Syndicated loans are a common debt financing format for large corporations in general. For those situated in Germany—with its bank-based financial system—such loans play a vital role. Given the multibillion volumes raised annually, the pricing of syndicated loans is economically significant, with its levels, structure, and determination having attracted the interest of researchers around the world. A critical review of the existing worldwide literature of syndicated loan pricing revealed notable gaps, including an almost complete absence of studies on the German corporate market. The overall research aim was to address this gap by exploring and analysing the “hidden drivers” of banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to German corporate borrowers, thereby developing an enriched understanding of the elements and determinants of pricing and its underlying processes and decisions. Adopting a pragmatist research paradigm, I chose a sequential mixed-methods approach, with a limited quantitative analysis preceding an extensive qualitative study. The first stage of the research was designed to evaluate the availability of reliable quantitative pricing data in the public domain—this being the main data source for the clear majority of extant studies. I found the availability and quality of pricing data for the German corporate market to be extremely limited, particularly in comparison to that available relating to the U.S. market. There was clearly much that remained unexplained; hence, primary research was required to illuminate syndicated loan pricing and the decision processes that contribute to it. The main element of the qualitative study was a series of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with a sample of bank lending professionals and key informants. The purpose of these interviews was to explore the complex realities of syndicated lending through the eyes and experiences of the people involved and to interpret the socially constructed phenomena surrounding the pricing of German corporate syndicated loans. The study succeeded in revealing and substantiating important and to date hidden phenomena concerning numerous dimensions of syndicated lending in general and pricing in particular. An explanation was developed for the relative opacity of the German corporate syndicated loan market. The study enabled significant enhancements to the understanding of the concept of pricing and its complex and interwoven elements. More broadly, a new and richer perspective was developed of syndicated lending as a behavioural phenomenon, involving a complex interplay of relationships and strategies, and involving individuals and departments within banks, between banks as members of the syndicate, and between lenders and borrowers. The insights gained informed the development of a comprehensive model of the pricing elements of syndicated lending and their determinants. This research is the first to conduct and produce an in-depth study of the internal workings of syndicated corporate lending in the German market and a study that does not rely on secondary data that are at best incomplete. It has resulted in many rich and original insights and a conceptualisation of syndicated lending that differs radically from the classical understanding of lender-borrower relationships as founded on theories of asymmetric information. The research presented here, therefore, makes significant contributions to the literature, in helping to close notable gaps in the banking and financial intermediation literature.

This dissertation contains three empirical studies that examine the effect of investor protection on three different aspects of corporate governance: mergers and acquisitions, US cross-listings, and convergence of information environment around the world.1 The first study investigates the relation between investor protection and the choice of acquisition form (partial versus full acquisition). I argue that if private benefits are a motivation for mergers and acquisitions, an acquirer is more likely to bid for a controlling fraction (but not a hundred percent) of a target firm in countries with weak investor protection because in these countries private benefits of control are an important asset. The empirical results support this argument: compared to full mergers, partial acquisitions are the preferred form of acquisition when target countries do not effectively protect minority investors. Partial acquisitions are also more common among foreign acquirers from countries with poor legal systems. Finally, I show that firm-level corporate governance of the target firm is negatively related to the likelihood of partial acquisition. The second study examines the effect of investor protection on domestic liquidity for cross-listed firms. If US cross-listing can improve a firm’s information environment because of more stringent disclosure requirements in the US, I expect the information improvement to be reflected in a reduction in domestic liquidity costs. The empirical results are consistent with this prediction: local bid-ask spreads and price impact (a proxy for the cost of adverse information) significantly decrease while local trading volume significantly increases one year after US cross-listing. In addition, the liquidity improvement is larger for cross-listed firms that are from poor investor protection countries, and that are listed on the NYSE. The results in the second study are consistent with the “bonding” argument by Coffee (2002). The third study tests Coffee’s (1999) prediction of a convergence in corporate governance around the world. Since information environment is a key factor of corporate governance, it is important to see if there is a convergence in information environment across countries over the past two decades. Using various common proxies for information environment, I show that the quality of information environment generally improves through time, but the improvement is larger for developed markets and countries with better institutional quality. In the third study, I also reproduce the main results in Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008). These studies report similar divergence in information environment for cross-listed firms post-US-listing, but fail to control for the quality of information environment in the domestic market. After we control for this market effect, we do not find support for their results: there is no improvement in information environment for cross-listed firms, and no difference in the change between developed and emerging countries. 1 The second and third empirical studies are co-authored work with my supervisor, Professor Henk Berkman. For consistency, I use the first person ‘I’ throughout the dissertation.

