This thesis examines the relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples in the particular context of the prairie provinces to determine whether or not it can be described as fiduciary and, if so, what obligations arise from it. <p>While very few judicial decisions have dealt with this specific issue, an analysis of the existing jurisprudence suggests that there are two types of fiduciary relationships in which Aboriginal peoples are involved. The first type is a manifestation of the more traditional fiduciary concept. It is similar to classic fiduciary situations, such as doctor/patient, director/corporation, partner/partner, in which a fiduciary having control over the property or person of another must act in that other person's best interests. In the Aboriginal context, the power of the federal Crown over surrendered Indian reserve lands and over Indian moneys is limited by its fiduciary obligations of this traditional type. The second type is unique to the situation of Aboriginal peoples. It arises out of the constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights and gives rise to obligations that limit the jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments over them. <p> This thesis concludes that the provincial Crown in the prairie provinces possesses no fiduciary obligations arising directly out of its relationship with First Nations peoples, in the classic fiduciary sense, because history and the Constitution have established that that relationship is with the federal Crown. Provincial fiduciary obligations are limited to those arising from the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights and thus arise only in respect of constitutionally valid provincial laws that infringe on such rights. In Saskatchewan, the only infringing provincial laws that are possible are those made under the authority provided by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, which authorizes Saskatchewan to make limited laws relating to hunting, fishing and trapping applicable to Indians.

This thesis examines the relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples in the particular context of the prairie provinces to determine whether or not it can be described as fiduciary and, if so, what obligations arise from it. <p>While very few judicial decisions have dealt with this specific issue, an analysis of the existing jurisprudence suggests that there are two types of fiduciary relationships in which Aboriginal peoples are involved. The first type is a manifestation of the more traditional fiduciary concept. It is similar to classic fiduciary situations, such as doctor/patient, director/corporation, partner/partner, in which a fiduciary having control over the property or person of another must act in that other person's best interests. In the Aboriginal context, the power of the federal Crown over surrendered Indian reserve lands and over Indian moneys is limited by its fiduciary obligations of this traditional type. The second type is unique to the situation of Aboriginal peoples. It arises out of the constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights and gives rise to obligations that limit the jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments over them. <p> This thesis concludes that the provincial Crown in the prairie provinces possesses no fiduciary obligations arising directly out of its relationship with First Nations peoples, in the classic fiduciary sense, because history and the Constitution have established that that relationship is with the federal Crown. Provincial fiduciary obligations are limited to those arising from the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights and thus arise only in respect of constitutionally valid provincial laws that infringe on such rights. In Saskatchewan, the only infringing provincial laws that are possible are those made under the authority provided by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, which authorizes Saskatchewan to make limited laws relating to hunting, fishing and trapping applicable to Indians.

This thesis examines the relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples in the particular context of the prairie provinces to determine whether or not it can be described as fiduciary and, if so, what obligations arise from it. While very few judicial decisions have dealt with this specific issue, an analysis of the existing jurisprudence suggests that there are two types of fiduciary relationships in which Aboriginal peoples are involved. The first type is a manifestation of the more traditional fiduciary concept. It is similar to classic fiduciary situations, such as doctor/patient, director/corporation, partner/partner, in which a fiduciary having control over the property or person of another must act in that other person's best interests. In the Aboriginal context, the power of the federal Crown over surrendered Indian reserve lands and over Indian moneys is limited by its fiduciary obligations of this traditional type. The second type is unique to the situation of Aboriginal peoples. It arises out of the constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights and gives rise to obligations that limit the jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments over them. This thesis concludes that the provincial Crown in the prairie provinces possesses no fiduciary obligations arising directly out of its relationship with First Nations peoples, in the classic fiduciary sense, because history and the Constitution have established that that relationship is with the federal Crown. Provincial fiduciary obligations are limited to those arising from the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights and thus arise only in respect of constitutionally valid provincial laws that infringe on such rights. In Saskatchewan, the only infringing provincial laws that are possible are those made under the authority provided by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, which authorizes Saskatchewan to make limited laws relating to hunting, fishing and trapping applicable to Indians.

