This dissertation examines reputation, the belief of the decision maker about types of advisors, in incomplete information games with multiple advisors. The decision maker believes that an advisor can be one of two types – an advisor who is biased towards suggesting any particular advice (bad advisor) or an advisor who has the same preferences as the decision maker (good advisor). I explain why it is not always beneficial for the decision maker to seek advice from two advisors simultaneously compared to seeking advice from a single advisor. It is shown that a strong concern for one’s reputation not to be perceived as a bad advisor can make the good advisor sometimes give wrong advice. Also, if each type of advisor considers his future important, the decision maker is better off having a single advisor. Then I show that, when dealing with two advisors, it is better for the decision maker to seek advice simultaneously since the possibility of obtaining information is lower in sequential cheap talk. I also examine how an individual’s perception of what he thinks of himself (self-reputation) and what others think of him regarding his ability to resist temptation (perception of reputation) affect his actions. It is shown that higher self-reputation and higher perception of reputation help in making resolutions and keeping up with them both in the short and the long run. However, this result requires that individuals find it relatively easy to resist temptation. Also, even those who find it hard to resist temptation can sustain their resolution after telling friends about the resolution in the short run if they value the future more than the present.

This dissertation consists of three research papers on cheap talk game and satisficing behaviour. The first chapter examines the potential for communication via cheap talk between an expert and a decision maker whose type (preferences) is uncertain. The expert privately observes states for each type of the decision maker and wants to persuade the decision maker to choose an action in his favour by informing her of the states. The decision maker privately observes her type and chooses an action. An optimal action for the decision maker depends upon both her type and type-specific states. In equilibrium the expert can always inform the decision maker in the form of comparative statements and the decision maker also can partially reveal her type to the expert or public. The second and third chapters build a dynamic model of satisficing behaviour in which an agent’s “expected” payoff is explicitly introduced, where this expectation is adaptively formed. If the agent receives a payoff above her satisficing level she continues with the current action, updating her valuation of the action. If she receives a payoff below her satisficing level and her valuation falls below her satisficing level she updates both her action and satisficing level. In the second chapter, we find that in the long run, all players satisfice. In individual decision problems, satisficing behaviour results in cautious, maximin choice and in normal form games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, they in the long run play either cooperative or defective outcomes conditional on past plays. In coordination games like the Battle of the Sexes, Choosing Sides and Common Interest, they in the long run coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes. In the third chapter, we find that satisficing players in the long run play subgame dominant paths, which is a refinement of subgame perfection, and identify conditions with which they ‘always cooperate’ or ‘fairly coordinate’ in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes games, respectively, and truthfully communicate in sender-receiver games. Proofs and simulations are provided in appendices.

Experimental willingness to pay (WTP) studies can be classified as hypothetical or non-hypothetical. In a hypothetical study, such as conjoint analysis, a subject does not need to make a real economic commitment. In contrast, in a non-hypothetical task such as in experimental auctions, a subject may need to actually buy the product. Subjects in hypothetical studies tend to overstate their true WTP. Consequently, researchers need to correct hypothetical values to obtain reliable WTP estimates. Recently, incentive-aligned and cheap talk approaches have been proposed as ways to correct for hypothetical bias. In a hypothetical task, a cheap talk script explicitly reminds the subject about the hypothetical nature of the task and its expected consequences. In an incentive-aligned task (non-hypothetical), subjects are randomly selected to physically buy the product. The objective of our study is to assess and compare the reduction of hypothetical bias in consumers’ willingness to pay for novel products by applying a generic, short, and neutral cheap talk script in a retail setting. To accomplish this objective, we employ non-hypothetical, hypothetical, and hypothetical with cheap talk treatments in our experimental design. We conducted our experimental retail study using conjoint analysis and open-ended elicitation mechanisms, utilizing Becker DeGroot Marshak (BDM) mechanism for the incentive-aligned treatments. Consistently in both elicitation mechanisms, using seemingly unrelated and random-effect Tobit techniques, we find that our cheap talk script is effective in eliminating the hypothetical bias. As expected, the hypothetical WTP values are significantly higher than the non-hypothetical values but the hypothetical values with cheap talk are not significantly different from incentive-aligned or non-hypothetical estimates. In addition, we find that open-ended estimates are significantly higher than conjoint analysis estimates and that emotions and familiarity can have significant impacts on WTP estimates.