This dissertation contains three empirical studies that examine the effect of investor protection on three different aspects of corporate governance: mergers and acquisitions, US cross-listings, and convergence of information environment around the world.1 The first study investigates the relation between investor protection and the choice of acquisition form (partial versus full acquisition). I argue that if private benefits are a motivation for mergers and acquisitions, an acquirer is more likely to bid for a controlling fraction (but not a hundred percent) of a target firm in countries with weak investor protection because in these countries private benefits of control are an important asset. The empirical results support this argument: compared to full mergers, partial acquisitions are the preferred form of acquisition when target countries do not effectively protect minority investors. Partial acquisitions are also more common among foreign acquirers from countries with poor legal systems. Finally, I show that firm-level corporate governance of the target firm is negatively related to the likelihood of partial acquisition. The second study examines the effect of investor protection on domestic liquidity for cross-listed firms. If US cross-listing can improve a firm’s information environment because of more stringent disclosure requirements in the US, I expect the information improvement to be reflected in a reduction in domestic liquidity costs. The empirical results are consistent with this prediction: local bid-ask spreads and price impact (a proxy for the cost of adverse information) significantly decrease while local trading volume significantly increases one year after US cross-listing. In addition, the liquidity improvement is larger for cross-listed firms that are from poor investor protection countries, and that are listed on the NYSE. The results in the second study are consistent with the “bonding” argument by Coffee (2002). The third study tests Coffee’s (1999) prediction of a convergence in corporate governance around the world. Since information environment is a key factor of corporate governance, it is important to see if there is a convergence in information environment across countries over the past two decades. Using various common proxies for information environment, I show that the quality of information environment generally improves through time, but the improvement is larger for developed markets and countries with better institutional quality. In the third study, I also reproduce the main results in Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008). These studies report similar divergence in information environment for cross-listed firms post-US-listing, but fail to control for the quality of information environment in the domestic market. After we control for this market effect, we do not find support for their results: there is no improvement in information environment for cross-listed firms, and no difference in the change between developed and emerging countries. 1 The second and third empirical studies are co-authored work with my supervisor, Professor Henk Berkman. For consistency, I use the first person ‘I’ throughout the dissertation.

This dissertation contains three empirical studies that examine the effect of investor protection on three different aspects of corporate governance: mergers and acquisitions, US cross-listings, and convergence of information environment around the world.1 The first study investigates the relation between investor protection and the choice of acquisition form (partial versus full acquisition). I argue that if private benefits are a motivation for mergers and acquisitions, an acquirer is more likely to bid for a controlling fraction (but not a hundred percent) of a target firm in countries with weak investor protection because in these countries private benefits of control are an important asset. The empirical results support this argument: compared to full mergers, partial acquisitions are the preferred form of acquisition when target countries do not effectively protect minority investors. Partial acquisitions are also more common among foreign acquirers from countries with poor legal systems. Finally, I show that firm-level corporate governance of the target firm is negatively related to the likelihood of partial acquisition. The second study examines the effect of investor protection on domestic liquidity for cross-listed firms. If US cross-listing can improve a firm’s information environment because of more stringent disclosure requirements in the US, I expect the information improvement to be reflected in a reduction in domestic liquidity costs. The empirical results are consistent with this prediction: local bid-ask spreads and price impact (a proxy for the cost of adverse information) significantly decrease while local trading volume significantly increases one year after US cross-listing. In addition, the liquidity improvement is larger for cross-listed firms that are from poor investor protection countries, and that are listed on the NYSE. The results in the second study are consistent with the “bonding” argument by Coffee (2002). The third study tests Coffee’s (1999) prediction of a convergence in corporate governance around the world. Since information environment is a key factor of corporate governance, it is important to see if there is a convergence in information environment across countries over the past two decades. Using various common proxies for information environment, I show that the quality of information environment generally improves through time, but the improvement is larger for developed markets and countries with better institutional quality. In the third study, I also reproduce the main results in Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008). These studies report similar divergence in information environment for cross-listed firms post-US-listing, but fail to control for the quality of information environment in the domestic market. After we control for this market effect, we do not find support for their results: there is no improvement in information environment for cross-listed firms, and no difference in the change between developed and emerging countries. 1 The second and third empirical studies are co-authored work with my supervisor, Professor Henk Berkman. For consistency, I use the first person ‘I’ throughout the dissertation.

