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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
101

Rules and Efficiency in collective choices : an experimental approach / Mécanismes et efficience dans les situations de choix collectif : une approche expérimentale

Theroude, Vincent 24 June 2019 (has links)
Cette thèse contient trois essais sur la coopération, mesurée à travers les contributions dans le jeu du bien public.Dans le premier chapitre, je propose une revue de la littérature sur l’hétérogénéité dans les jeux de bienpublic linéaires. Je distingue deux types d’hétérogénéité : l’hétérogénéité en dotation et l’hétérogénéité en rendement du bien public (c’est-à-dire en MPCR). Malgré un conflit normatif exacerbé, les agents hétérogènes contribuent autant au bien public que des agents homogènes. Sont-ils en mesure d’utiliser des mécanismes pour atteindre l’efficience (une provision complète du bien public) ? Mes résultats sont nuancés. Les agents hétérogènes en dotation sont capables de "s’autogouverner" et d’atteindre l’efficiencetandis que les agents hétérogènes en MPCR ne parviennent pas parfaitement à surmonter le problème de la sous-provision du bien public.Dans le deuxième chapitre, co-écrit avec Adam Zylbersztejn, nous étudions les effets d’un risque environnemental sur la coopération. Nous appelons risque environnemental une situation dans laquelle le rendement du bien public est risqué au moment de la décision. Nous considérons, dans notre expérience, deux types de risque : un risque individuel (le MPCR est déterminé indépendamment pour chaque membre du groupe) et un risque collectif (le MPCR est le même pour chaque membre du groupe). Nous constatons que le risque n’affecte pas la coopération : les sujets ne contribuent pas différemment au bien public lorsque le MPCR est certain ou lorsqu’il est risqué.Dans le troisième chapitre, j’examine les effets d’un mécanisme fondé sur la compétition intragroupe pour financer des biens publics. Dans mon expérience, les agents sont en compétition pour obtenir un MPCR plus élevé. Le rang dans la compétition - et donc le MPCR - dépend de la façon dont la contribution d’une personne se classe au sein de son groupe. Je trouve que la compétition n’améliore la provision des biens publics que lorsqu’elle ne génère pas d’inégalités trop importantes. / This thesis contains three essays on cooperation, observed through the contributions in the Public Good Game. In the first chapter, I survey the literature on heterogeneity in linear Public Good Games. I distinguish two kinds of heterogeneity: heterogeneity in endowment and heterogeneity in return from the public good (i.e. MPCR). Despite a normative conflict exacerbated, heterogeneous agents contribute as much as homogeneous agents to the public good. Are they able to use mechanisms to reach efficiency (i.e. a full provision of the public good)? I find mixed evidence. Agents heterogeneous in endowment are able to govern themselves and to reach efficiency while agents heterogeneous in MPCR do not perfectly overcome the underprovision problem.In the second chapter, co-written with Adam Zylbersztejn, we investigate the effects of environmental risk on cooperation. We call an environmental risk a situation in which the return of the public good is risky at the time of the decision. We consider, in our experiment, two kinds of risk: an individual one (i.e. the MPCR is determined independently for each group member) and a collective one (i.e. the MPCR is the same for each group member). We find that risk does not affect cooperation: subjects do not contribute to the public good differently when the MPCR is certain or when it is risky.In the third chapter, I investigate the effects of a mechanism based on within-group competition to provide public goods. In my experimental treatments, agents compete for a higher MPCR from the public good. The rank in the competition - and therefore the MPCR - depends on how one’s contribution ranks within the group. I find that competition improves public goods provision only when it does not generate too large inequalities.
102

