This research aims to dispel the myth that export cartels should be prohibited because they restrain competition and, thus, holds back economic development. It also proposes the conditions under which export cartels promote economic development. In contrast to the myth, this research argues that, when it comes to economic development, competition is not always desirable and, therefore, that export cartels should be formed under certain conditions. In other words, the doctrine that maximum competition is optimal competition is not applicable when the objective is economic development. Moreover, as export cartels from developing countries do not possess market power in the global market, if they facilitate their firms, which are mainly SMEs, to be able to export, competition in the global market is increased, rather than decreased. We then propose the concept of competition relocation, which argues that cartelisation does not eliminate competition but relocate competition from the activity being cartelised into other activities. The concept rejects the conventional interpretation of competition as a unidimensional action, in which cartels always decrease competition. On the contrary, competition is multidimensional, i.e., firms compete across different activities. Therefore, cartelisation may not eliminate or decrease competition but simply relocates it across different activities and the overall degree of competition might even increase. Export cartels is simply a tool to relocate competition. Based on the concept of competition relocation, we argue further that, in order to promote economic development, we must make sure that whenever cartelisation promotes the long-term productive capabilities more than competition does, cartelisation should be promoted. To derive the conditions under which export cartels should be promoted, we used both history and game theory. We study the historical lessons of now-developed countries, including Germany, the US, and Japan and draw a game-theoretical model to derive the conditions under which export cartels promote economic development. In terms of game theory, we propose that the situation in which export cartels should be promoted resembles the stag-hunt game, where both cartelisation and competition are Nash equilibria. Even though it is more productive to hunt a stag together, each hunter has an incentive to deviate and catch a hare. The model shows that, whenever the benefit of sharing resources between firms is sufficiently large (in comparison with other parameters), export cartels are more productive than competition. Therefore, most export cartels have been promoted among SMEs. Moreover, it also shows that, even though each firm may be able to export (due to abundant exclusive resources), the environment, which supports the use of resources across firms, could still make export cartels more productive.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:19:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Juliana Oliveira Domingues.pdf: 2326011 bytes, checksum: 148f72fc5d3e915290167f2a57667018 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-11-12 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The discussion about the relationship between competition defense and international trade is not a novelty. However, even in the globalized world there are countries that still lack the necessary expertise to deal with conducts of foreign agents that may distort the competition within their markets. International organizations have taken steps to discuss best practices and offer support to countries that intend to develop or improve their competition laws and policies and, in particular, to fight against the effects of anticompetitive practices. In the past it was argued that a set of multilateral competition rules should be created in view of international anticompetitive conducts and the use of artificial protectionist measures directed to annul the competition of imported products. However, the creation of multilateral competition rules has not been the focus of recent debates. The present study starts from the premise that the law is fundamental to development. The notion of development adopted herein is extensive, and based mainly in the new institutionalism (Douglass North) and in development as freedom (Amartya Sen). The analysis performed in this study was directed to export cartel practices that are antitrust exemptions in most jurisdictions and may be harmful to development. Export cartels may generate international trade distortions, especially in less developed or developing countries that do not have the expertise to handle such conducts. This theme has not been sufficiently debated even because it is a very particular conduct that relies on governmental support more often than not. Notwithstanding, in light of the need to foment development and based on the premises adopted in the present study, it is clear that such theme should be granted proper treatment considering the existing interface between competition and international trade. So, this study intends to deepen the analysis of export cartel exemptions and, within the development context that was adopted, indicate the need to create specific multilateral rules to regulate such practice / A discussão sobre a relação entre a defesa da concorrência e o comércio internacional não é nova. Entretanto, mesmo no mundo globalizado existem países que ainda carecem do conhecimento necessário para tratar das condutas de agentes estrangeiros que possam distorcer a concorrência em seus mercados. As organizações internacionais têm envidado esforços para discutir as melhores práticas e para oferecer suporte aos países que desejam criar ou aprimorar suas leis e políticas de concorrência, especialmente para combater os efeitos de práticas anticoncorrenciais. No passado houve muita argumentação sobre a necessidade de se criar um conjunto de regras multilaterais de concorrência em razão das condutas anticoncorrenciais que tem dimensão internacional e também pelo uso de medidas artificiais com fins protecionistas direcionados a anular a concorrência dos produtos importados. No entanto, a criação de regras multilaterais de concorrência não tem sido o foco dos debates recentes. No presente estudo, parte-se da premissa que o direito possui um papel fundamental na promoção do desenvolvimento. A noção de desenvolvimento adotada é mais ampla, baseada principalmente no novo institucionalismo (Douglass North) e no desenvolvimento como liberdade (Amartya Sen). A análise realizada voltou-se à prática dos cartéis de exportação, que são isenções antitruste em grande parte das jurisdições e que podem prejudicar o processo de desenvolvimento. Os cartéis de exportação podem gerar distorções ao comércio internacional, especialmente aos países menos desenvolvidos ou em desenvolvimento que não possuem expertise para lidar com essas condutas. Esse tema tem sido pouco debatido até mesmo por tratar-se de conduta com muitas particularidades e que conta, muitas vezes, com o apoio governamental. Contudo, diante da necessidade de fomentar o desenvolvimento e com base nas premissas adotadas neste estudo, entende-se que o tema precisa ter um tratamento adequado, considerando a interface existente entre a concorrência e o comércio internacional. Assim, o presente estudo aprofundará a análise das isenções aos cartéis de exportação e, dentro do contexto de desenvolvimento adotado, apontará a necessidade de criação de regras multilaterais específicas que regulem essa prática

In the 19th and 20th centuries, the Czech lands were among the largest hop-growing regions in the world. Hop products became, in the interwar period, one of the crucial agricultural export goods of the Czechoslovak economy. This study aims to draw attention to the process of emergence of cartels in this particular branch of agricultural production. It traces the attempts to organize the industry by means of cartels from their very beginning in the late 19th century until the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1938. As a point of departure, it takes the assumption shared by many theoreticians of industrial organization who argue that the given structure of the industry to some extent pre-determines the ways how the cartels emerge and the particular forms they assume. These institutions, however, might in turn reshape the structure of the industry. The analysis indicates that the cartels in the hop industry were essentially 'children of opportunity' and their emergence was rarely correlated with an economic crisis. Even though the industry gave rise also to international collusive structures, the cartels in the hop industry were essentially unstable and weak and in most cases, the attempts to create them failed. Present study challenges the belief, widely held in the scholarship on cartels in the Czech lands,...