Experimental willingness to pay (WTP) studies can be classified as hypothetical or non-hypothetical. In a hypothetical study, such as conjoint analysis, a subject does not need to make a real economic commitment. In contrast, in a non-hypothetical task such as in experimental auctions, a subject may need to actually buy the product. Subjects in hypothetical studies tend to overstate their true WTP. Consequently, researchers need to correct hypothetical values to obtain reliable WTP estimates. Recently, incentive-aligned and cheap talk approaches have been proposed as ways to correct for hypothetical bias. In a hypothetical task, a cheap talk script explicitly reminds the subject about the hypothetical nature of the task and its expected consequences. In an incentive-aligned task (non-hypothetical), subjects are randomly selected to physically buy the product. The objective of our study is to assess and compare the reduction of hypothetical bias in consumers’ willingness to pay for novel products by applying a generic, short, and neutral cheap talk script in a retail setting. To accomplish this objective, we employ non-hypothetical, hypothetical, and hypothetical with cheap talk treatments in our experimental design. We conducted our experimental retail study using conjoint analysis and open-ended elicitation mechanisms, utilizing Becker DeGroot Marshak (BDM) mechanism for the incentive-aligned treatments. Consistently in both elicitation mechanisms, using seemingly unrelated and random-effect Tobit techniques, we find that our cheap talk script is effective in eliminating the hypothetical bias. As expected, the hypothetical WTP values are significantly higher than the non-hypothetical values but the hypothetical values with cheap talk are not significantly different from incentive-aligned or non-hypothetical estimates. In addition, we find that open-ended estimates are significantly higher than conjoint analysis estimates and that emotions and familiarity can have significant impacts on WTP estimates.

Chapter 1: Intrafamily Bargaining and Love Popular culture and common wisdom testify that the way partners in a relationship feel for one another very much depends on how they treat each other. This paper posits the hypothesis that altruism or love in a relationship is endogenous to the actions of the partners and studies how this influences allocations and efficiency in a bargaining model of household decision-making. The main results are that agents treat their partner in a kinder way than without endogenously evolving love, this leads to more equitable allocations in household decision making and greater intertemporal efficiency. There are two mechanisms at work: agents treat their partner nicely to avoid retribution by a less loving partner in the future; and they treat the partner nicely so that the kind reciprocal behavior raises their own love towards the partner, which lets them enjoy higher utility. As to love, two interpretations emerge: love is a commitment device by which couples can implement Pareto superior allocations; and love is an investment good in the sense that costly nice behavior towards the partner today may ensure higher levels of trust and efficiency in the future. Chapter 2: Perception of Technology and Technological Progress under Extractive Institutions This paper explores the impact of different perceptions of the nature of technology - whether it may grow in an arithmetic or geometric fashion - on the choices of an elite that lives on extracting resources from the productive populace. We show that slow potential growth destroys the credibility of inclusive institutions that the elite may consider in order to foster growth whereas these can and will be implemented if populace and elite believe in fast growth. Belief in the potential of technological growth leads to growth-friendly policies under both extractive and inclusive institutions and, as history progresses, the true nature of technology reveals itself and this belief spreads. Chapter 3: A critical literature review of the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and the communication of Unprotected Information Assets This paper reviews the literature centred on the question of what kind of settings facilitate the transmission of unverifiable pieces of information that re- side with an agent whose incentives are not well aligned with an agent for whom this piece of information is useful. The question is framed within the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and its answers make extensive use of the modelling device of Cheap Talk. The main findings are that communication leads to costly distortions and the efforts to decrease bias and information loss may trigger major revisions to the structure of incentive systems and the allocation of decision-rights. The paper argues that the literature has so far failed to properly examine the question of property rights of information and is therefore focused on niche applications.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第22222号 / 経博第610号 / 新制||経||292(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 関口 格, 教授 原 千秋, 准教授 陳 珈惠 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

No description available.

