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This study investigates the theology of wealth, with reference to the parables of Jesus, in dialogue with recent Irish economic history. Poverty is commonly seen as a societal problem, but in the teaching of Jesus, especially in his parables, the status of the wealthy is called into question. This thesis explores what it means to be followers of Jesus in societies where historically high levels of wealth and comfort are widespread. It begins by considering that societal context, naming neoliberalism as the complex of economic, political, and cultural factors that combine to generate wealth. The parables of Jesus are introduced as a collection of narratives which puncture the philosophical assumptions at work in neoliberalism. Reading them after the twentieth century Swiss theologian Karl Barth, the parables are found to be apocalyptic interruptions which reorientate the reader towards the reign of God. With these two strands – neoliberalism and the parables – in play, the thesis reconsiders Ireland's recent economic history. It is argued that the ethical significance of the “Celtic Tiger” boom and the subsequent 2008 crash is best accessed not via the language of economics but through narratives. The re-telling of the events of the crash and its aftermath through parables exposes how markets are embedded in thick cultural, historical, and political settings and how simple and settled statistical accounts can miss much of ethical significance. The decisive chapter takes up the constructive task. Building on this re-described account of a wealthy society, it proposes that the appropriate response for Christians to the problem of wealth is to turn to worship as a reparative therapy that forms congregations in practices and ways-of-seeing that run counter to the normative perceptions of neoliberalism. This is achieved by means of a robust engagement with the work of the contemporary moral theologian, William Cavanaugh. A final chapter underlines the original contribution of the project, sketches some future areas of research, and proposes that lament is the initial stance that results from this study.

The market consensus during the financial crisis was that financial sector CEOs were engaged in excessive risk taking induced by compensation practices. Thus, the primary focus of this paper is to determine whether empirical evidence supports this assertion. As such, I examine bank CEO compensation, bank risks, and the relation between bank CEO risk taking incentives and bank risks and the effect of the 2007/9 financial crisis on this relation. I find that banks on average reduced their exposure to credit, capital, total, and unsystematic risks, and increased their exposure to liquidity, portfolio, off-balance sheet and (accounting) foreign exchange risks, from 2003 to 2006. These trends largely reversed during 2007 to 2009. During the 2007/9 financial crisis, banks experienced significant structural shifts in all risk indicators (except for capital and foreign exchange risks) which increased significantly consequent on the economic downturn. I also find that banks remained highly sensitive to changes in short- and long-term interest rates and foreign exchanges rates throughout the period. My findings also support a bank size effect. I observe consistent real growth in CEO base salary annually, from 2003 to 2009, which suggests that there is resilience in this form of compensation to the financial crisis. However, only small banks paid significantly higher base salary during the financial crisis to offset the similar decline in annual bonus payments caused by deteriorating financial and market performances during that time. I find that CEO portfolio option values were more responsive to changes in total risk during the pre-financial crisis period (2003 to 2006) than during the financial crisis (2007 to 2009). Also, I find evidence of banks size effects in compensation components, compensation structure and compensation sensitivity. My results are robust to other sample formations and statistical indicators. After adjusting for the simultaneity bias between bank CEOs' risk taking incentives (measured by the sensitivity of CEO option portfolio and pay for performance sensitivity) and bank risks (using accounting and market based measures), my findings reveal significant shifts in the relation between compensation and bank risks during the financial crisis. Specifically, during the financial crisis, CEOs with more sensitive pay for performance were related to banks with greater capital risk, and banks with higher portfolio risk had CEOs with more sensitive pay for performance. Also, banks with greater total and unsystematic risks during the financial crisis had CEOs with less risk taking incentives. Other indicators during the financial crisis show that less stable banks had CEOs with less risk taking incentives, while banks with greater asset return risk had CEOs with less sensitive option portfolios. Overall, these results do not support the risk inducing incentives of bank CEO compensation especially during the financial crisis.

