Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-161).

Joseph Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain are inseparable. Free Trade had triumphed in 1846 and remained the dominant politico-economic theory in the United Kingdom until the closing years of the nineteenth century. After 1870 serious challenges to Britain's industrial and commercial supremacy came from Germany and the United States. Attempts at Tariff Reform were made in the early 1880's by Lord Randolph Churchill and others, but they came to nothing. Joseph Chamberlain was at this period a radical reformer, but in 1886 he became a Liberal Unionist in opposition to Home Rule. He was not yet a Tariff Reformer. In 1895 Chamberlain became Secretary of State for the Colonies, and also an ardent Imperialist. Although still nominally a Free Trader he began to interest himself in imperial preference. The Unionist party, however, was still staunchly Free Trade in sentiment. By 1902 the combined issues of protection and imperial preference were raised in Parliament. The Education Bill of- that year, sponsored by Lord Salisbury's government, was most unpopular and the Unionists were looking for a new issue. Lord Salisbury retired, and Arthur Balfour became Prime Minister. Chamberlain, still at the Colonial Office, was now veering towards Tariff Reform. It was his visit to South Africa in 1902-03 which clarified his views on this all important subject. In 1903 he launched his Tariff Reform campaign and resigned from the cabinet. A rift in the Unionist ranks soon became apparent. Even the Prime Minister was unable to heal the breach. From 1904 to 1906 Chamberlain campaigned hard for Tariff Reform. He was successful in capturing the Liberal Unionist "machine" and also obtained a strong following among the Conservative Unionists. But the Liberal party, hitherto split, closed ranks on the Free Trade issue, and secured the support of Labour. Balfour attempted, unsuccessfully, to hold the various sections of the Unionist party together, but, at length he tendered his resignation on December 4, 1905. The Liberals, under Campbell-Bannerman were triumphantly returned to power in January 1906. In the same year Joseph Chamberlain suffered a stroke and was never, thereafter, able publicly to lead the Tariff Reform campaign. The campaign, however, continued with varying success. Balfour, as usual, would not declare himself, but Tariff Reform sentiment was growing. In 1908 the tide seemed to be turning towards Tariff Reform and in the next year it reached its height. But Lloyd George in 1909 introduced the People's Budget, and in the controversy which ensued and which culminated in the Parliament Act of 1911, the Tariff Reform issue was sidetracked. The 1910 elections showed the strength of Free Trade. Balfour was forced to resign as Leader of the Opposition in 1911. Bonar Law, the new leader, was not enthusiastic over Tariff Reform and did not favour Balfour's proposed referendum on that subject. The international situation after 1911 went from bad to worse and 1914 witnessed not only the .outbreak of the First World War, but the death of Joseph Chamberlain. Chamberlain had accomplished much with his Tariff Reform League and his research schemes, but he was not able to overthrow Free Trade. It was not until the early 1930's that Great Britain changed her tariff policy. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The issue of tensions between market access and environmental protection is relatively new focus in the domain of international trade. This article suggests solutions to this conflict within the WTO framework so that while pursuing the goals of free trade and promoting development of economy the objective of 'sustainable development' can be achieved at the same time. This article includes an introduction, the main body (three chapters) and conclusion. j The Introduction starts by describing the development of the regimes of market access and environmental protection; it goes on to analyze the causes of the tension between the two and finally emphasizes the importance of resolving this tension within the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. Chapter One elaborates on the existing principles, regulations and exception in the WTO framework and states that these regulations cannot live up to expectations of the developed countries and environmentalists. The conclusion is that it is impractical for the developing countries to avoid this issue. Chapter Two starts with an inquiry into the crux of tensions between free trade and environmental protection. It goes on to enlist different proposals by academic scholars and compare these principles' application in European Community Treaty (EC) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), hoping to resolve the tensions between market access and environmental protection. Chapter Three summarizes academic proposals and experiences of EC and NAFTA and discusses possible practical resolutions within WTO including both short-term measures and long-term ones. This chapter concludes by suggesting possible courses of action for China that could allow it to sustain the 'green challenge.' The Conclusion discusses the objectivity and unavoidability of the tensions between the free trade and the environment protection and reinforces the importance of resolving the problem within the WTO framework as well as the necessity of amending related regulations and harmonizing environmental standards of the WTO members. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

