My dissertation consists of four chapters. In the first chapter, I use a laboratory experiment to analyze how individuals resolve an exploration versus exploitation trade-off. The experiment implements a single-agent exponential bandit model. I find that, as predicted, subjects respond to changes in the prior belief, safe action, and discount factor. However, I commonly find that subjects give up on exploration earlier than predicted. I estimate a structural model that allows for risk aversion, base rate neglect/conservatism, and probability mis-weighting. I find support for risk aversion, conservatism, and probability mis-weighting as potential factors that influence subject behavior. Risk aversion appears to contribute to the finding that subjects explore less than predicted. <div><br></div><div>In the second chapter, I use a laboratory experiment to analyze how a group of voters experiment with a new reform. The experiment implements the continuous time Strulovici (2010) collective experimentation model. I analyze a subset of data where groups and single decision makers should eventually prefer to stop experimentation and abandon the reform. I find three results that are consistent with the modeled experimentation incentives. In this subset of data, groups stop experimentation earlier than single decision makers, wait longer to stop experimentation as the number of revealed winners increases, and stop experimentation earlier than the utilitarian optimum predicts. However, I also find that both groups and single decision makers stop experimentation earlier than predicted. Additional treatments show that this result is unlikely to be explained by standard explanations such as incorrect belief updating or risk aversion. </div><div><br></div><div>In the third chapter, I use a laboratory experiment to investigate the role of group size in an innovation contest. Subjects compete in a discrete time innovation contest, based on Halac et al. (2017), where subjects, at the start of each period, are informed of the aggregate number of innovation attempts. I compare two innovation contests, a two-person and four-person contest, that only differ by contest size and have the same probability of obtaining an innovation in equilibrium. The four-person contest results in more innovations and induces more aggregate innovation attempts than the two-person contest. However, there is some evidence that the two-person contest induces more innovation attempts from an individual than the four-person contest. Subjects' behavior is consistent with subjects placing more weight on their own failed innovation attempts, when updating their beliefs, than their competitors' failed innovation attempts.</div><div><br></div><div>In the fourth chapter, I investigate the role of performance feedback, in the form of a public leaderboard, in innovation competition that features sequential search activity and a range of possible innovation qualities. I find that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of contests with a fixed ending date (i.e., finite horizon), providing public performance feedback results in lower equilibrium effort and lower innovation quality. I conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical predictions and find that the experimental results largely support the theory. In addition, I investigate how individual characteristics affect competitive innovation activity. I find that risk aversion is a significant predictor of behavior both with and without leaderboard feedback and that the direction of this effect is consistent with the theoretical predictions.</div>

Les choix de localisation des ménages conduisent à divers problèmes tels que la ségrégation entre ménages riches et ménages pauvres et à des inégalités spatiales entre les régions. Cette thèse étudie ces phénomènes à l'aide de modèles théoriques et d'expériences menées en laboratoire. Pour commencer, une expérience dont l’objectif est d’analyser les conditions sous lesquelles est réalisée pour voir sous quelles conditions différentes structures urbaines peuvent être obtenues. En effet, aux Etats-Unis, les riches sont majoritairement en banlieue et les pauvres en centre-ville alors que l'opposé est observé dans les grandes villes européennes. Il apparait que le ratio « coût d'opportunité du temps/la demande de logements » est un facteur essentiel pour expliquer ces types de structure. Ensuite, une étude théorique est menée pour obtenir des structures de villes plus complexes, où les riches et les pauvres sont beaucoup moins en situation de ségrégation. La théorie montre que les politiques publiques peuvent donner des résultats très différents. Puis, nous étudions la répartition du capital humain entre les régions. Dans les pays où elle est inégale, on observe une croissance trop faible dans les régions pauvres et une augmentation des inégalités spatiales. Pour combattre ces inégalités, il est montré qu'il est possible de faire revenir les travailleurs qualifiés dans les régions pauvres car il existe des complémentarités avec les travailleurs non qualifiés. Des études ont montré que ces derniers augmentent la productivité des travailleurs qualifiés. Enfin, une étude expérimentale est faite pour étudier les choix de consommation. Nous testons l’hypothèse de l'existence d'un consommateur représentatif souvent faite en Nouvelle Economie Géographique. Il en ressort que les modèles existant ne prennent pas assez en compte l’hétérogénéité des goûts des consommateurs. / Several problems such as spatial inequalities between regions and spatial segregation within cities arise from households’ location choices. The purpose of this dissertation is to address these problems with theoretical and experimental studies. To begin, a laboratory experiment has been conducted in order to understand under which conditions different urban structures emerge. Indeed, in the U.S., spatial segregation occurs and the richer households are located in the suburbs while the poor ones are located downtown. The opposite pattern is observed in several major European cities. It appears in our study that the ratio ‘transportation costs/demand for land’ is a key factor for explaining these two types of segregation. Then, a theoretical model is used to reproduce several types of urban structures, where poor and rich households are located in the same neighborhoods. The theory predicts that policy interventions can lead to very different outcome. Then, the spatial distribution of human capital among regions is studied. Because skilled workers are mainly attracted toward wealthier regions, economic growth is lower in the poorer regions and spatial inequalities increase. The theoretical model predicts that it is possible to bring back the skilled workers in poor regions because there exists complementarities between skilled and unskilled workers. Indeed, the presence of unskilled workers enhances skilled workers' productivity, making their return more profitable. To finish, a laboratory experiment has been conducted to study consumers' behavior. Because in New Economic Geography models, the existence of a representative consumer is often assumed. The relevance of this hypothesis is tested. It appears that the existing models do not take enough into account heterogeneity in tastes among the consumers.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(農学) / 甲第20435号 / 農博第2220号 / 新制||農||1049(附属図書館) / 学位論文||H29||N5056(農学部図書室) / 京都大学大学院農学研究科生物資源経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 栗山 浩一, 教授 福井 清一, 教授 伊藤 順一 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Agricultural Science / Kyoto University / DGAM

