Innovation and commercialization are crucial for the competitiveness and economic well-being of countries. Despite the importance of innovation, recent studies have showed that Canada is lagging behind other countries in terms of its innovation and commercialization performance. The claim is often made that Canada performs well in generating the knowledge needed for innovation; however, the problem lies in transforming this knowledge into commercial success. Thus, a major preoccupation is how to turnaround this weak commercialization performance. Despite the wide range of programs, policies and regulations implemented by the Canadian Government along with its provincial counterparts to engender a turnaround, little has changed in Canada’s commercialization performance. Therefore, the search for solutions continues. Given that commercialization takes place at the firm-level, this study will explore the relationship between firm-size and commercialization. Several existing studies have examined the link between innovation and firm size, but few have examined the link between commercialization and firm size. Despite the arguments supporting medium-sized firms’ ability to commercialize innovations, there is a weak empirical base that explores the position of Canadian medium-sized firms and their innovation and commercialization capabilities. This study will contribute to the existing knowledge by covering the gap in the literature concerning the role of medium-sized firms in commercialization, compared to small and large firms. This study provides evidence suggesting that small and medium-sized firms should be considered differently.

The first two chapters study the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). They rely on a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously. In the first paper the effect of foreign lobbying under the FTA is examined empirically using Canadian industry-level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin. The analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy: the presence of an organized lobbying group in an FTA partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the FTA is associated with less protection. The second paper analyses political viability of FTAs and their effect on the world trading system in the presence of lobbying by organized foreign interest groups. I show that the FTA in the presence of an organized lobby group in a prospective partner country may cause an increase in the level of protection against imports from third countries and impede trade with non-member countries. I also find that foreign lobby may encourage the local government to enter a welfare-reducing trade-diverting FTA. Finally, I show that the FTA increases the lobbying power of the organized lobby groups of the member countries, which can potentially obstruct the viability of welfare-improving multilateral trade liberalization. The last paper shows that the reason for a higher capital-labor ratio observed for exporting firms is a higher capital intensity of their production technology. Exporters are more productive, more likely to survive and, hence, more likely to repay loans. A higher repayment probability causes creditors to charge lower interest rate and reduces the marginal cost of the firm when a more capital-intensive technology is used. Here, a reduction in international trade costs stimulates exporting firms to use more efficient capital-intensive technologies, while non-exporters switch to less capital-intensive ones. This within-industry change in the composition of technologies reinforces the productivity advantage of exporters and contributes further to industry-wide productivity improvement. The results of model simulations highlight that to 10% of welfare and productivity gains of trade liberalization come from the adoption of new technologies by existing firms in the industry, thus amplifying the effect of resource reallocation from firms' entry and exit.

This dissertation examines the identity of new controlling shareholders in partial corporate control transactions and its influence on firm performance and corporate policies in an international context. In a transfer of partial corporate control, the identity of controlling shareholder changs, thereby facilitating an event study of corporate changes resulted from controlling shareholder turnover. The dissertation comprises of three empirical research projects to address two questions: Firstly, does the identity of a new controlling shareholder in a partial control transfer matter to firm value? Secondly, how does new controlling shareholder identity explain the differences of firm performance and corporate policies in the long run? The equity block transactions in listed firms from around the world announced between 1996 and 2005 are filtered to arrive at the final sample of 215 corporate control transfers through private negotiation. This hand-collected dataset allows the dissertation to contribute to the existing literature on ownership concentration by introducing the identity of controlling shareholder into the theoretical framework and investigating its significance in an international context. It is argued that firm value, long-term performance and corporate policies can be influenced by the identity of new controlling shareholders because different controlling shareholders have distinct incentives, skills and styles. This dissertation finds that individual investor controlled firms outperform those controlled by corporate investors in both short-term abnormal returns and long-term performance after a control transfer; and that the sample firms controlled by individual and corporate investors adopt different policies of investment and financial leverage. The evidence presented here shows that individual controlling shareholders are better motivated to monitor managers and improve operational efficiency. Partial corporate control activities have important governance effects and controlling shareholder heterogeneity is a significant contributing factor to firm performance and decision making.

This dissertation examines the identity of new controlling shareholders in partial corporate control transactions and its influence on firm performance and corporate policies in an international context. In a transfer of partial corporate control, the identity of controlling shareholder changs, thereby facilitating an event study of corporate changes resulted from controlling shareholder turnover. The dissertation comprises of three empirical research projects to address two questions: Firstly, does the identity of a new controlling shareholder in a partial control transfer matter to firm value? Secondly, how does new controlling shareholder identity explain the differences of firm performance and corporate policies in the long run? The equity block transactions in listed firms from around the world announced between 1996 and 2005 are filtered to arrive at the final sample of 215 corporate control transfers through private negotiation. This hand-collected dataset allows the dissertation to contribute to the existing literature on ownership concentration by introducing the identity of controlling shareholder into the theoretical framework and investigating its significance in an international context. It is argued that firm value, long-term performance and corporate policies can be influenced by the identity of new controlling shareholders because different controlling shareholders have distinct incentives, skills and styles. This dissertation finds that individual investor controlled firms outperform those controlled by corporate investors in both short-term abnormal returns and long-term performance after a control transfer; and that the sample firms controlled by individual and corporate investors adopt different policies of investment and financial leverage. The evidence presented here shows that individual controlling shareholders are better motivated to monitor managers and improve operational efficiency. Partial corporate control activities have important governance effects and controlling shareholder heterogeneity is a significant contributing factor to firm performance and decision making.

Thesis (M.S.) -- Central Connecticut State University, 2007. / Thesis advisor: Cora Marshall. "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Art Education." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 77-80). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.S.)--Ohio University, June, 1985. / Title from PDF t.p.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Texas at El Paso, 2008. / Title from title screen. Vita. CD-ROM. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Project (M.B.A.) - Simon Fraser University, 2004. / Theses (Faculty of Business Administration) / Simon Fraser University. MBA-MOT Program. Senior supervisor: Dr. Colleen Collins-Dodd.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 239-261). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references.