This Thesis is about the role which social conventions play in shaping our moral choices, and about the possibility of a normative theory that takes such conventions seriously. It also hints at the idea of looking at conventions as a kind of moral technology. If existing conventions serve a useful function, then perhaps we can take what we know about conventions and apply that knowledge in a forward-looking manner. Chapter 1 of this Thesis outlines the shape of the project, and explains its roots in methodological individualism and a relative, subjective theory of value. Chapter 2 surveys the literature on norms and conventions, and explains why it is that despite the prevalence of the former in the literature, moral theorists should focus on the latter. Chapter 3 looks at the ways in which conventions structure strategic interaction. They do so both by providing information that served as an input to rational decision making, and by providing a more direct, non-instrumental form of motivation. In Chapter 4, we look at the relevance of the literature on public goods and the problem of collective action, and argue that beginning and maintaining conventions embodies a collective action problem. In Chapter 5, we move to examine the normative force of conventions, and suggest that conventions constitute a reasonable set of constraints on self-interested behaviour. Chapter 6 addresses the fact that a convention-based approach seems capable of endorsing asymmetrical outcomes, at least some of which seem unjust. In Chapter 7, we look more generally at the adequacy of a conventionalist account, and examine the departures which such an account seems to make from everyday morality. Finally, in Chapter 8, we put theory to practice, and examine the world of professional obligation. We offer there a meta-ethics of professional obligation that suggests that such obligations are best understood as conventions between professionals. That argument serves as a challenge to existing principle-based and virtue-based theories of professional obligation, and illustrates the practical importance of this Thesis. In Chapter 9, we summarize the ground covered, and discuss how we can apply what we know about conventions to ameliorate problematic situations.

This Thesis is about the role which social conventions play in shaping our moral choices, and about the possibility of a normative theory that takes such conventions seriously. It also hints at the idea of looking at conventions as a kind of moral technology. If existing conventions serve a useful function, then perhaps we can take what we know about conventions and apply that knowledge in a forward-looking manner. Chapter 1 of this Thesis outlines the shape of the project, and explains its roots in methodological individualism and a relative, subjective theory of value. Chapter 2 surveys the literature on norms and conventions, and explains why it is that despite the prevalence of the former in the literature, moral theorists should focus on the latter. Chapter 3 looks at the ways in which conventions structure strategic interaction. They do so both by providing information that served as an input to rational decision making, and by providing a more direct, non-instrumental form of motivation. In Chapter 4, we look at the relevance of the literature on public goods and the problem of collective action, and argue that beginning and maintaining conventions embodies a collective action problem. In Chapter 5, we move to examine the normative force of conventions, and suggest that conventions constitute a reasonable set of constraints on self-interested behaviour. Chapter 6 addresses the fact that a convention-based approach seems capable of endorsing asymmetrical outcomes, at least some of which seem unjust. In Chapter 7, we look more generally at the adequacy of a conventionalist account, and examine the departures which such an account seems to make from everyday morality. Finally, in Chapter 8, we put theory to practice, and examine the world of professional obligation. We offer there a meta-ethics of professional obligation that suggests that such obligations are best understood as conventions between professionals. That argument serves as a challenge to existing principle-based and virtue-based theories of professional obligation, and illustrates the practical importance of this Thesis. In Chapter 9, we summarize the ground covered, and discuss how we can apply what we know about conventions to ameliorate problematic situations. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Boston University, 1990. / The central question of this dissertation 1s whether Habermas's discourse ethics can successfully take account of the kinds of criticisms of Kantian formalism, first raised by Hegel, without at the same time abdicating the universalism of the Kantian conception of justice. Specifically, it considers whether the universality of moral principles can be maintained while recognizing the particularity of our experiences and values. This question is pursued in the context of a discussion raised by contemporary Anglo-American ethicists. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre argue that . our notions of the right and the good are derived from a notion of the good life which defines the character of any given community. This would seem to undercut the force of Habermas's quasi-deontological position, which asserts that norms are only legitimated by universally valid criteria. This dissertation maintains that Habermas's theory of moral character accounts for both our historical rootedness and our ability to adopt a universalistic standpoint from which to question and assess our culturally mediated beliefs. When Habermas's position is considered in light of the arguments of critics such as Carol Gilligan, Martha Nussbaum, and Larry Blum, who criticize neo-Kantian tendencies to characterize morality as moral argument and the consequent failure to develop concepts of moral character, moral perception, moral emotion, and moral judgment, it becomes clear that Habermas needs a general moral theory that extends to the private sphere. It is posssible to reformulate Habermas's ethical theory so that the distinction between norms and values issues from an ideally regulated discourse that at the same time defines the boundary between public and private. The gap between norms and values also can be bridged by incorporating the notion of symmetrical reciprocity as a meta-norm of discourse, which would ground both principles of justice and a notion of the good without privileging any historically specific vision of the good life.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Université Lyon 3, 1999-2000. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (B.A.)--Bryn Mawr College. Dept. of Italian, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Université Lyon 3, 1999-2000. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--West Virginia University, 2002. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains iii, 83 p. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 80-83).

The American Dream is founded upon the ideological belief that ‘you can be anything you want to be, regardless of your current class position.’ This belief is contained within the dominant prevailing notion that the U.S. is a meritocracy where power and success are associated with determination and failure with laziness. This thesis challenges whether the American Dream is a relevant, attainable and viable concept for higher education students via the avenue of a soccer scholarship. In so doing, the research presented challenges the perceived wisdom of ‘American exceptionalism’ from a critical theoretical perspective. The research question at the heart of this study is ‘what are the motives of American university students for undertaking a soccer scholarship?’ The adoption of an interpretive paradigm for this study aims to provide an explanation of student decision-making. In the final analysis, this approach reveals what soccer means to the lives of the student-athletes. The central themes of the study were established via a pilot study and categorised as: family, social class, social mobility and career development. Questionnaires were completed by 154 students from two separate Division One universities. Twelve students were then purposively sampled and interviewed using a semi-structured format. To supplement these opinions, interviews were then conducted with a selection of coaches and athletic directors at the respective institutions. Analysis of the responses was contextualised using the framework provided by Csikszentmihayli and Schneider’s (2000) ‘Support/Challenge Questionnaire’. The findings support a common hypothesis that the family is a significant agent in socialising of their children to the cultural values of the American Dream. The findings additionally reveal support for the notion that families are important influences on their child’s sport mobility orientations in the soccer context. An alternative explanation proposed here is that the transmission process is actually a two-way dialogue in which children socialised their parents and vice versa. The family in this study represent a potentially problematic social process for the inculcation of values related to the maintenance of social life. The conclusions presented clearly reveal that the majority of students embarking on a soccer scholarship are motivated by the need to firstly finance their higher education and secondly to take part in a sport they have played since childhood. Students were aware of the uncertainty of the marketplace and the limitations of their own technical ability. As such their participation in the scholarship could be considered to be a pragmatic adaptation of a ‘labour of love.’

published_or_final_version / Sociology / Master / Master of Philosophy