本文以2008年金融海嘯為分界點，由於在事前並沒有一個投資大師以及機構法人能夠精準的預測金融海嘯發生，海嘯發生之後幾乎使得市場上所有的投資人 都面臨虧損，不但金融權威一夕崩解，一向以報導「大師投資法」的媒體業也必須重新找尋新的出路，透過尋找神奇致富的素人取代失寵的名人與大師，報導其相關投資方法，來吸引一般投資大眾，以刺激其銷量。隨後，報章雜誌也相繼報導許多神奇致富故事，媒體一時之間變成「富翁製造機」，透過電視媒體加以延伸、渲染，閱聽大眾眼之所見、耳之所聞，都是唾手可得的賺錢妙方與密技，時下投資人紛紛起而效尤，期待自己能成為下一個大戶，投資市場上充滿了「樂透式」的投資氛圍。 本研究係作者本人長期的觀察與調查，發現很多名人或是素人，固然也有腳踏 實力，努力鑽研，創造財富的案例，也有不少案例在媒體的報導與引用上，因為採取「隱惡揚善」，甚至誇大賺錢、神奇致富的一面，對於賠錢部分卻是絕口不提，其次，大部分散戶投資人都希望能有捷徑或是透過學習、複製的方式，來進行投資理財，殊不知是用自己一知半解的想法進行投資，期待能於股市中發點小財，而且只看「結果」下的投資決策，會讓投資大眾產生錯覺，很容易失之偏頗。 所以，本研究的進行，期望達到下列目的： 1. 收集與整理相關媒體銷售的資料，了解目前散戶偏好的投資意見為何。 2. 針對受訪談的媒體從業人員所提供之意見進行歸納比較，進而探討名人與素人透過媒體管道所提供給散戶的投資建議，是否為一正確、可信之投資意見。 3. 最後，根據本研究之相關結論，並提出適當意見，做為媒體自律與散戶在投資理財上的建議。 / This study will investigate and analyze the changed role of the media industry as a 'rich making machine' since the financial crisis of 2008. The financial meltdown served as a turning point for the media since there were no investment gurus or corporate bodies that accurately had predicted the development. Virtually all investors in the market faced losses and many investment celebrities lost their credibility. Subsequently newspapers and magazines turned to rich and successful people to replace them and stimulating their sales by reporting miraculous rich stories. They are selling recipes how to make money to a willing audience, members of the investing public eager to become the next investment guru. Stimulated by this, the 'lottery' type of investment is in full swing on the market. Through long‐term observation and investigation we found that, first, many of the business celebrities actually based their success on a solid foundation, strove to study and then created wealth. Many of the media reports, however, tend to overly focus on the virtues and exaggerate the money making 'magic rich' side, while on the other hand neglecting or even covering up failures and bad deeds. Secondly, many investors are looking for a shortcut to create riches and try to copy others supposedly successful investment models without real understanding of market mechanisms and easily become misled by biased media reporting. This study is expected to achieve the following purposes: (1) Collect and collate information related to media sales, retail preferences in order to understand the preferences of all investors. (2) Conduct interviews with media practitioners, collect their opinions, summarize and compare them. Then discuss the advise given by investment celebrities given through the media pipeline and check if this advise is correct or credible. (3) Based on the findings of this study propose a self‐regulating body for the media and give recommendations for potential investors.