Essays on Experimental Economics

Daniel John Woods (11038146) 22 July 2021 (has links)
This thesis contains three chapters, each of which covers a different topic in experimental economics.<br><br>The first chapter investigates power and power analysis in economics experiments. Power is the probability of detecting an effect when a true effect exists, which is an important but under-considered concept in empirical research. Power analysis is the process of selecting the number of observations in order to avoid issues with low power. However, it is often not clear ex-ante what the required parameters for a power analysis, like the effect size and standard deviation, should be. <br>This chapter considers the use of Quantal Choice/Response (QR) simulations for ex-ante power analysis, as it maps related data-sets into predictions for novel environments. <br>The QR can also guide optimal design decisions, both ex-ante as well as ex-post for conceptual replication studies. This chapter demonstrates QR simulations on a wide variety of applications related to power analysis and experimental design.<br><br>The second chapter considers a question of interest to computer scientists, information technology and security professionals. How do people distribute defenses over a directed network attack graph, where they must defend a critical node? Decision-makers are often subject to behavioral biases that cause them to make sub-optimal defense decisions. Non-linear probability weighting<br>is one bias that may lead to sub-optimal decision-making in this environment. An experimental test provides support for this conjecture, and also other empirically important biases such as naive diversification and preferences over the spatial timing of the revelation of an overall successful defense. <br><br>The third chapter analyzes how individuals resolve an exploration versus exploitation trade-off in a laboratory experiment. The experiment implements the single-agent exponential bandit model. The experiment finds that subjects respond in the predicted direction to changes in the prior belief, safe action, and discount factor. However, subjects also typically explore less than predicted. A structural model that incorporates risk preferences, base rate neglect/conservatism, and non-linear probability weighting explains the empirical findings well. <br>
103

ESSAYS IN MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS

Chen Wei (11185083) 26 July 2021 (has links)
<div>My dissertation consists of three chapters in the field of managerial economics and experimental economics. The first chapter studies the ratchet effect and the possible ways to mitigate it. Specifically, I conduct a controlled experiment to test the effectiveness of job rotation in eliminating the ratchet effect. Additionally, I compare effort provision between the situation where agents are rotated exogenously and the situation where the principal rotates agents endogenously. The experiment shows that the ratchet effect is effectively reduced both when workers are informed that they will be rotated in the future and when a principal has a costly option of rotating agents.</div><div> </div><div><br></div><div>The second and third chapter are based on joint work with Prof. Yaroslav Rosokha. In the second chapter, we study a single-queue system in which human servers have discretion over the effort with which to process orders that arrive stochastically. We show theoretically that the efficient outcome in the form of high effort can be sustained in the subgame perfect equilibrium if the interactions are long term (even when each server has a short-term incentive to free ride). In addition, we show that queue visibility plays an important role in the type of strategies that can sustain high-effort equilibrium. In particular, we show that limiting feedback about the current state of the queue is beneficial if servers are patient enough. We conduct a controlled lab experiment to test the theoretical predictions and find that when the queue is visible, human subjects cooperate if the queue is long, but defect if the queue is short. We also find that cooperation is hard to achieve when the queue is not visible. </div><div><br></div><div>In the third chapter, we report another lab experiment to test the theory developed in the second chapter. In the new experiment, we provide a more natural queueing frame for the subjects rather than the neutral language used in the second chapter. We also increase the number of matches in each treatment. We find that effort increases with the expected duration of the interaction. We also find that visibility has a strong impact on the strategies that human subjects use to provide effort. As a result, providing less visibility makes servers more willing to provide high effort if they are patient enough.</div>
104