This paper adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analyze risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. Given its inherent discretion, risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives. To assess these incentives the analytical models consider risk reporting as an endogenous feature, thereby providing a benchmark to discuss regulatory attempts. Particularly, discretionary disclosure models refer to verified disclosure, e.g., on risk factors or risk management, whereas cheap talk models refer to unverified disclosure, like managerial forecasts on the impact of risk factors. This provides an analytically-based framework for discussion. Unlike prior literature focusing on disclosure cost, I argue that uncertainty of information endowment and issues of credible communication can explain restricted risk reporting observed empirically. Linking regulatory attempts to these restrictions implies that regulation may mitigate the incentives-driven restrictions to some extent, but can have adverse effects on risk reporting. I particularly discuss the link between effective risk monitoring and precision of risk reporting; the ex post assessment and usefulness of managerial forecasts on impacts of risk factors; the claimed decreasing cost of capital by mandatory risk reporting; and the threat of self-fulfilling prophecies. While the discussion has implications for both specific risk reporting requirements and empirical research, overall results suggests not to overestimate the informativeness of risk reporting even in a regulated environment.

The existing literature on information disclosure commonly assumes full commitment to truthful disclosure and therefore revelations are always credible, which can be quite unrealistic in many circumstances. This thesis mainly contributes to the literature by studying information disclosure in the form of cheap-talk in auctions and monopoly pricing, which allows for mis-reporting and false disclosure. The thesis is composed mainly of three research papers. The first paper (Chapter 2), also the major chapter of this thesis, investigates cheap-talk information disclosure in auctions, where bidders' preferences are horizontally differentiated. The seller may reveal information of product attributes before the auction, and the disclosure policy is characterized by a partition of the attribute space. In a symmetric setting, I first show that informative equilibria reveal the feature that more precise information is provided for less popular product attributes. Second, I prove an equilibrium existence theorem that an informative equilibrium can be supported by an information partition of any degree, as long as the number of bidders is sufficiently large. And finally, the optimal disclosure policy reveals a complementarity relationship between the number of bidders and the optimal degree of equilibrium partitions. In this chapter, optimal information structure is endogenously determined. In the second paper (Chapter 3), I turn to study how a monopoly seller should reveal a product's horizontal attributes, when consumer preferences conform to a mixture distribution. I show that the optimal disclosure policy largely depends on the characteristics of the mixture distribution. Specifically, when consumer preferences are highly heterogenous, it is better for the seller to reveal information and serve different groups of consumers separately. And when the preference distribution becomes more asymmetric, cheap-talk disclosure is more likely to be dominated by no disclosure at all. In this chapter, information structure is taken as given. The third paper (Chapter 4) studies optimal regulation of risk-averse producers, in a setting of complementary production with independent cost realization. The production can be organized in the form of either component, or integrated production. I show in this paper that the relative virtues of these two forms of production depend on the degree of risk aversion of the producers.

近年來政府面對關於揭露環境污染物的危險的爭論日趨嚴重。我們特提出政治經濟學中的二重要議題。一是對於在環境政策資訊不完全的情況，選民在考慮其做錯決策之機會成本後，將如何影響其投票決策；追求社會福利極大的政策制定者會如何制定最適的投票通過比例；以及政策制定者如何藉由專家的宣告來改變選民對環境政策的預期報酬，進而達到三方的均衡。二是我們將進一步討論關於選民政策與意識形態的策略動機。當有關政黨效率的資訊不完全時，選民在收到專家對政黨效率的宣告後，如何調解其政策及意識形態，以達到均衡。採用廉價談判的賽局 (cheap talk game) 理論提供解決的思考方向，探討政策制定者、選民、專家間的關係，政府的策略性溝通是否會有效，提供一理論模型的解釋。藉探討種種均衡存在的條件，盼能為議題甚或更一般化的政府政策，提供一理論依據，其能給予政府、社會一些參考與貢獻。