This dissertation contains three empirical studies that examine the effect of investor protection on three different aspects of corporate governance: mergers and acquisitions, US cross-listings, and convergence of information environment around the world.1 The first study investigates the relation between investor protection and the choice of acquisition form (partial versus full acquisition). I argue that if private benefits are a motivation for mergers and acquisitions, an acquirer is more likely to bid for a controlling fraction (but not a hundred percent) of a target firm in countries with weak investor protection because in these countries private benefits of control are an important asset. The empirical results support this argument: compared to full mergers, partial acquisitions are the preferred form of acquisition when target countries do not effectively protect minority investors. Partial acquisitions are also more common among foreign acquirers from countries with poor legal systems. Finally, I show that firm-level corporate governance of the target firm is negatively related to the likelihood of partial acquisition. The second study examines the effect of investor protection on domestic liquidity for cross-listed firms. If US cross-listing can improve a firm’s information environment because of more stringent disclosure requirements in the US, I expect the information improvement to be reflected in a reduction in domestic liquidity costs. The empirical results are consistent with this prediction: local bid-ask spreads and price impact (a proxy for the cost of adverse information) significantly decrease while local trading volume significantly increases one year after US cross-listing. In addition, the liquidity improvement is larger for cross-listed firms that are from poor investor protection countries, and that are listed on the NYSE. The results in the second study are consistent with the “bonding” argument by Coffee (2002). The third study tests Coffee’s (1999) prediction of a convergence in corporate governance around the world. Since information environment is a key factor of corporate governance, it is important to see if there is a convergence in information environment across countries over the past two decades. Using various common proxies for information environment, I show that the quality of information environment generally improves through time, but the improvement is larger for developed markets and countries with better institutional quality. In the third study, I also reproduce the main results in Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008). These studies report similar divergence in information environment for cross-listed firms post-US-listing, but fail to control for the quality of information environment in the domestic market. After we control for this market effect, we do not find support for their results: there is no improvement in information environment for cross-listed firms, and no difference in the change between developed and emerging countries. 1 The second and third empirical studies are co-authored work with my supervisor, Professor Henk Berkman. For consistency, I use the first person ‘I’ throughout the dissertation.

This dissertation investigates the information considerations of volatility, pricediscovery and the relationship change in volume and volatility resulting from index derivatives transactions on financial markets in Australia. The impact of information on volatility was investigated in the essay one, as volatility is a key factor for accurately pricing derivative securities. I assessed the forecast accuracy, unbiasedness and information content of volatility forecasts, based on implied volatility and conditional volatility models for the S&P/ASX 200 Index Options market in Australia. The conditional volatility models produce the most accurate forecasts and are robust when forecasting into short time horizons. Essay two, investigates the information content of the index and option markets in the price-discovery process. Based on the above volatility results, the long-run equilibrium relationship between the share price index and the implied price of the share-price-index option was investigated. Causality was determined to show which market leads the other. Information share measures were used to gauge the contribution of the share price index and index option markets to the price-discovery process. Unambiguous evidence shows the index market leads the options market and the former contributes more to price-discovery than the latter. In essay three, I investigate the dynamic relationship between the future price volatility of the S&P/ASX 200 Index and the trading volume of the S&P/ASX 200 Index Options to explore the informational role of option volume in predicting price volatility. I found the contemporaneous call options volume have a significant strong positive feedback effect on the implied volatility, but the contemporaneous feedback effect of volume on the TARCH volatility is insignificant. The contemporaneous feedback effects from the implied volatility and the TARCH volatility to the call options volume are positive, significant and strong.

This thesis examines the relationship between equity valuation and four value drivers: revenue growth, volatility, profit margin and competitive advantage. It is motivated by evidence that the predominant valuation techniques of equity analysts are not associated with improved portfolio performance. Prior research suggests that equity analysts devote considerable resources into forecasting near-term earnings, but derive target prices from those earnings in an almost arbitrary fashion. In contrast, the valuation techniques in the commercial world are increasing in sophistication. Around 30 percent of large corporations in the United States and Australia use real options analysis for project evaluation, according to recent surveys. Thus, the research question is whether sophisticated equity valuation, based on rigorous economic assumptions, is useful for investment decision-making.

