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Thesis (M.P.A.)--Bowling Green State University, 2009. / Document formatted into pages; contains v, 86 p. Includes bibliographical references.

This Thesis is about the role which social conventions play in shaping our moral choices, and about the possibility of a normative theory that takes such conventions seriously. It also hints at the idea of looking at conventions as a kind of moral technology. If existing conventions serve a useful function, then perhaps we can take what we know about conventions and apply that knowledge in a forward-looking manner. Chapter 1 of this Thesis outlines the shape of the project, and explains its roots in methodological individualism and a relative, subjective theory of value. Chapter 2 surveys the literature on norms and conventions, and explains why it is that despite the prevalence of the former in the literature, moral theorists should focus on the latter. Chapter 3 looks at the ways in which conventions structure strategic interaction. They do so both by providing information that served as an input to rational decision making, and by providing a more direct, non-instrumental form of motivation. In Chapter 4, we look at the relevance of the literature on public goods and the problem of collective action, and argue that beginning and maintaining conventions embodies a collective action problem. In Chapter 5, we move to examine the normative force of conventions, and suggest that conventions constitute a reasonable set of constraints on self-interested behaviour. Chapter 6 addresses the fact that a convention-based approach seems capable of endorsing asymmetrical outcomes, at least some of which seem unjust. In Chapter 7, we look more generally at the adequacy of a conventionalist account, and examine the departures which such an account seems to make from everyday morality. Finally, in Chapter 8, we put theory to practice, and examine the world of professional obligation. We offer there a meta-ethics of professional obligation that suggests that such obligations are best understood as conventions between professionals. That argument serves as a challenge to existing principle-based and virtue-based theories of professional obligation, and illustrates the practical importance of this Thesis. In Chapter 9, we summarize the ground covered, and discuss how we can apply what we know about conventions to ameliorate problematic situations.

We create pure strategy versions of Robert Axelrod's well known norms and metanorms games. To analyze the evolutionary behaviour of these games, we utilize replicator dynamics complemented with agent based model simulations. Our findings show that the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the norms game is one in which a player defects and is lenient. The metanorms game, however, has two evolutionarily stable strategies. The first is a repeat from the norms game, that is, a player defects and is always lenient. The other is one in which a player follows the norm and punishes those who are lenient and those who defect. We also introduce the concept of providing an incentive for players to play a certain strategy in our controlled norms game. This particular game has two evolutionarily stable strategies. In the first, a player follows the norm, while in the second, a player does not. We wish to transition the population of players from a state in which the majority of players initially do not follow the norm to one in which the majority of players do. During this transition, we look to minimize the total use of our incentive. We also utilize agent based model simulations to explore the effect of imposing simple network connections and heterogeneity onto a population of agents playing these games.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-308).

Thesis (Ph. D)--UCLA, 2009. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 176-181).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1983. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 55-61).

This Thesis is about the role which social conventions play in shaping our moral choices, and about the possibility of a normative theory that takes such conventions seriously. It also hints at the idea of looking at conventions as a kind of moral technology. If existing conventions serve a useful function, then perhaps we can take what we know about conventions and apply that knowledge in a forward-looking manner. Chapter 1 of this Thesis outlines the shape of the project, and explains its roots in methodological individualism and a relative, subjective theory of value. Chapter 2 surveys the literature on norms and conventions, and explains why it is that despite the prevalence of the former in the literature, moral theorists should focus on the latter. Chapter 3 looks at the ways in which conventions structure strategic interaction. They do so both by providing information that served as an input to rational decision making, and by providing a more direct, non-instrumental form of motivation. In Chapter 4, we look at the relevance of the literature on public goods and the problem of collective action, and argue that beginning and maintaining conventions embodies a collective action problem. In Chapter 5, we move to examine the normative force of conventions, and suggest that conventions constitute a reasonable set of constraints on self-interested behaviour. Chapter 6 addresses the fact that a convention-based approach seems capable of endorsing asymmetrical outcomes, at least some of which seem unjust. In Chapter 7, we look more generally at the adequacy of a conventionalist account, and examine the departures which such an account seems to make from everyday morality. Finally, in Chapter 8, we put theory to practice, and examine the world of professional obligation. We offer there a meta-ethics of professional obligation that suggests that such obligations are best understood as conventions between professionals. That argument serves as a challenge to existing principle-based and virtue-based theories of professional obligation, and illustrates the practical importance of this Thesis. In Chapter 9, we summarize the ground covered, and discuss how we can apply what we know about conventions to ameliorate problematic situations. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

archives@tulane.edu / Conventional wisdom suggests people must be willing to admit a problem exists before they can hope to solve it. This may be especially true in the case of implicit prejudice. Unlike explicit prejudice, which is conscious and deliberate, implicit prejudice is often unconscious and counter to what people intend. In addition, implicit prejudice is undesirable and leads people to respond defensively when told they have such prejudice. In this dissertation, I investigated whether social norms that encourage people to admit prejudice and exert effort to control it can be used to increase people’s willingness to admit their own implicit prejudice. In three experiments, participants watched (Experiments 1 and 2) or read about (Experiment 3) other people’s reactions to implicit attitude feedback. Then, participants were told they have an implicit bias favoring Whites over Blacks and responded to questions assessing defensiveness and willingness to admit prejudice. Experiments 1 and 2 found that seeing others acknowledge prejudice decreased people’s defensiveness to feedback about their own implicit attitudes and increased willingness to admit personal prejudice. Experiment 3 manipulated social norms with summary information about a referent group and found that while learning most other people deny prejudice caused participants to believe denying was more normal, overall, the manipulation had little influence on defensiveness or willingness to admit prejudice. Together, these experiments suggest that social norms can influence people’s willingness to admit personally prejudiced implicit attitudes, but to be effective, the example set by others must be vivid. / 1 / Aaron Moss