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Bootstrapping kan användas som komplement eller substitut till extern finansiering som metoder för resursanskaffning till lägsta möjliga kostnad. Samtliga respondenter föredrog internt genererade medel framför banklån. Ökning av eget kapital med hjälp av externa finansiärer visade sig vara det minst önskvärda alternativet för kapitalanskaffning. Studien visade att ägartillförda medel och nyttjande av släkt och vänner var de vanligast förekommande metoderna för bootstrapping i de tillfrågade företagen. Av de tillfrågade företagen var de som ansåg sig existera på en riskfylld marknad mer benägna att använda sig av bootstrappingmetoder. / Bootstrapping can be used as an addition or a substitute for external financing as methods for acquisition of resources at lowest possible cost. All of the respondents preferred internally generated finances to bank loans. Financing by issuing equity was the least desirable method. The study showed that owner’s capital and usage of friends and family as cheap labor are the most commonly occurring methods of bootstrapping in the surveyed corporations. Among the surveyed corporations, those operating on unpredictable markets are more likely to use bootstrapping methods.

According to the 2010 Small and Medium Enterprise White Book published by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the proportion of the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Taiwan is 97.9%, which indicates that the SMEs is the foundation of Taiwan¡¦s economic development. However, the financing activity of the SMEs is limited owing to the lack of financing channels and the defects of finance, operation, and structure design. Hence, through the depth interviews, the paper investigates how the SMEs could make use of the internal and external resources to negotiate with the banks when applying for the credit line. The research indicates that the SMEs should recognize the useful resources from the producing and selling chains and provide them to the banks as the sub-gages. This would make it easier for the banks to control the repayment sources or secure their rights. On the other hand, the SMEs will acquire the appropriate credit line solutions, expand the business scale and reach the goal of sustainable management.

Since Kyoto Protocol took effect on Feb.16, 2005, Greenhouse gas emission reduction and Energy tax levy become a hot topic immediately. In addition, an action plan has been raised at the second National Energy Conference in 2005, for promoting ESCOs (Energy Service Companies) to improve energy efficiency and achieve energy conservation by conducting Energy Saving Performance Contract(ESPC). Hopefully these results will attain substantial reduction of carbon dioxide emission goals. International ESCO development model involves inter-industry integration, it faces many barriers¡Asuch as financing, insurance, measurement and verification, risk guarantee, tax exemption, small-scale market---etc. The financing barriers are the most importment problem in the development of ESCOs. In the study, Yin case studies are used to collect and analyze national barrier factors in financing. feasible financing mechanisms were explored in this study for ESCO , by participating in TAESCO¡¦s activities and interviewing with key persons in energy service companies, financial institutions and ESCO industry experts. The achievements of this study are¡G(1)ESCO industry prospects is optimistic conservative.(2)The business models have different opinions for localized development.(3)The key barrier factors are consistent with the types of barriers reported in the literatures on ESCO industry in other countries.(4)The industry has a few successful energy saving projects only, and then general business loans and own funds are the main way in ESCO financing.(5)The biggest gap of the financing with financial institutions is that banks do not have experience in ESCO industry.(6)There are three feasible financing mechanisms, which can be promoted on national ESCO industry. Finally, implementation of the results proposed three appropriate localization financing mechanisms(ESCO Credit Guarantee, Firefly Project Fund, Development Fund or Project Best Lending) will be worthy to explore empirically in the future.