The failures of constitutionalism and good governance in Africa are well documented. Importantly, these failures have also highlighted the importance of constitutionalism and good governance in Africa. This study centrally explores the relevance and viability of social trust-based governance and constitutionalism in Malawi, specifically, and Africa, generally. Social trust-based governance and constitutionalism is an approach to governance and constitutionalism that is informed by the trust concept and is also fully mindful of local conditionalities in its operationalisation. By referring to the Constitution of Malawi and other pieces of legislation in Malawi, this study demonstrates that there is a legal basis for articulating and practising social trust-based governance and constitutionalism in Malawi. This legal basis stems primarily from sections 12 and 13 of the Constitution but is also supported by legislation like the Corrupt Practices Act, Public Finance Management Act, Public Procurement Act and the Public Audit Act. In spite of the fact that there is a basis for social trust-based governance and constitutionalism in Malawi it is evident that governance and constitutionalism in Malawi have not, so far, been practised in line with the stipulations of the social trust-based approach. The current approach to governance and constitutionalism in Malawi is heavily steeped in the liberal democratic tradition. In this connection, this study demonstrates the limitations of the liberal democratic approach to governance and constitutionalism in Malawi principal among which is the lack of autochthony. Since the apparatus of liberal democracy has subsequently become quite entrenched in Malawi and most African countries, it is argued that the way forward involves creating a synthesis out of liberal democracy and the norms, traditions and values indigenous to Africa. This study identifies the philosophy of ubuntu as being an important source of values and principles that can be utilised to confer some autochthony to governance and constitutionalism in Malawi, specifically and Africa, generally. The approach adopted in this study concedes that neither a rigid insistence on liberal democratic constitutionalism nor a strict adherence to ubuntu-based governance and constitutionalism can succeed in Malawi. The solution is to utilise values from both traditions in order to generate a viable approach to governance and constitutionalism. In this study, the viability and relevance of social trust-based governance and constitutionalism is demonstrated by reference to the relationship between the branches of government, public resource management and the accountability of public functionaries and citizenry empowerment in Malawi. This study argues that a social trust-based approach to governance and constitutionalism can improve the relations between the branches of government, reinvigorate public resource management and also enhance accountability of public functionaries and empower the populace in line with the Constitution’s vision. The Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, thus remains integral to governance and constitutionalism in Malawi. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

OPSOMMING Alhoewel die trustfiguur reeds sedert die 19e Eeu in Suid-Afrika erken word, en as `n suiwer trustfiguur tipeer kan word, is die hantering van die regte van sekere trustbegunstigdes steeds in onsekerheid gehul. Die hoofrede hiervoor is die oorbeklemtoning van die wyse waarop trusts tot stand kom en die onderbeklemtoning van die unieke fidusiêre aard van die trust na oprigting daarvan. In Engeland, Skotland, Sri Lanka, Louisiana en Quebec, waar die suiwer trustfiguur ook aanwending vind, bestaan, in teenstelling met die oënskynlike regsposisie in Suid-Afrika, die moontlikheid van trustbegunstigdes sonder regte glad nie. In hierdie jurisdiksies speel die oprigtingsinstrument `n ondergeskikte rol en ontstaan die regte van trustbegunstigdes ex lege uit hoofde van die trustfiguur as `n vertrouensverhouding sui generis. Alhoewel die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg die fidusiêre aard van die verhouding tussen trustee en trustbegunstigde erken, word die aard en omvang van die regte wat hieruit voort behoort te vloei nog nie voldoende deur die howe erken nie. Vertrouensverhoudinge waaruit regte en verpligtinge ex lege voortspruit, is bekend aan die gemenereg en word steeds hedendaags aangetref in verskeie ander vakdissiplines binne die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, waaronder die maatskappyereg. Die suiwer trustfiguur stel verder noodwendig `n vertrouensverhouding daar wat juis daarop gemik is om die regte van trustbegunstigdes te beskerm. Die standpunt word dus ingeneem dat alle trustbegunstigdes in Suid-Afrika derhalwe oor ex lege regte beskik. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat trustbegunstigdes se regte nie uitsluitlik voortvloei uit hoofde van die tersaaklike oprigtingshandeling nie, maar dat unieke regte ontstaan as gevolg van die onderliggende fidusiêre verhouding wat tot stand kom wanneer, maar ongeag hoe, die trust opgerig word. Kortom: Die fidusiêre verhouding behoort erken te word as eie, onafhanklike bron van trustbegunstigdes se moontlike regte teen die trustee in die geval van trustbreuk. Nie net is dit `n logiese stap in die ontwikkeling van die gemenereg nie, maar sal dit ook die beskerming van trustbegunstigdes in die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg op dieselfde voet plaas as trustbegunstigdes in die ander jurisdiksies wat nagevors is. So 'n stap sal bydra tot regsekerheid en nie tot `n wesentlike omwenteling in die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg en -administrasie lei nie. SYNOPSIS Although the trust figure has been recognised in South Africa since the 19th century and can be characterised as a proper trust, uncertainty still prevails regarding the scope and acknowledgement of the rights of some trust beneficiaries. The main reason for this is the over-emphasis of the manner in which trusts are created, and the under-emphasis of the unique fiduciary nature of the trust once it has been established. In England, Scotland, Sri Lanka, Louisiana and Quebec where the proper trust figure is also applied, there is no possibility, contrary to the apparent legal position in South Africa, of trust beneficiaries without rights. In these jurisdictions the instrument used to create a trust plays a subordinate role and the rights of trust beneficiaries originate ex lege by virtue of the trust itself as a relationship of trust sui generis. Although South African trust law acknowledges the fiduciary nature of the relationship between trustee and trust beneficiary, the nature and extent of the rights that should emanate from this relationship are not adequately acknowledged by the courts. / Jurisprudence / L.L.D.