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no / Purpose – Bank securitisation is deemed to have been a major contributing factor to the 2007/2008 financial crises via fuelling credit growth accompanied by lower banks’ credit standards. Yet, prior to the crisis a common view was that securitisation activity makes the financial system more stable as risk was more easily diversified, managed and allocated economy-wide. The purpose of this paper is to review the extant literature to explore the so far generated knowledge on the impact of securitisation on banking risks. In particular, the authors examine the theoretical arguments and empirical studies on securitisation and banking risks before and after the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. Design/methodology/approach – Review and discussion of the literature. Findings – Theoretical literature univocally accentuate the undesirable consequences of securitisation, which may promote retention of riskier loans, undermine banks’ screening and monitoring incentives and enhance banks’ risk appetite. However, empirical evidence does not uniformly support the theoretical conclusions. If banks are securitisation active they lend more to risky borrowers, have less diversified portfolios and hold less capital, retain riskier loans and are aggressive in loan pricing. Others argue that securitisation reduces banks insolvency risk, increases profitability, provides liquidity and leads to greater supply of loans. Mortgage securitisation is an area where there is consistent evidence of bank risk taking via securitisation. Originality/value – The paper identifies open issues for future research.

This paper applies a cross-sectional regression analysis of 83 countries over the period 2009-11 in order to examine the role played by the exchange-rate regime in explaining how countries fared in terms of economic growth recovery following the recent financial crisis. After controlling for income categorization, regime classification, using alternative regime definitions, and accounting for various other determinants, the paper finds a significant relationship between the regime choice and the recovery performance, where those countries with more flexible arrangements fared better. These results were conditional on the regime classification scheme and the income level, implying an asymmetric effect of the regime during the recovery period between high and low income countries. The paper also finds that proxies for initial conditions as well as trade and financial channels were highly significant determinants of the growth performance during the recovery period.

This dissertation analyzes key features of credit derivatives market, basic risks of the products and trends the market has experienced for several years since its inception, discusses regulatory issues of the market with regard to the Basel II treatment and key reasons for investors using credit derivatives. Dissertation also examines whether and how credit derivatives affected current financial turmoil, analyzes credit derivatives losses of selected institutions on the financial markets and compares them with total losses of these institutions. The main result of the work is that there was no substantial effect of the credit derivatives market on the current financial crisis. Dissertation also examines whether there is any connection between U.S. banks credit derivatives trades and their capital adequacy ratio. According to the analysis, there is no evidence for credit derivatives to essentially affect capital adequacy ratio of U.S. banks. A potential explanation for the higher values of U.S. banks' capital adequacy ratio may be that there are sophisticated risk management strategies banks have been implicating for many years.

Purpose – The purpose of this research project is to explore the research question – how does the pursuit of agenda of regulatory reforms, post the crisis, influence governance arrangements at banks and assist them in maintaining resilience during subsequent episodes of crises?Research methodology – The project adopts a comparative case study approach involving a mixture of review of secondary resources and fieldwork interviews across East Asian nations. Findings – The project applied the Minskian Financial Instability Hypothesis to the 1997 East Asian crisis. It explored the macro-economic and policy environment during 1990s for highlighting institutional failures at the heart of the crisis. The interview findings offered contextual setting and diverse perspectives for regulatory reforms aimed at improving bank governance, post the crisis. The experience of case study banks outlined the impact of regulatory reforms on banking business models, post the crisis. The role of post-1997-crisis regulatory reforms in bringing about East Asian resilience, during the 2007 crisis, is thus analysed in the research project. Practical implications – The research project provides emerging economy perspective to regulatory reforms and offers policy-level recommendations for banks, regulatory authorities, corporate borrowers, and statutory auditors in maintaining governance standards conductive to financial stability in the long run. Originality – The project claims originality of application, interpretation and evaluation (which are considered as building blocks for “academic contribution”) of an important academic theory in the context of financial crises – Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. It integrates the aspects of financial instability, regulatory reforms and bank governance in the context of East Asian financial crisis by introducing the concept of “economic responsibilities” of market participants from emerging economies.