This dissertation contains three empirical studies that examine the effect of investor protection on three different aspects of corporate governance: mergers and acquisitions, US cross-listings, and convergence of information environment around the world.1 The first study investigates the relation between investor protection and the choice of acquisition form (partial versus full acquisition). I argue that if private benefits are a motivation for mergers and acquisitions, an acquirer is more likely to bid for a controlling fraction (but not a hundred percent) of a target firm in countries with weak investor protection because in these countries private benefits of control are an important asset. The empirical results support this argument: compared to full mergers, partial acquisitions are the preferred form of acquisition when target countries do not effectively protect minority investors. Partial acquisitions are also more common among foreign acquirers from countries with poor legal systems. Finally, I show that firm-level corporate governance of the target firm is negatively related to the likelihood of partial acquisition. The second study examines the effect of investor protection on domestic liquidity for cross-listed firms. If US cross-listing can improve a firm’s information environment because of more stringent disclosure requirements in the US, I expect the information improvement to be reflected in a reduction in domestic liquidity costs. The empirical results are consistent with this prediction: local bid-ask spreads and price impact (a proxy for the cost of adverse information) significantly decrease while local trading volume significantly increases one year after US cross-listing. In addition, the liquidity improvement is larger for cross-listed firms that are from poor investor protection countries, and that are listed on the NYSE. The results in the second study are consistent with the “bonding” argument by Coffee (2002). The third study tests Coffee’s (1999) prediction of a convergence in corporate governance around the world. Since information environment is a key factor of corporate governance, it is important to see if there is a convergence in information environment across countries over the past two decades. Using various common proxies for information environment, I show that the quality of information environment generally improves through time, but the improvement is larger for developed markets and countries with better institutional quality. In the third study, I also reproduce the main results in Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008). These studies report similar divergence in information environment for cross-listed firms post-US-listing, but fail to control for the quality of information environment in the domestic market. After we control for this market effect, we do not find support for their results: there is no improvement in information environment for cross-listed firms, and no difference in the change between developed and emerging countries. 1 The second and third empirical studies are co-authored work with my supervisor, Professor Henk Berkman. For consistency, I use the first person ‘I’ throughout the dissertation.

This dissertation contains three empirical studies that examine the effect of investor protection on three different aspects of corporate governance: mergers and acquisitions, US cross-listings, and convergence of information environment around the world.1 The first study investigates the relation between investor protection and the choice of acquisition form (partial versus full acquisition). I argue that if private benefits are a motivation for mergers and acquisitions, an acquirer is more likely to bid for a controlling fraction (but not a hundred percent) of a target firm in countries with weak investor protection because in these countries private benefits of control are an important asset. The empirical results support this argument: compared to full mergers, partial acquisitions are the preferred form of acquisition when target countries do not effectively protect minority investors. Partial acquisitions are also more common among foreign acquirers from countries with poor legal systems. Finally, I show that firm-level corporate governance of the target firm is negatively related to the likelihood of partial acquisition. The second study examines the effect of investor protection on domestic liquidity for cross-listed firms. If US cross-listing can improve a firm’s information environment because of more stringent disclosure requirements in the US, I expect the information improvement to be reflected in a reduction in domestic liquidity costs. The empirical results are consistent with this prediction: local bid-ask spreads and price impact (a proxy for the cost of adverse information) significantly decrease while local trading volume significantly increases one year after US cross-listing. In addition, the liquidity improvement is larger for cross-listed firms that are from poor investor protection countries, and that are listed on the NYSE. The results in the second study are consistent with the “bonding” argument by Coffee (2002). The third study tests Coffee’s (1999) prediction of a convergence in corporate governance around the world. Since information environment is a key factor of corporate governance, it is important to see if there is a convergence in information environment across countries over the past two decades. Using various common proxies for information environment, I show that the quality of information environment generally improves through time, but the improvement is larger for developed markets and countries with better institutional quality. In the third study, I also reproduce the main results in Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008). These studies report similar divergence in information environment for cross-listed firms post-US-listing, but fail to control for the quality of information environment in the domestic market. After we control for this market effect, we do not find support for their results: there is no improvement in information environment for cross-listed firms, and no difference in the change between developed and emerging countries. 1 The second and third empirical studies are co-authored work with my supervisor, Professor Henk Berkman. For consistency, I use the first person ‘I’ throughout the dissertation.