This thesis uses a comprehensive data set to examine the relationship between Canadian labour market outcomes and several changes in the policy environment. The data set, spanning the period 1981-98, is compiled from a number of comparable surveys and contains information on the demographics and job characteristics of individual workers. The first chapter examines the impact that the tariff reductions of the Canada- U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) had on the inter-industry wage structure in the goods producing sector. Previous studies use industry-level data and consequently are unable to control for either differences in worker composition or divergent wage trends for different worker types. These studies find that tariff cuts either had no effect or increased the relative wages of workers in impacted sectors. In contrast, I use data with information on worker characteristics and find that the relative wages of non-union workers in impacted industries decreased. The second chapter investigates the link between the CUSFTA tariff reductions and several labour market outcomes that are potentially linked to industrial productivity. In particular, I examine whether tariff reductions are related to changes in the (i) the size of firm a worker is likely to be employed with, (ii) the probability that a worker will be represented by a union, and (iii) the mean skill level of workers. Although I find evidence that these outcomes have changed over time, none of them seem to be linked directly to CUSFTA. The final chapter, co-authored with David Green, examines the extent to which the declining market outcomes of successive cohorts of job entrants in Canada can be accounted for by changes in the minimum wage, unionization rate, and industrial composition of employment. A flexible density estimator is used, which allows for a comparison between cohorts across the entire wage distribution. The main findings are that for males, changes in unionization and industrial composition can account for about a quarter of the decline in wage outcomes for new job entrants between 1998 and 1981. Similar results are found for females; in addition, the minimum wage provides a "wall" against further erosion for more recent cohorts of entrants. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

Thesis (B.A.)--Boston University. University Professors Program Senior theses. / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-01

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This study examines the extent to which the equivalency provision presented in the SPS agreement is able to foster trade negotiations between countries adopting different food safety measures. The study examines the role of scientific evidence as well as the political, economic, and cultural factors in impacting the national regulatory process and the international trade negotiations. It focuses on the limitations of science in allowing countries to reach consensus in contentious trade-related debates laden with risk uncertainty and missing data. The study consists of comparing the key components of the U.S. and French regulatory systems to identify the cultural basis for the differences in the perception of listeria risk and in preferences to control it. The stringent standards adopted in the U.S. and the preference for pasteurization are attributed to the complete separation of the regulatory functions form those of food production, the open style of decision-making which allows private citizens to review and comment on administrative actions, the unwillingness of U.S. regulators to expose vulnerable individuals to deadly pathogens, and the reliance on quantitative data to validate the effectiveness of pasteurization. The more flexible standards impacting listeria regulation in France are attributed to the the integration of regulatory functions with those of food production, the consumer preference for natural products, the public's trust in the government's regulatory decisions, and the belief that the determination of appropriate safety measures should be left up to the producers. / Master of Science

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

In the last twenty years, regional trade agreements have proliferated. These have usually taken the form of customs unions (CUs) or free trade areas (FTAs). This thesis concentrates mostly on the formation and behaviour of CUs. Union members levy a common external tariff (CET) on non-members. Existing theoretical models, however, do not agree on how the CET rate is chosen. Every model imposes a different choice rule exogenously. In this thesis, for the first time, plausible choice rules, based on the CU's social welfare function, are derived endogenously. The strategic behaviour of members and non-members, reveals that responsibility for CET choice tends to be assumed by the member that can induce the rest of the world to levy those tariffs members prefer to face. Relatively few general results exist describing the relationship between country characteristics and trade bloc formation. Here, new light is shed on this issue, by systematically analysing bloc formation in an asymmetric world, and investigating the role of preferences in coalition formation. It is found that global free trade is most likely to arise when all countries are similar. Customs unions tend to form between relatively well-endowed countries or those with similar preferences. It is also demonstrated that CUs will usually Pareto dominate FTAs, except where preferences differ significantly. The role of transfers in CU formation has received relatively little attention in the regionalism literature. In this thesis, optimal intra-union transfers are introduced and their impact on CET choice is investigated. The impact of transfers on CU behaviour depends on the direction of the transfer. When the relatively inelastic member is the recipient, the CU responds less aggressively to non-member tariff choices than it does when transfers are not permitted. However, if the relatively elastic member is the transfer recipient, the union's aggression increases. Moreover, when one union member exercises a similar degree of control over both CET and transfer choice, then the equilibrium CET tends to be lower than in the corresponding no-transfers situation.