While scholars have focused on the importance of the landmark decisions of the United States Supreme Court and its Chief Justice, John Marshall, in the rising influence of the federal justice system in the early Republic, the crucial role of the circuit courts in establishing uniformity of federal law and procedure across the nation has largely been ignored. This thesis seeks to remedy this lack of research on circuit courts by revealing the central role of their presiding Supreme Court justices in the successful development of a national court system drawn up from the ‘inferior’ courts rather than down from the Supreme Court to the lower jurisdictions. This thesis argues that, at a time when the Supreme Court had few cases to consider, all of the nation’s law was formulated by the lower courts; with very few decisions appealed, the circuit court opinions were invariably accepted as final, settling the law for each circuit and for the nation if followed by other justices. Therefore, in the early years, it was the circuit experience and not Supreme Court authority which shaped the course of United States law. This thesis contributes to an understanding of this early justice system because of its focus on and the depth of its research into the work of the circuit courts. Through detailed analysis, it reveals the sources used by the justices to influence the direction of the law and, by its reading of almost 2000 cases tried by four prominent Marshall associate justices, presents insights into momentous issues facing the Union. The thesis examines the generality of the circuit work of each justice but pays particular attention to the different ways in which each contributed to the shaping of United States law. Understanding the importance of the role of the circuit courts leads to a more informed reading of early American legal history.

Political scientists have conducted much work examining a court's decision on the merits of a case. We have concluded that ideology has a strong influence on the outcome on the merits of a decision. Furthermore, courts seek to render a decision that is closest to their own policy preferences. However, federal circuit courts within the judicial hierarchy are constrained by other actors according to the strategic model. There is an abundance of evidence showing that superior actors constrain courts' ideological preferences when such courts render decisions on the merits. However, there is a dearth of scholarship regarding judicial decision making on threshold issues. I argue that federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by transforming their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary. They achieve this goal by controlling the type of litigants who gain access to the courts by deciding cases on threshold grounds. I also argue that federal circuit courts are responsive to changes in Congress's ideology because Congress has power to control threshold issues through various mechanisms. I seek to establish that the grounds upon which as case is dismissed -- jurisdictional, justiciable, and procedural -- defines the parameters that constrain federal circuit courts.

Unelected bureaucrats make a broad range of important policy decisions raising concerns of accountability in a democratic society. Many classics in the literature highlight the need to understand agency decisions at stages prior to the final vote by agency appointees, but few studies of the bureaucracy do so. To this point, scholars have treated the issue of shirking as one where laziness and inefficiency are the driving forces. However, it is more realistic to expect that shirking comes in the form of ideological resistance by administrators. I develop a theory that the independence afforded to the bureaucracy is functionally comparable to that of the judiciary, allowing for the insertion of individual attitudinal preferences by bureaucrats. Drawing from the attitudinal model of judicial research, I look at whether attitudes affect the decision making of administrative law judges at the National Labor Relations Board, the influence administrative law judge decisions have on reviewing bodies, and whether attitudinal decision making can be controlled by external political and legal actors. Results demonstrate that Democratic judges are more likely than Republican judges to rule for labor in unfair labor practice cases, administrative law judge decisions provide the basis for subsequent decisions of reviewing bodies, and that few political and legal controls exist over this set of bureaucrats. This research provides evidence that lower level bureaucrats make decisions based on their own political preferences and that these preferences have far ranging consequences for policy and law.

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