Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 240-258).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Harvard University, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 314-328).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 2000. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 114-118).

Thesis (M.A.)--West Virginia University, 2010. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 69 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 68-69).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2009. / ""Submitted to College of Business in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-117)

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2006.

This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, we study the role of financial frictions on the demand side of the economy. In particular, we study the interaction between firm and household credit constraints over the business cycle. We construct a real business cycle model with explicit modeling of price and quantity side of housing. This allows us to include both firm and household financing frictions. The model is estimated for the U.S economy using quarterly data on key macroeconomic variables over the period 1970 - 2006. Household and firm financial accelerators operate primarily through movement in house and capital prices respectively. We find clear evidence of the operation of a financial accelerator mechanism, whereby shocks to the economy are amplified most in the presence of both types of frictions, as opposed to just firm or household frictions. Over the business cycle, total factor productivity shocks in the non-housing sector explain about half of the volatility of GDP and consumption. However, cyclical variations in housing investment and housing prices are predominantly explained by housing preference and housing technology shocks. Finally, spillovers from household financing frictions are mostly concentrated in consumption. However, they also affect business investment via its impact on the demand for capital and consequently its price. The second chapter focuses on financial frictions on the supply side. We study the role of bank capital in the transmission of shocks to the economy. Given the evolutionary change in the financial services industry and the growth of shadow banking in the decades prior to the global recession, we characterize credit intermediation with a heterogeneous banking sector comprised of traditional retail and shadow banking. We approach the shadow banking system from a regulation perspective wherein commercial banks have incentives to transfer loans from on- to off-balance sheet to gain regulatory relief. Since bank capital is costly, banks cover part of their funding needs by loan sale in the secondary market. Furthermore, these transferred loans are bundled together and converted into liquid asset backed securities. Commercial banks’ effective return is subject to their monitoring effort, which is unobservable and hence introduces a moral hazard problem in loan sale. This limits the amount of loan sold in the secondary market. We find that loan sale and securitization enhances credit intermediation in normal times and improves the resilience of the system to productivity shocks. However, it also exposes the economy to shocks emerging in the financial system. In response to financial market shocks, the government via its backstop program, can ameliorate its impact on the economy. Finally, we compare the model economy with Basel I and Basel II capital requirement and find that business cycle fluctuations are amplified under Basel II regime. Furthermore, in response to a negative productivity shock there is a transfer of loans from on to off balance sheet under Basel II rules with procyclical capital constraints. This points towards a need for countercyclical capital requirement as being implemented under Basel III accord. In the third chapter, we focus on the question of trade off between price and financial stability goals for the conduct of monetary policy. The recent crisis has generated renewed interest in Hayekian theory and Minsky’s instability hypothesis, which claims that accommodative monetary policy can be harmful for an economy by promoting excessive risk taking – the so called risk taking channel of monetary policy transmission. Risk Taking Channel has been documented for the U.S and Euro area and we investigate the presence of this in Asia. Using annual and quarterly data on publicly listed banks in Asia, we find that when interest rates are too low - lower than a benchmark - bank risk increases. Furthermore, there is also a case for greater supervision and capital stringency to alleviate risk taking.

x, 84 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / In this dissertation,I examine whether financial reporting quality increases following the appointment of an accounting expert to the audit committee. Prior literature documents positive cross-sectional associations between maintaining an accounting expert on the audit committee and financial reporting quality. Although this suggests that accounting expertise enhances the quality of a firm's financial reports, it is unclear whether financial reporting quality improves after appointing an accounting expert. Additionally, I explore how the strength of alternative governance provisions and the current expertise of the audit committee influence relations between appointing an accounting expert and changes in financial reporting quality. I hypothesize that accounting experts possess the financial backgrounds needed to detect accounting manipulations and the reputational capital to warrant actions that limit exposure to financial reporting failures. Therefore, I predict that newly appointed accounting experts have the ability and incentive to strengthen financial reporting systems and increase the quality of financial reports. Furthermore, I predict that incremental improvements in reporting quality following the appointment of an accounting expert are larger for strong governance firms because they possess the infrastructure necessary to act on audit committee recommendations and for firms with no prior accounting expertise because of opportunities for new accounting critiques by financially minded individuals. I test these predictions on a sample of 1,590 audit committee appointments between 2003 and 2005. Overall, I do not find empirical evidence of a change in financial reporting quality following the appointment of an audit committee accounting expert. However, I find that firms with strong governance that appoint an accounting expert experience larger post-appointment improvements in reporting quality than do firms with weak governance, as highlighted by more income-decreasing discretionary accruals, larger increases in earnings response coefficients, and higher quality accruals. Additionally, my evidence suggests that strong governance firms appointing their first accounting expert increase their reporting quality following the appointment. Therefore, my results imply that accounting expertise complements other governance mechanisms involved in financial monitoring. Overall, I provide evidence regarding the audit committee's influence over financial reporting and the conditions associated with effective use of accounting expertise. / Committee in charge: Steven Matsunaga, Chairperson, Accounting; David Guenther, Member, Accounting; Xuesong Hu, Member, Accounting; Larry Singell, Outside Member, Economics

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