OPSOMMING Alhoewel die trustfiguur reeds sedert die 19e Eeu in Suid-Afrika erken word, en as `n suiwer trustfiguur tipeer kan word, is die hantering van die regte van sekere trustbegunstigdes steeds in onsekerheid gehul. Die hoofrede hiervoor is die oorbeklemtoning van die wyse waarop trusts tot stand kom en die onderbeklemtoning van die unieke fidusiêre aard van die trust na oprigting daarvan. In Engeland, Skotland, Sri Lanka, Louisiana en Quebec, waar die suiwer trustfiguur ook aanwending vind, bestaan, in teenstelling met die oënskynlike regsposisie in Suid-Afrika, die moontlikheid van trustbegunstigdes sonder regte glad nie. In hierdie jurisdiksies speel die oprigtingsinstrument `n ondergeskikte rol en ontstaan die regte van trustbegunstigdes ex lege uit hoofde van die trustfiguur as `n vertrouensverhouding sui generis. Alhoewel die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg die fidusiêre aard van die verhouding tussen trustee en trustbegunstigde erken, word die aard en omvang van die regte wat hieruit voort behoort te vloei nog nie voldoende deur die howe erken nie. Vertrouensverhoudinge waaruit regte en verpligtinge ex lege voortspruit, is bekend aan die gemenereg en word steeds hedendaags aangetref in verskeie ander vakdissiplines binne die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, waaronder die maatskappyereg. Die suiwer trustfiguur stel verder noodwendig `n vertrouensverhouding daar wat juis daarop gemik is om die regte van trustbegunstigdes te beskerm. Die standpunt word dus ingeneem dat alle trustbegunstigdes in Suid-Afrika derhalwe oor ex lege regte beskik. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat trustbegunstigdes se regte nie uitsluitlik voortvloei uit hoofde van die tersaaklike oprigtingshandeling nie, maar dat unieke regte ontstaan as gevolg van die onderliggende fidusiêre verhouding wat tot stand kom wanneer, maar ongeag hoe, die trust opgerig word. Kortom: Die fidusiêre verhouding behoort erken te word as eie, onafhanklike bron van trustbegunstigdes se moontlike regte teen die trustee in die geval van trustbreuk. Nie net is dit `n logiese stap in die ontwikkeling van die gemenereg nie, maar sal dit ook die beskerming van trustbegunstigdes in die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg op dieselfde voet plaas as trustbegunstigdes in die ander jurisdiksies wat nagevors is. So 'n stap sal bydra tot regsekerheid en nie tot `n wesentlike omwenteling in die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg en -administrasie lei nie. SYNOPSIS Although the trust figure has been recognised in South Africa since the 19th century and can be characterised as a proper trust, uncertainty still prevails regarding the scope and acknowledgement of the rights of some trust beneficiaries. The main reason for this is the over-emphasis of the manner in which trusts are created, and the under-emphasis of the unique fiduciary nature of the trust once it has been established. In England, Scotland, Sri Lanka, Louisiana and Quebec where the proper trust figure is also applied, there is no possibility, contrary to the apparent legal position in South Africa, of trust beneficiaries without rights. In these jurisdictions the instrument used to create a trust plays a subordinate role and the rights of trust beneficiaries originate ex lege by virtue of the trust itself as a relationship of trust sui generis. Although South African trust law acknowledges the fiduciary nature of the relationship between trustee and trust beneficiary, the nature and extent of the rights that should emanate from this relationship are not adequately acknowledged by the courts. / Jurisprudence / L.L.D.