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Unfunded public pension and Other Post Employment Benefits (OPEB) liabilities impose major threats to local fiscal sustainability, which increases governments' default risk and crowds out funding for essential local services. To close the funding gaps, localities may apply a wide range of fiscal instruments, including increasing taxes, fees, and user charges, issuing debt and bonds, obtaining grants and/or decreasing expenditures. This research compares the US local fiscal choice behavior in the context of the fiscal federalism framework. The goal is to identify the ideal mix of constitutional fiscal rules to preserve local fiscal sustainability. Not only should the rules aim to minimize local adverse fiscal behavior pre-crisis, which may include excessive spending, large accumulations of unfunded liabilities, and over-reliance on external grants, but also allow strong local fiscal adaptive capacity post-crisis. The findings help localities identify any effective and prudent fiscal options available to close their pension funding gaps and contribute to the overall sub-national fiscal institutional reforms. Theoretically, this research introduces a novel analytical framework pertaining to local fiscal sustainability by separating pre-crisis and post-crisis institutional analysis and by consolidating two historically viewed as two competing paradigms, public choice and public finance. I argue that the two approaches are complementary rather than contradictory since public choice theory sets up an institutional prerequisite for normative outcomes to be realized and prevents the occurrence of extreme circumstances. The ideal mix of formal fiscal rules, thus, should induce the balanced budget rule that applies to all budget items, stringent spending and debt limits, and institutionalized local tax authority and stable tax structure, but not tax limits. Tax limits are less effective in constraining government than spending and debt limits due to fiscal gimmicks. Moreover, stringent tax limits could significantly limit local governments' ability to bounce back on their own. This research also found that cities do apply different fiscal strategies to reduce exogenous shocks, given their unique fiscal institutions in place. Furthermore, cities with fewer institutional constraints exhibit a faster speed of adjustment. However, certain institutional variables, such as public union size and tax authority, might not have the same fiscal implications as predicted by the theory. Cities often manage to cut their short-term spending regardless of the size of their public unions. A broad range of tax authority does not imply greater local revenue-generating capacity. Own source revenue autonomy might be a better indicator of local fiscal adaptive capacity. / Doctor of Philosophy / Unfunded public pension and Other Post Employment Benefits (OPEB) liabilities impose major threats to local fiscal sustainability, which increases governments’ default risk and crowds out funding for essential local services. To close the funding gaps, localities may apply a wide range of fiscal instruments, including increasing taxes, fees, and user charges, issuing debt and bonds, obtaining grants and/or decreasing expenditures. This research compares the US local fiscal choice behavior in the context of the fiscal federalism framework. The goal is to identify the ideal mix of constitutional fiscal rules to preserve local fiscal sustainability. Not only should the rules aim to minimize local adverse fiscal behavior pre-crisis, which may include excessive spending, large accumulations of unfunded liabilities, and over-reliance on external grants, but also allow strong local fiscal adaptive capacity post-crisis. The findings help localities identify any effective and prudent fiscal options available to close their pension funding gaps and contribute to the overall sub-national fiscal institutional reforms. Theoretically, this research introduces a novel analytical framework pertaining to local fiscal sustainability by separating pre-crisis and post-crisis institutional analysis and by consolidating two historically viewed as two competing paradigms, public choice and public finance. I argue that the two approaches are complementary rather than contradictory since public choice theory sets up an institutional prerequisite for normative outcomes to be realized and prevents the occurrence of extreme circumstances. The ideal mix of formal fiscal rules, thus, should induce the balanced budget rule that applies to all budget items, stringent spending and debt limits, and institutionalized local tax authority and stable tax structure, but not tax limits. Tax limits are less effective in constraining government than spending and debt limits due to fiscal gimmicks. Moreover, stringent tax limits could significantly limit local governments’ ability to bounce back on their own. This research also found that cities do apply different fiscal strategies to reduce exogenous shocks, given their unique fiscal institutions in place. Furthermore, cities with fewer institutional constraints exhibit a faster speed of adjustment. However, certain institutional variables, such as public union size and tax authority, might not have the same fiscal implications as predicted by the theory. Cities often manage to cut their short-term spending regardless of the size of their public unions. A broad range of tax authority does not imply greater local revenue-generating capacity. Own source revenue autonomy might be a better indicator of local fiscal adaptive capacity.