abstract: This dissertation contains a portfolio of papers in economics. The first paper, ``Vehicle Emissions Inspection Programs: Equality and Impact," presents the results of a study of the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program. Using a unique data set, I find that the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program is regressive in that it constrains the vehicle repair decisions of people on the low end of the income distribution more than those on the high end. I also find that the social cost of the program in Arizona is more than twice the social benefit, assuming a \$7 million value of statistical life. The second paper is ``Fiat Value in the Theory of Value." Because of advances in information processing technology, it is now technically feasible to have a currency-less monetary system. This paper explores one such system. In the model, prices are in units currency-less fiat money called fiat value, fiat value is a form of government debt, and the services of the stock of fiat value are a factor of production. In this system, the National accounts must be revised to account for money as a production factor, Friedman satiation is possible even with positive inflation, and various monetary policy regimes are explored. The third paper, ``Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Modern Paradigm of Money," uses the model developed in ``Fiat Value in the Theory of Value" to evaluate quantitative easing and interest on reserves policies as a response to liquidity shocks. I find that quantitative easing is an effective response to liquidity crises because it drives the marginal product of money to zero. When the marginal product of money is zero, the business sector does not have to pay to rent the services of money, a production factor that is free to create. I also show that a positive interest on reserve policy hampers the effectiveness of quantitative easing, and that quantitative easing does not cause a high inflation rate. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2017

This study is within the field of financial innovation and entrepreneurship. The thesis’s primary purpose is to investigate how and why entrepreneurs in Sweden are positioning themselves in regarding Initial Coin Offerings as a new financial vehicle based on the Swedish regulations and the underlying factors to the entrepreneur’s point of view. The literature contributes a limited knowledge of the Swedish industry concerning ICOs, and therefore this research aims to enhance awareness. Through qualitative research based on eleven interviews, we conclude there is a general lack of knowledge and risk-aversion from the absence of regulations in Sweden. Furthermore, all interviewed entrepreneurs were open-minded about an ICO with certain limitations. Considering that, on average, an enticing secondary market has existed for the tokens issued by ICOs, and a remarkable amount of money has been left on the table by project promoters, investors seeking for potential profit have hoarded the cryptocurrency space, creating a situation similar to the dot-com bubble. Thus, we also discuss the benefits, drawbacks, and the possible fate regarding ICOs, a new financing method that should not be overlooked.

Cette thèse comporte trois chapitres. Le premier chapitre décrit les moyens de paiement permettant le transfert de monnaie électronique (e-monnaie), les déterminants de leur adoption et leur usage dans le monde. Les deux chapitres suivants sont des articles qui analysent la concurrence entre la monnaie fiduciaire et l’e-monnaie à partir du modèle de Lagos-Wright (2005). Dans le premier article, à la différence des espèces, la détention d’e-monnaie est garantie contre le risque de perte ou de vol, et les marchands doivent investir pour recevoir l’e-monnaie. Du fait des complémentarités stratégiques entre les acheteurs et les vendeurs, il existe une multiplicité d’équilibres où seule une monnaie, ou les deux circulent. Nous analysons le bien-être et quantifions le modèle pour expliquer l’échec de l’e-monnaie en Europe et son succès en Asie et aux Etats-Unis. Dans le second article, les espèces concurrencent la monnaie mobile (M-monnaie). Les agents peuvent créer des partenariats et chaque transaction est réglée avec un seul moyen de paiement. Les agents sans partenaire utilisent les espèces, les autres utilisent l’M-monnaie. Les acheteurs avec un partenaire détiennent toujours de l’M-monnaie, seule ou en complément des espèces, alors que les acheteurs sans partenaire utilisent soit l’une, soit l’autre, soit les deux, soit aucune monnaie. Cependant, l’M-monnaie ne remplace les espèces que si le nombre de vendeurs traditionnels est très faible et l’inflation pas trop élevée. Ainsi, le partenariat est un mécanisme de coordination qui explique le succès des applications de paiement mobile proposées par des enseignes à leurs clients fidèles aux Etats-Unis. / This thesis has three chapters. The first chapter describes the means of payment allowingthe transfer of electronic money (e-money), the determinants of their adoption and their usein the world. The following two chapters are articles that analyze the competition between fiat money and e-money from the Lagos-Wright model (2005). In the first article, unlike cash, the holding of e-money is guaranteed against the risk of loss or theft, and merchants must invest to receive e-money. Due to strategic complementarities between buyers andsellers, there is a multiplicity of equilibria where only one money, or both, circulate. We analyze welfare and quantify the model to explain the failure of e-money in Europe and its success in Asia and in the United States. In the second article, cash competes with mobilemoney (M-money). Agents can create partnerships and each transaction is settled with one means of payment only. Agents without a partner use cash, the others use M-money.Buyers with a partner always hold M-money, alone or in addition to cash, while buyers without a partner use either one, or the other, or both, or no money. However, M-money replaces cash only if the number of traditional sellers is very low and inflation not too high.So, partnership is a coordination mechanism that explains the success of mobile payment applications offered by brands to their loyal customers in the United States.

The purpose of this thesis is to argue that the core of a monetary economy is a network of triangular contracts between banks, firms, workers and capital goods suppliers. Not only does this network give rise to the creation and valuation of money but it is the organising feature of modern economies, giving rise to both episodes of stability and crises. In constructing this argument I consider both orthodox and heterodox points of view. We analyse equilibrium models of money, and find that while money can exist in sequence economies with frictions, models of this type give no justification for its creation, valuation or holding for any significant duration, either theoretically or experimentally. Models that introduce dated goods and trading frictions to motivate the issue of risk-spreading ‘bundled’ debt are more promising for money creation, although they still cannot explain the the holding and valuation of money. Using the concept of team-production of Alchian and Demsetz and that of ‘hostage-taking’ in contracts owing to Williamson, we demonstrate how the issue of a token of generalised purchasing power from a team-production contract can enhance output and consumption. This conclusion motivates an original monetary theory of production that integrates the insights of Post-Keynesian monetary theory and the triangular contracts of the Circulation Approach and expresses them in a way that shows consistent asset and liability matching through a balance sheet approach. The creation and valuation of money and the determination of interest are embedded within the central processes of this economy. The features of the monetary production economy we analyse are in contrast to the mainstream proposition that the economy as a whole is rendered coherent by the existence of a unique and stable equilibrium determined by the utility-maximisation of households and the profit maximisation of firms. Apart from their inability to describe the economy in aggregate, such models treat money as an afterthought that is in no way core to their conception. We set the triangular contracts within a rigorous stock-flow framework of the type developed by Godley and Lavoie and argue that the shifting of the level of impact of uncertainty and failed expectations induced by money leads to specific patterns of economic disruption. These patterns are independent of the specific behavioural characteristics of households and firms and so are robust to policy changes that leave the institutions of the monetary production economy intact. We briefly assess current monetary policy and alternatives in the light of these findings.