Essays in Cooperation and Competition

Mouli Modak (12476466) 29 April 2022 (has links)
<p>This dissertation is a collection of three papers, each one being a chapter. The running subject of interest in all the papers is the strategic behavior of individuals in different environments. In the first chapter, I experimentally investigate collusive behavior under simultaneous interaction in multiple strategic settings, a phenomenon which I call multiple contacts. I investigate how multiple contacts impact collusive behavior when the players are symmetric or asymmetric. The second chapter is a joint work with Dr. Brian Roberson. In this chapter, we examine the role of cognitive diversity in teams on performance in a large innovation contest setting. We use a theoretical model to derive conditions under which increasing diversity can improve the performance in the large contest. Finally, in the third chapter, a joint work with Dr. Yaroslav Rosokha and Dr. Masha Shunko, we experimentally study players' behavior when they interact in an infinitely repeated environment, where the state of the world in each period is stochastic and dependent on a transition rule. Our main questions are how the transition rule impacts behavior and whether asymmetry in players impacts this.</p> <p><br></p> <p>In the first chapter, I study the phenomenon of multiple contacts using a laboratory experiment with multiple symmetric or asymmetric prisoners' dilemma games. When agents interact in multiple settings, even if defection or deviation from collusion in one setting can not be credibly punished in the same setting, it may be punishable in other settings. This can increase the incentive to collude. I observe a statistically significant increase in probability of punishment in one game after defection in another game under multiple contacts, but only when the games are asymmetric in payoffs. While punishment of defection increases in some situations, I do not find any significant increase in collusion due to multiple contacts in either symmetric or asymmetric environment. In addition to this result, to find further support for the theory which suggests that agents should use different strategies under multiple contacts, I estimate the underlying strategies that subjects use in my experiment. To this end, I modify popular strategies (e.g., Grim Trigger, Tit-for-Tat, etc.) to condition on the history observed in multiple strategic settings. I find that only for games with asymmetric payoffs subjects use these modified strategies in the presence of multiple contacts.</p> <p><br></p> <p>The second chapter is a theoretical work. In our model of large team innovation contest, teams develop an innovation using the skills or perspectives (tools) belonging to individual team members and the costly effort they provide.</p> <p>Prizes are awarded based on the values of the teams' innovations. Within a team, the team members posses different skills or perspectives (tools) which may be applied to innovation problems. For a given innovation problem and a given level of team effort, different combinations of tools within a team may generate different values for the team innovation. In this context, we examine the issues of individual team performance as a function of a team's own composition and the overall performance of the contest as a function of the compositions of the teams. We find that the question of whether increasing diversity leads to an increase in expected performance, for both an individual team and the overall contest, depends on the efficiency with which teams are able to effectively apply diverse sets of tools to innovation problems. Thus, our paper provides a channel -- other than a direct cost of diversity -- through which diversity can be beneficial or detrimental depending on how efficient teams are at utilizing diverse sets of team member tools.</p> <p><br></p> <p>The final chapter is another experimental study. We study an enviroment where individuals interact with each other in a prisoners' dilemma game repeatedly over time. However, the payoffs of the prisoners' dilemma game is decided stochastically using a transition rule. We vary the transition rule from alternation to random and study the change in subject behavior when the interaction is either symmetric or asymmetric. Our results show that in asymmetric environment, alternation can improve cooperation rates.</p> <p>With random transition rule, symmetric environment is more conducive to cooperation. We find that asymmetric environment with random transition rules performs the worst in terms of cooperation rates.</p>
105

Investigating the Ability of Pro-social Emotions to Enhance Cooperative Behavior

Vergara Sobarzo, Lucía A 01 January 2013 (has links) (PDF)
This research investigates the use of pro-social emotions to improve cooperation. In particular, it tries to reconcile the results from Noussair and Tucker (2007) and Lopez et al. (2010). To reach this goal the experiment considers different degrees of revelation: no revelation, partial and full disclosure of information. Additionally, I use different microeconometric specifications to accommodate different hypothesis about the motivation of the subjects. My results diverge from those of Lopez et al. because I find that revealing the decision of a single subject at random does not significantly increase cooperation, which is the main result of these authors. Also, my findings indicate that cooperation is triggered only when I reveal information of either 3 or all the subjects in the group, the last case being similar to the public observability of Noussair and Tucker. These authors find a non-permanent increase in contributions, so I do but using a positive framed-experiment with disclosure of additional information, the group’s earning loss. Therefore, random revelation together with the disclosure of information about subjects’ decisions appears to be a good alternative to promote cooperation in a sample pool of undergraduate students. Also, I observe a reduction in contributions over time, but in the random revelation treatment this decay by less than 40%. The most interesting result that I obtain is the evidence of altruism and positive reciprocity in the specification of Ashley et al. (2003, 2010), instead of the matching in contributions reported by these authors.
106

Characterizing adult attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD): A multidisciplinary approach using computational modeling, novel neurocognitive tests, and eye-tracking

Ging Jehli, Nadja Rita 08 December 2022 (has links)
No description available.
107

Three Essays on Food Choice Decisions

Pham, Matthew Van 09 July 2014 (has links)
No description available.
108

Assessing the potential effects of the Brenner Basis Tunnel Opening: socioeconomics changes and possible behavioural interventions

Lombardi, Giorgio 29 January 2024 (has links)
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the potential effects of the planned Brenner Pass opening in 2028. The thesis is divided into 3 studies: in the first, we will provide a methodological description of possible approaches to be used in this type of analysis. In the second, we will propose an experiment to understand if it is possible to exploit the default effect to induce a modal shift towards the most sustainable means of transportation: the train. In the third study, we will conduct a simulation by applying the model constructed by Monte et al in 2018. The simulation results demonstrate that the opening of the Brenner Base Tunnel will lead to an increase in welfa re in the Trentino Alto Adige region (+0.2%), along with other socio economic changes such as increased commuting and housing costs. Theresults of the second study highlight the potential of a simple policy based on the default effect, pushing over half ( 54%) of the participants to repeatedly choose the most sustainable option.
109

