes by the subjects when validating their initial belief and leave them highly uncertain.The second step of evaluation is the evaluation interview. The principal transfers some of his informational advantage by way of feedback to his employee. However, the feedback may be manipulated. The question raised in the second chapter is whether principals bias information in order to modify the agent’s motivation and what is its impact on the agent’s choice of effort. We find that principals manipulate messages and agents tend to trust these messages and increase their effort accordingly. Our results show however a significant difference in manipulation when this one increases the true ability than when it decreases it.Finally, we study the decision to bias the evaluation in a real effort experiment. We find that the majority of supervisors are willing to bias their report in order for them to earn more. The results show that guilt aversion plays an important role in the decision to lie.

It is well-established that, when confronted with a decision to be taken under risk, individuals use reference payoff levels as important inputs. The purpose of this paper is to study which reference points characterize decisions in a setting in which there are several plausible reference levels of payoff. We report an experiment, in which we investigate which of four potential reference points: (1) a population average payoff level, (2) the announced expected payoff of peers in a similar decision situation, (3) a historical average level of earnings that others have received in the same task, and (4) an announced anticipated individual payoff level, best describes decisions in a decontextualized risky decision making task. We find heterogeneity among individuals in the reference points they employ. The population average payoff level is the modal reference point, followed by experimenter's stated expectation of a participant's individual earnings, followed in turn by the average earnings of other participants in previous sessions of the same experiment. A sizeable share of individuals show multiple reference points simultaneously. The reference point that best fits the choices of the individual is not affected by a shock to her income.