In East Asian economies, about 2/3 listed firms are controlled by family shareholders. In the US and West European, the proportions of family firms are about 33% and 44%, respectively. Thus, family-controlled listed firms are common in almost every nation. In Taiwan, nearly 70% of listed firms are family-controlled. Many previous studies have pointed out that family firms are playing an important role in global economic activities. The equity structures and management ideas of family firms are different from those of common firms. For instance, family members possess decisive equities and will usually take positions of directors or top managers. They may usually view their firms as an asset inherited from forefathers, and they should pass it on to their next generations. The impact of these differences on firm¡¦s financial decisions has become a main research focus in recent years. Previous studies of family firms mainly placed the focus on the impact of family factors on corporate performance, but this study would attempt to investigate the impact of family factors on debt decisions from the perspectives of debt-financing decision and cost of debt-financing. First of all, this study probed into whether family and non-family firms have differences debt-financing decisions. Empirical findings indicated that family firms have a lower debt ratio and a 0.2813% lower cost of debt than non-family firms. A further comparison on the factors of debt decisions showed that the difference in the impact of family and non-family firms on debt levels lies in mainly three aspects, including depreciation tax shield, operational risk, and firm size. In the aspect of cost of debt-financing, family firms are relatively more sensitive to firm size, debt ratio, and credit risk. Previous studies that applied the agent theory to investigate debt decisions focused more on the problems of debt agency problem and seldom used the inter-relationship between equity agency problem and debt agency problem to discuss the impact of equity agency problem on debt decisions. The problems of equity agency of family firms encompass the traditional equity agency between the manager and shareholders and core equity agency between controlling shareholders and external shareholders. Besides, family ownership and management can reduce the problems of traditional equity agency, and controlling shareholders using the pyramid structure of equities and cross-holding to enhance control right will increase the problems of core equity agency. Thus, based on the problems of equity agency problem, the family factors can be divided into family ownership, enhancement of control, and family management to investigate the respective impact on debt-financing decisions. In the aspect of debt-financing, it was empirically discovered that higher family ownership would lead to a closer relationship between firm value and the wealth of family shareholders. Debt financing would be avoided to reduce financial risks and maintain the wealth of family shareholders. A positive correlation existed between debt ratio and the difference between family control and family ownership, implying when the difference between family control and family ownership is higher, the problems of core equity agency between controlling shareholders and small shareholders will be more serious, and the company will be inclined to adopt debt-financing to acquire long-term capitals. The estimate coefficient of the effect of family management on debt ratio is not significance. Thus, whether the CEO is taken by a family member will not affect debt-financing decisions. In the analysis of control level, when the control level is low, firms are inclined to adopt debt-financing decisions to reduce the effect of equity dilution. On the contrary, when the control level is high, in order to avoid the loss of control benefit caused by debt monitoring, firms will be inclined to avoid debts. As a result, control and debt ratio are in an inverted U-shaped relationship. In addition, for family firms, the maintenance of control and risk control are important factors affecting their debt-financing decision. In the aspect of cost of debt, family ownership can reduce the cost of debt-financing. If the non-linear relationship of family ownership is considered, the impact of family ownership on the cost of debt-financing is non-linear and in an inverted U shape. The maximum value is 8.64%. When the family ownership exceeds 17.9%, the effect of family ownership on the cost of debt financing is negative. As the minimum family ownership was defined as 10% in this study, and the average family ownership among the samples was 21%, it could be inferred that higher family ownership would lead to a lower cost of debt-financing. In a comparison with Anderson et al. (2003), it was discovered that the average family ownership has negative influence on the cost of debt, but for the family firms in the US, higher family ownership would reduce its negative influence on cost of debt, and for domestic family firms, higher family ownership would increase its negative influence on the cost of debt. The Control-enhancing mechanisms will increase core equity problem and cost of debt, and the relationship between control enhancement and cost of debt are not in a non-linear relationship. Creditors conceive that their mortgage will be more secured if family members take the position of CEO. Thus, family CEO can reduce the cost of debt-financing.

This paper examines the timing of initial public offerings and private placements by venture-backed companies. Using a sample of 187 venture-backed IPOs and private placements in a variety of industries between 1991 and 2000 over TSEC and OTC, we find that these companies go public when equity valuationsare high and employ private placements when values are lower. Seasoned venture capital appears to take firms public when industrial equity valuations are higher than their less experienced counterparts. The results are robust to differential specifications of control variables.

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Abstract¡G From previous studies we found that growth opportunity is an important factor help explaining the cross-sectional differences of firms¡¦ dividend and financing policies. However, growth opportunities are unobservable and not measurable, scholars used different proxies to catch the idea. Prior empirical studies used market-to book, earning-price ratio, Tobin¡¦s Q, R&D intensity, capital expenditure (deflated by book value of assets), PPE, previous sales growth as proxies for growth opportunities, but had inconsistent results. The purposes of this thesis are: first, to find out the relationship between growth opportunities and realized growth, and to determine which proxy is most suitable; second, to find the empirical evidences of the relation between growth opportunities and financing policies, growth opportunities and dividend policies support contract theories, tax-based theories or signaling theories; and finally, to find out if firm¡¦s growth opportunities are affected by its financing and dividend policies. We examine all nonfinancial firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1991 to2000. We use the correlation and regression to determine the relation between growth opportunities and realized growth, then distinguish total debt ratio, short-term debt ratio, long-term debt ratio from financing policies, and dividend payout ratio, cash-dividend yield, stock dividend yield, and dividend yield from dividend policies. We use different growth opportunity proxy to separate whole sample into two subsamples, and growth as a dummy variable. We use regression to find the relation between growth and financing policies, dividend policies. Finally, we use simultaneous equation to determine the relationship among growth opportunities, financing policies and dividend policies to see if they are interdependent. Our empirical result shows that growth opportunities and realized growth have positive relations. But growth opportunities are not positively correlated with realized investment growth. Price-based proxies are often overestimate future equity market value growth. Growth firms have higher debt ratios and long-term debt ratios. The result supports contracting theory and progressive tax rate theory. Growth firms have higher short-term debt ratios, too. We can¡¦t find the significant relation between growth opportunities and dividend pay¡Vout ratios. Growth firms have lower cash dividend yield, and the result supports cash-flow constraint and contracting theories. There is no clear relation between stock dividend yield and growth opportunities. Through simultaneous equation, over financing and too much cash-dividend restrict firms¡¦ growth opportunities.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2004. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 117 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 112-117).

Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on Feb 16, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Dissertation advisor: Dr. Ronald Ratti. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.