Confiance en soi et économie comportementale du travail : trois essais expérimentaux / Self-confidence and behavioral labor economics : three experimental essays

Vialle, Isabelle 10 December 2010 (has links)
Ce manuscrit comporte trois essais qui partagent l’objectif commun d’évaluer l’impact de la confiance en soi sur les décisions des agents économiques à l’aide de la méthode expérimentale. Ce travail se concentre sur trois thèmes relatifs à l’économie comportementale du travail : le travail au noir, la recherche d’emploi et le travail en équipe. Le premier chapitre analyse les biais d’optimisme dans le contexte du travail irrégulier. Ce travail fournit une mesure des biais d’optimisme à travers un processus de décision. Les résultats montrent que les modalités d’annonce du contrôle altèrent la perception du risque : la désignation du nombre d’agents aléatoirement contrôlés tend à encourager l’optimisme des fraudeurs. Le second chapitre étudie comment l’incertitude quant à l’habileté et l’estime que les demandeurs d’emploi ont d’eux-mêmes affectent leurs décisions de recherche. Les résultats montrent qu’en moyenne les agents peu habiles ne modifient pas leur salaire de réserve, alors que les sujets très habiles tendent à diminuer leurs exigences salariales et donc à stopper plus rapidement leur recherche. Cependant, les décisions des agents peu habiles ne sont pas homogènes : les agents peu compétents ont des exigences salariales d’autant plus élevées qu’ils ont une haute estime d’eux-mêmes. Le troisième chapitre vise à évaluer dans quelle mesure l’image que les travailleurs ont d’eux-mêmes conditionne leur choix d’effort lorsqu’ils travaillent en groupe. Les résultats montrent que les agents qui sur évaluent (sous-évaluent) leur habileté exercent plus (moins) d’effort que les sujets qui ont une perception correcte de leurs compétences. Les résultats révèlent également que les individus bénéficient de la sur-confiance de leur partenaire, mais pas de leur propre biais, alors que la sous-confiance détériore le bien-être de tous les membres de l’équipe. / This dissertation contains three essays that estimate the effects of self-confidence on economic agents’ decisions. An experimental approach is used for those contributions. This work is interested in three topics concerning behavioral labor economics: moonlighting, job search and teamwork. The first chapter investigates the existence of optimism biases in the context of irregular work. This essay proposes a measure of optimism biases through a decision process. The results show that the way the monitoring policy is announced deeply affects the perception of the risk at stake: the designation of the number of randomly controlled agents tends to foster the cheats’ optimism. The second chapter studies how the uncertainty on ability and self-esteem of job-seekers affect their search behaviors. The results show that on average the low ability agents’ decisions are not affected by the uncertainty about their ability, whereas the high ability agents tend to decrease their reservation wage and thus to stop their search faster. However, the low ability agents’ decisions are not homogeneous: the higher the worker’s self-esteem is, the higher his reservation wage is. The third chapter aims at estimating how workers’ self-image biases affect effort choices and team production. The results show that the workers who overestimate (underestimate) their ability provide higher (lower) effort levels than the unbiased. The results also reveal that the agents benefit from their partner’s confidence, but not from their own bias. Conversely, the presence of underconfident agents in the team damages the welfare of both teammates.
110

Experimentální test alternativních designů aukcí frekvenčních pásem s komunikačními kanály / An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for Spectrum Auctions with Communication Channels

Matoušek, Jindřich January 2014 (has links)
Charles University in Prague Faculty of Social Sciences Institute of Economic Studies MASTER THESIS An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for Spectrum Auctions with Communication Channels Author: Bc. Jindřich Matoušek Supervisor: PhDr. Lubomír Cingl Academic Year: 2013/2014 Abstract The multi-unit auction mechanisms are one of the most important instruments used for the allocation of spectrum licenses, airport time slots, delivery routes, networking or furniture allocation. This thesis experimentally examines the attributes of complex multi-unit auction mechanisms (Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction and its combinatorial extension Simultaneous Multi-Round Package Bidding) in the presence of an opportunity to collude among the bidding participants due to a provision of a simple communication channel - a chat window. The results suggest that in our parameter setting, the combinatorial bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Interestingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in both examined auction formats. Bidders are able to split the auctioned goods in a collusive agreement, which results in a better allocation compared to the auction formats without the communication channel. Combinatorial bidding on packages probably makes the decision-making problem of bidders hard to process...

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