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第24374号 / 経博第661号 / 新制||経||302(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 西山 慶彦, 教授 江上 雅彦, 教授 秋田 祐哉 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

<p>    </p> <p>I worked on two chapters studying the labor markets in Colombia and Iraq. My third chapter analyzed health outcomes in the US. </p> <p><br></p> <p>My first chapter examines whether the three-year gap between the announcement (in 2014) and the start (in 2017) of the Illicit Crop Substitution Program (ICSP) increased child labor in Colombia. My results from a difference-in-differences model using differences in historical coca production show that due to the ICSP announcement, children became four percentage points more likely to work in municipalities with historical coca production than in non–coca-growing areas. </p> <p><br></p> <p>My second chapter ran a randomized control trial and a double-incentivized resume rating to elicit the preferences of employers and job seekers for candidates and vacancies in Iraq. After revealing the ob offer rate for female job seekers, women applied for jobs by three more percentage points than the men in the control group. This paper highlights the value of revealing employers’ preferences to improve the match between female candidates and employers when women underestimate the chances of finding a job. </p> <p><br></p> <p>In my third paper, I study how removing the black box warning on Chantix, a prescription drug used to reduce nicotine consumption, affects veterans’ visits to smoking cessation therapy. Using a difference-in-differences model, I found that veterans schedule almost two more medical consultations in counties with high-quality hospitals than in places with low-quality medical care centers. </p>

<p>This study examines several emerging topics in strategic communication and information design. The first chapter studies the role of verification in persuasion and its interaction with commitment in a Bayesian persuasion framework in which the sender is not fully bound by the committed plan. Both theoretically and experimentally, we demonstrate that making verification easier can significantly improve information transmission when commitment is low, but its effect is limited when commitment is high. However, empirically receivers do not respond as strongly as predicted by theory, which is consistent with base-rate neglect and conservatism. On the other hand, senders generally anticipate receivers' actions and best respond to the empirical behavior of receivers. We provide empirical implications for cases where verification is instrumental in improving information transmission and where it is not. </p> <p><br></p> <p>The second and third chapters are based on joint work with Dr. Collin Raymond. In the second chapter, we investigate how increasing the complexity of the message space in the presence of limited memory can reduce misrepresentation in strategic communication. We enrich a standard cheap talk game so that senders must communicate not just a payoff-relevant state, but also payoff-irrelevant attributes correlated with the state.  We show that increasing the set of attributes that may need to be reported (i.e., the complexity of the game) improves the amount of information transmitted in equilibrium. Our findings demonstrate that the reporting of redundant information may induce equilibria that feature improved outcomes compared to simpler, more direct reporting systems, and point out the importance of complexity when trying to induce truthful information revelation.</p> <p><br></p> <p>In the third chapter, we analyze some extensions on the effect of complexity. We present experimental evidence which shows that  too much of an increase in complexity leads to a reversal of those gains. Limited memory on the part of players, as well as the relative complexity faced by senders and receivers, drives these changes, and individuals experience cognitive costs when dealing with complex environments that they are willing to pay to avoid. </p> <p><br></p>

Previous studies have underscored the economic importance of the role of the entrepreneur, and empirical studies testing the nature of the entrepreneur are notably lacking. This study directly addresses this issue by examining newly gathered field data which captures the decision making and risk behaviors for a group of high-technology entrepreneurs. Two decision making tasks were used to elicit risk aversion measures and to test for any 'joy of winning' or judgmental errors, possibly in the form of over optimistic behavior. These elicitations were made with the use of multiple price formats and winner's curse experiments. 62 responses were collected from subjects at the 2004 national Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) conference in Atlanta, March 2004. From these 62 responses a subject pool of 33 entrepreneurs and 29 non-entrepreneurs were identified. Statistical methods were employed to assign risk aversion measures and identify any 'joy of winning' or judgmental errors for the entrepreneur (treatment) group compared with the non-entrepreneur (control) group. Findings show that entrepreneurs exhibit less risk aversion, but show no statistically meaningful difference in judgmental errors compared to their non-entrepreneur counterparts. However, there is evidence to support the claim that both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs exhibit a 'joy of winning', and that the size of the effect is larger for entrepreneurs.

The proliferation of big data and the algorithms that utilize it have revolutionized the way in which individuals make decisions, interact, and live. This dissertation presents a structured analysis of behavioral ramifications of artificial intelligence (AI) and big data in contemporary society. It offers three distinct but interrelated explorations. The first chapter investigates consumer reactions to digital privacy risks under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), an encompassing regulatory act in the European Union aimed at enhancing consumer privacy controls. This work highlights how consumer behavior varies substantially between high- and low-risk privacy settings. These findings challenge existing notions surrounding privacy control efficacy and suggest a more complex consumer risk assessment process. The second study shifts to an investigation of historical obstacles to consumer adherence to expert advice, specifically betrayal aversion, in financial contexts. Betrayal aversion, a well-studied phenomenon in economics literature, is defined as the strong dislike for the violation of trust norms implicit in a relationship between two parties. Through a complex simulation, it contrasts human and algorithmic financial advisors, revealing a significant decrease in betrayal aversion when human experts are replaced by algorithms. This shift indicates a transformative change in the dynamics of AI-mediated environments. The third chapter addresses nomophobia – the fear of being without one's mobile device – in the workplace, quantifying its stress-related effects and impacts on productivity. This investigation not only provides empirical evidence of nomophobia's real-world implications but also underscores the growing interdependence between technology and mental health. Overall, the dissertation integrates interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks and robust empirical methods to delineate the profound and often nuanced implications of the AI-data nexus on human behavior, underscoring the need for a deeper understanding of our relationship with evolving technological landscapes. / Doctor of Philosophy / The massive amounts of data collected online and the smart technologies that use this data often affect the way we make decisions, interact with others, and go about our daily lives. This dissertation explores that relationship, investigating how artificial intelligence (AI) and big data are changing behavior in today's society. In my first study, I examine how individuals respond to high and low risks of sharing their personal information online, specifically under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a new regulation meant to protect online privacy in the European Union. Surprisingly, the results show that changes enacted by GDPR, such as default choices that automatically select the more privacy-preserving choice, are more effective in settings in which the risk to one's privacy is low. This implies the process in which people decide when and with whom to share information online is more complex than previously thought. In my second study, I shift focus to examine how people follow advice from experts, especially in financial decision contexts. I look specifically at betrayal aversion, a common trend studied in economics, that highlights individuals' unwillingness to trust someone when they fear they might be betrayed. I examine if betrayal aversion changes when human experts are replaced by algorithms. Interestingly, individuals displayed no betrayal aversion when given a financial investment algorithm, showing that non-human experts may have certain benefits for consumers over their human counterparts. Finally, I study a modern phenomenon called 'nomophobia' – the fear of being without your mobile phone – and how it affects people at work. I find that this fear can significantly increase stress, especially as phone-battery level levels decrease. This leads to a reduction in productivity, highlighting how deeply technology is intertwined with our mental health. Overall, this work utilizes a mix of theories and detailed analyses to show the complex and often subtle ways AI and big data are influencing our actions and thoughts. It emphasizes the importance of understanding our relationship with technology as it continues to evolve rapidly.

What does it mean to act morally? This research is part of normative ethics, which studies the formation of moral judgments and whether such judgments are able to motivate people to act in accordance with them. The gap between the dimension of the common good and the private life of each citizen has led to questioning whether there are moral norms whose content may constitute, per se, a sufficient reason for action. More specifically, when a norm, collectively chosen and shared, succeeds in self-imposing without any intervention of external authority.The interest for this theme arises from the urgency of defining conditions under which a group of interdependent agents, can organize themselves to obtain long-term collective benefits, find in collective action, a motivation, a commitment and a responsibility that decrease the temptation of opportunistic behaviour in distribution contexts. The main goal of this inquiry is trying to propose a normative solution of a problem of distributive justice in the following terms of: how can a norm generate a motivational causal force that induces compliance with what it asserts, in contexts where selfish rather than prosocial behaviour would be expected? This problem, approached from different perspectives, economic, psychological, sociological, also requires a philosophical reflection. Within this framework, the issue of compliance might be reread as a motivational problem: thus, the aim of this thesis would be to try to clarify the relationship between an impartial ethical point of view and what kind of real motivations people have to act in accordance with some specific ethical principles – namely, what reasons people have for acting in alignment with principles of distributive justice. Thus, the dissertation provides evidence from laboratory experiments that supports John Rawls’s Kantian constructivism as a method that allows subjects to evaluate different distribution criteria in production situations, making them reach an agreement on the liberal egalitarian principle. The Rawlsian method would rationally justify the ex-ante collective choice on that principle and it gives real motivations to comply ex-post, as it provides the conditions for creating a rationally justified joint commitment.

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